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Abstract 
The study of Islamic finance would not be complete without a thorough understanding of the 
core Islamic injunction on ribā an-nasi’ah that underlies current financial exchanges.  
However, several studies purport Muslim economic woes to be linked to the rigidities of this 
injunction.  By employing a capital structure model in a rational expectations setting, we 
justify this religious injunction is in fact welfare-enhancing. This is because it averts: (i) 
economically inefficient financing structures; (ii) non-sustainable long-run equilibria 
stemming from the expropriation of wealth; (iii) fragile financial systems; and (iv) financial 
exclusion.  We then present in this study a perspective of a quasi-equity financing tool to 
calibrate the Islamic financial system.  Lastly, we attribute Muslim economic 
underdevelopment to weak-form property rights and lack of Islamic rulings (ijtihad) in the 
production of new financial instruments, institutions and markets. 
The ensuing studies in this collection of Islamic finance essays draws from the above 
foundational research.  Specifically, our second study contrasts an interest-free payday loan 
facility with interest-based schemes of mainstream credit and current payday loans.  An 
examination of alternative form of credit facility is timely as inefficiencies in mainstream 
credit markets have pushed selected households to frequent high cost payday loans for their 
liquidity needs.  Ironically, despite the prohibitive cost there is still persistent demand for the 
product.  This paper rides on the public policy objective of expanding affordable credit to 
rationed households.  Here, we expound a simple model that integrates inexpensive interest-
free liquidity facility within an endogenous leverage circuit.  This builds on the technology of 
Rotating and Savings Credit Association/ Accumulating Savings and Credit Association/ 
mutual/ financial cooperative and cultural beliefs indoctrinated in Islam.  Our results indicate 
the potential economic efficiency of this interest-free circuit in contrast to the competing 
interest-bearing schemes of payday lenders and mainstream financiers.  A version of this 
essay co-authored with M.S. Ebrahim and A. Jaafar has been accepted in the forthcoming 
Journal of Economic Organization and Behaviour. 
The unravelling of the recent crisis underscores the pertinence of proper loan pricing that 
strips away the put option to default, particularly where there is extensive churning of the 
collateral in the financial system.  This survey paper, the third in our collection of essays, 
explores this issue from an agency theoretic perspective of trading financial claims between 
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risk-averse lender and borrower, in rational expectations and symmetric information setting. 
Constructing on lender (financial intermediary) asset transformation and public depositor 
custodial functions, we intuitively deduce the economic efficiency of pragmatically default-
free solution over default-prone one.  By enforcing proper structuring of the former, it averts 
financial fragility and costly bailouts.  Furthermore, it endows depositors with similar 
security of deposit insurance scheme without the associate moral hazard issues.  Finally, we 
detail design of this pragmatically default-free structure that reduces in-moneyness of the put 
option to default. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1. Motivation of study 
The Muslim world till the tenth century was a hallmark of advanced economy 
surpassing that of Western Europe (Kuran, 2004; Waywell, 2006).  However, a snapshot of 
its present economic state shows otherwise.  Despite accounting for nearly 22% of total world 
population, Muslim countries constitute only 6% of the world’s Gross National Income (Pew 
Research Centre, 2009; World Bank, 2010).  Based on the United Nations Human 
Development Index for 2010, 22 of the 56 Muslim countries received low scores, whilst only 
four were in the very high categories.  Of the 14 Muslim countries included in the Financial 
Development Index 2010, five remained in the lowest quartile with marked deterioration 
from the preceding year’s ranking (Bilodeau and Harrry, 2010).   
What has instigated this apparent economic backwardness?  One aspect of these studies 
proxies on the economics of religion and religious establishment, a field mooted by the 
seminal work of Weber (1930).  Religious values set the ‘moral base’ that is intrinsic to 
efficient and sustainable economic growth (Wilbur and Jameson, 1980).  Here, religion 
composing beliefs and values that transcends generations’ is treated as endogenous to 
economic development (Iannaccone, 1998; Acemoglu et al., 2005; Noland, 2005; Guiso et 
al., 2006).  Specifically with regards to the present Muslim state, questions arise: Is Islam, the 
religion of the land, and its religious establishment inimical to economic growth?  Result of 
studies under this banner remains inconclusive.   
Using the World Values Survey dataset to discern religious affinities and degree of 
religiosity with social attitudes conducive to economic growth, Guiso et al. (2003) observe 
that Islam is antithetical to financial development and economic growth.  They find for 
example, in states where Islam is dominant Muslims favour less private ownership and 
competition, which are fundamental market forces.  Kuran (2005, 2009), in his understanding 
of the economic trajectory of the Muslim and Western civilisation, points to Islam’s 
continued prohibition of interest in restraining financial and commercial innovation, which 
sets the path to present Muslim countries economic degradation.  Kuran (2009, p.595) 
rationalises, “In regions under Islamic law, and thus subject to a formal [interest] ban, 
financial development differed from the paths taken in places with liberalized financial 
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attitudes.  By the middle of the second millennium western Europe was well on its way to a 
narrow interpretation of the Biblical prohibition of usury.  Among Muslims the dominant 
view remained that all forms of interest are sinful.  If the direct effects of this divergence were 
negligible, the indirect effect had cascading implications for relative economic performance”.  
Archaic forms of financial transactions, accounting practices and organisational 
backwardness are evidentiary to this religious rigidity.   
He contends that Islam essentially prohibits ribā, the doubling of debt for every delay 
in settlement.  Thus, the unanimous juridical treatment that construes interest in financial 
transactions as ribā begs questions.  Unlike in the Muslim world, “the separation of church 
and state early in the second millennium enabled European entrepreneurs to develop 
institutions within an essentially secular space, and generally without worrying about 
clerical reactions” (Kuran, 2008, p.43-44).  As with Kuran (2005, 2009), Rubin (2011) 
analyses the economic impact of this ecclesial doctrine between Muslim and Christian 
(Western) societies.  From a game theory perspective, he argues the prohibition of interest is 
economically restraining, and its continued persistency in Muslim states has led to this 
divergent economic path.   
According to Kuran (2005), the over extension of the juridical decision proclaiming 
interest in financial transactions as ribā effectively delimits even innocuous interest-based 
loans.  To comply with the letter of the Shari’ah (Islamic law) many resorted to ‘hilah’ (legal 
stratagem that abides in form rather than substance of the law) in their financing design that 
effectively mimics the economic outcome of its mainstream counterpart (see El-Gamal, 
2009).  This inherent contradiction has precipitated critiques to question how ‘Islamic’ is 
Islamic banking?  (see Khan, 2010), as this broad-based juridical interpretation is seen 
inimical to Muslim states’ economic efficiency (Kuran, 2005, 2009; El-Gamal, 2009; Rubin, 
2011).  Furthermore, the application of equity-based contracts such as mudarabah heavily 
promoted by Islamic economists (see Siddiqi, 1983; Chapra, 2006) as solution to interest-
based contracts seem distant even after fifty years of the establishment of the first Islamic 
bank in 1960s.       
Contrary to the above, results of several studies such as Ragab (1980), Noland (2005), 
Chapra (2008) and Grosjean (2011) point to other contributory factors permeating the poverty 
trap of Muslim states.  To Ragab (1980) degeneration of the Muslim world became visible 
during the Ottoman ruling, particularly in the eighteenth century when its indigenous 
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institutions failed to develop with times.  In response, the political elites built a secular state 
fashioning the institutions of the West with mixed effects on economic participation by the 
people within the state.  It is the lack of dynamism in ijtihad (juridical interpretation and 
deduction of Islamic sources) that has led to the stagnancy in the development of the Shari’ah 
and this is worsened by the political elites’ foreign interest.  Similarly, Noland (2005) in his 
cross-country and within-country panel data studies finds no affirmative evidence that Islam 
is a drag to economic growth.   
In Chapra’s (2008) case it is rather the political elites’ failure to observe property rights 
coupled with the supporting decline in factors critical to development (i.e., education, 
research and development).  To maintain their political legitimacy, dissenting jurists were 
prosecuted whilst others retreated to the confines of the madrasah (religious schools).  
Despondent jurists began to lose touch with the changing economic and legal environment 
and as such the knowledge related to Islamic jurisprudence failed to expand with the passage 
of time.  The study by Grosjean (2011) reverberates earlier findings on weaknesses of 
institutions, “it does not seem that what constituted an obstacle to the development of formal 
finance is Islam, as a religion, but rather the Islamic institutions implemented by the Ottoman 
Empire” (p.13). 
2. Rationale and objectives  
With the above studies and several others (see also El-Gamal, 2009; Khan, 2010), each 
research centres on historical institutions and political elites legacies on the financial-
economic construct of the Muslim world without venturing on understanding the economic 
rationale of this divine revelation.  Unlike other Abrahamic faiths, religious tenet approbating 
the application of ribā remains the cornerstone of Islam even in commutative transactions.  
This is derived from the revealed sources (Qur’ān – the Muslim Holy Book and Sunnah – the 
Tradition of Prophet Muhammad PBUH) and consensus of Muslim jurists.  Except for certain 
specific rulings, the Qur’ān and Sunnah mostly contain general guidance particularly with 
regards to social matters.  It is here that the field of jurisprudence plays a critical role in 
ensuring the embodiment of the Shari’ah, such as the ribā prohibition. 
Jurists hold the ribā injunction is of two forms.  Ribā an-nasi’ah (also known as the 
evident ribā) draws from the Qur’ānic verses that renounce the oppressive deferred credit 
practices of pre-Islamic Arabia of doubling the debt for every delay in settlement (verses 
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2:275, 2:278-279, 2:281, 3:130-132, 4:161, 30:39), rather lenders are encouraged to grant 
respite to the borrower (verse 2:280).  Furthermore in the revealed texts, ribā is directly 
contrasted with charity (verse 2:276-277, 30:39).  The second form, ribā al-fadl (also known 
as the hidden ribā) derives its legal legitimacy from the Sunnah in relation to spot (barter) 
exchanges of similar genus without an equivalent counter value.  Ribā al-fadl is prohibited to 
block the means that could lead to ribā an-nasi’ah (see Ibn Qayyim, 1973).  
Inferences on the ribā prohibition are meted through legal reasoning (usūl fiqh) by 
Muslim jurists.  To date, most of these juridical reasoning centres on extracting the necessary 
pre-conditions or ratio legis (‘illah) of the injunction from the original Sources in application 
to current practices (see Kamali, 1996).  It is here that the emphasis on the lexical 
interpretation of the Arabic ribā connoting increase or growth, that Muslim jurists have 
syllogistically confined it to interest operative in financial transactions (see Alfattouh et al., 
2006; Al-Zuhaili, 2006).  As encapsulated by Khalil (2006, p.55) “...the controversy over riba 
is not whether it is legal or not, for the Quran clearly prohibits it.  Rather, the debate is over 
the proper definition of riba and its application to certain transactions, particularly those 
involving banks and loans”, to the effect that the objective of the Shari’ah is relegated to 
secondary position.
1
  If any, discussion by Islamic economists on the objectives is critiqued 
for its normative economics leanings (see Siddiqi, 1983; Chapra, 1985, 2006).   
The blinded focus on the ‘illah of this Canonical injunction has led to the quagmire of 
present Islamic banking and finance practices and raised critiques from contemporary 
scholars.  Without refuting the immutability of the revealed sources of the Shari’ah, we argue 
that an inquisition on the hikmah (rationale) for this prohibition underpinned by financial-
economic theory provides a move forward in understanding the Islamic weltanschauung 
(worldview) and shaping the future financial architecture rather than subjugation to legal 
stratagem.  Through this undertaking it forcibly interlinks the divine revelations to the 
contemporary schematics of economic and finance field.  Our application of hikmah thus 
aims “to solve many of the problems arising from the relationship of knowledge to religion 
and of knowledge to empirical reality” (Kamali, 1996, p.5). The collection of essays in this 
thesis enhances the theoretical groundings of Islamic finance, which is still at a nascent stage 
                                                   
1  According to Al-Zuhayli (2003, p.343), “the modern usage of the term riba is restricted to returns based 
on the deferment of payment of debts, which make it analogous to the pre-Islamic riba that multiplies with 
the passage of time.  This is indeed the type of riba al-nasi’ah effected through loans and currency 
exchanges that is most common in today’s economies”.  
 14 
 
as well as the design of public policies relating to financial development.  Our perspective is 
also different from Kuran (2005, 2009) and Rubin (2011) as we investigate the ban on ribā 
an-nasi’ah from a fundamental and thorough Shari’ah basis to explain the Muslim economic 
underdevelopment. 
3. Thesis organisation 
This thesis is a collection of three essays that centres on the prohibition of ribā an-
nasi’ah (deferred exchanges) proscribed in the Islamic revealed sources and its implications 
with respect to financial transactions and the development of modern financial exchanges.  
Each of these essays explores different aspects of this area.  The first essay enquires into the 
economic rationale (hikmah) for the Islamic prohibition of ribā an-nasi’ah, which differs 
from identification of the legal cause (‘illah) dominant in the Islamic juridical approach, and 
proffers our perspective of the current economic malaise of the Muslim world.  Premised on 
the economic rationale deduced above, we expound a hybrid structure that is Shari’ah 
compliant and economically efficient over pure debt as well as pure equity contracts in the 
presence of agency cost of debt.   
The second essay is rooted in the Islamic religious tenets that discern ribā against 
charity (sadaqah).
2
  The study expounds an institutional design of an interest-free loan 
facility aimed at smoothing inter-temporal income shocks of households who currently 
subscribe to the services of high cost payday lenders in recourse to being credit rationed by 
mainstream financiers.  We deliberately explore the economic efficiency of this form of 
charitable contract due to its direct contrast with usurious payday loans and credit rationing 
in mainstream finance.  The integration of Islamic cultural beliefs in our model concurs with 
the religious teachings of other Abrahamic faith such as the Jewish free loan societies for 
assisting the poor.  Furthermore, it supports the ‘democratisation of finance’ to the masses 
espoused by Shiller (2008), and demonstrates its functioning beyond the rubrics of 
philanthropic endeavours suggested by Rahman (1964).
3
     
Capitalising on the observations derived from the first essay, the third essay builds on 
the issue of financial fragility deduced from the economic rationale of the ribā an-nasi’ah 
                                                   
2  A version of this essay co-authored with A. Jaafar and M.S. Ebrahim has been accepted in the forthcoming 
Journal of Economic Organization and Behaviour (see Salleh et al., 2013). 
3  See also Shiller (2012) ‘Finance and the Good Society’. 
 15 
 
injunction.  This is discussed in the context of collateralised loan structures given its 
importance in financial intermediary securitisation and rehypothecation activities (see Gorton 
and Metrick, 2009; Singh and Aitken, 2010).  Moreover, the study on collateralised loan 
structures merits attention for its inter-linkages with the real economy through the collateral 
channel (Fisher, 1933; Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Reichlin and Siconolfi, 2004), and the 
controversies in the recent financial crisis (Foley and Stothard, 2012; Das, 2013).  In the final 
essay we intuitively discuss the economic efficiency of pragmatically default-free 
collateralised loan with competing risky financial contract.  In reality, it is very close to a 
hybrid contract as it makes allowance for equity to go slightly ‘underwater’.  This makes the 
structure quasi-Islamic as it resolves fragility and reduces the conflict of interest between 
borrowers and lenders in accordance with Al-Zuhayli (2003). We further explicate an iron-
clad collateralised debt pricing structure that moderates the put option to default in agency 
cost of debt.  This essay is written in a mainstream framework in order to have a stronger and 
more forceful impact on academics, policy makers and practitioners. 
4. Description of thesis and findings 
 All three essays are guided by the Islamic religious tenets with groundings in economic 
and finance theory.  Although the collection of essays is interlinked by the theoretical study 
on the economic objectives of this Canonical prohibition of ribā an-nasi’ah, each paper is 
independent of the other and therefore, contains its own literature review. 
4.1 Has the prohibition of ribā an-nasi’ah hindered the economic development of the 
Muslim world? 
Within the first essay, we critically appraise relevant studies that find the 
institutionalisation of this tenet retards financial development and hence, economic growth of 
Muslim countries (see Kuran, 2005, 2009; Rubin, 2011) and questions: (i) Why has Islam 
prohibited ribā an-nasi’ah in financial transactions? and (ii) Has this injunction impeded 
Muslim economic growth historically?  We study the economic rationale of the injunction on 
ribā an-nasi’ah from a capital structure perspective.  This approach contrasts to that of Rubin 
(2011) as we model the conflict of interest (agency perspective) between lenders and 
borrowers.  This approach is consistent with Allen (2001) and is a significant improvement 
over Rubin (2011) who models the game theoretic perspective of the ruling elite with 
religious establishment to capture the dominant financial contracting scheme in terms of 
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interest bearing debt versus equity.  Even though this is a rigorous model it fails to capture 
the agency issues of the conflicting parties to a contract.  Our approach involves modelling 
the trading of risk-free and risky financial claims against payoffs of the underlying real assets 
of a project undertaken by a risk-averse financier and entrepreneur-manager.  We incorporate 
the element of default accruing to the financier in the case of risky loans.  Our approach of 
segregating the demand and supply financing functions differs from Modigliani and Miller 
(1958, 1963) and Miller (1977) in that it: (i) recognises the varying negotiating capabilities of 
each contracting parties; and (ii) endogenously determines the equilibrium parameters of the 
loan to derive at a close-form solution.  Our loan pricing equilibria entails satisfaction of: (i) 
Basic condition: where in a risk-free loan, project payoffs are strictly positive even in the 
worst state of the economy.  In the case of a risky loan, there exists elements of default in 
some states of the economy and as such its interest rate and debt ratio is higher than a risk-
free one; (ii) Debt pricing condition: where both demand and supply functions equate; and 
(iii) Asset pricing condition: price of the project undertaken by the entrepreneur-manager 
equates the utility derived from the project payoffs.  
Results from the model point to the promotion of economic welfare.  First, we observe 
a hierarchy of economic efficiency of risk-free over risky debt in the presence of agency cost.  
Even when agency cost is low, risky loan is at best at par (not economically more efficient) to 
its risk-free competitor.  This accrues from the project risk and cost of default that is 
incorporated in the debt pricing condition by the risk-averse financier.  Our results also point 
to the amalgamation of Myers and Majluf (1984) Pecking Order Theory (in the absence of 
asymmetric information) and Myers (1984a) Static Trade-Off Theory (in the absence of 
taxes).  This corroborates the difficulty in disentangling the effects of the competing theories 
as observed by Leary and Roberts (2010), and Fama and French (1998, 2002, 2005).  Second, 
there is potential for expropriation of wealth if the loan is priced such that the interest rate (i) 
exceeds the unleveraged project returns (expropriation by financier); or (ii) is below zero 
(expropriation by entrepreneur-manager).
 4
  Third, given the interconnectedness of the 
                                                   
4  Advocates of libertarianism stress individuals’ liberty to conduct.  Thus, the issue of expropriation of 
wealth does not arise when each contracting parties are exercising their rights under the agreed contracted 
terms (i.e., mutually consenting).  In this context, the Islamic prohibition of ribā an-nasi’ah would be seen 
as a paternalistic social policy that creates market friction and impedes efficiency.  From an Islamic 
perspective, although the religion recognises individual private rights, it also forbids exploitative behaviour 
that is detrimental to socio-economic equity (see Al-Zuhayli, 2003).  Rather than an impediment, this is 
borne from the need to balance once rights against ensuring long-run sustainable social equilibrium.  This 
is evident from the Qurānic verse (4:29), “O you who believe, eat not up your property among yourselves 
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financial system, risky debts imbue financial fragility since defaults can instigate a negative 
domino effect in the system and real economy.  Credit freeze situation can occur if there is 
high uncertainty on the solvency position of parties within the market.  Fourth, where agency 
cost of debt deters trading of financial claims resulting in no equilibria (i.e., the three 
conditions mentioned above are unmet), this results in financial autarky.  The breakdown 
exemplifies financial exclusion (outright credit rationing) by the financier.  We find the 
economic efficiency of pure equity contract espoused by Siddiqi (1983) and Chapra (2006) 
materialises only in extreme cases of agency cost of debt.  
The first essay also discusses mechanisms to defray the above mentioned issues.  This 
involves structuring hybrid security that embeds the down-side ‘risk sharing’ as opposed to 
‘risk-transfer’ in pure debt, with up-side ‘profit-sharing’ of the residual returns in pure equity 
contracts.  Hybrid structures are malleable as it allows the financier to calibrate the returns in 
accordance with the project specificities.  Apart from this, the participative element if 
properly structured avoids expropriation of wealth.  It is generally economically efficient to 
pure debt contracts in that the equity option and project collateral moderates risk shifting, 
underinvestment and debt overhang issues of agency cost of debt.  Moreover unlike 
convertible debt, the entrepreneur-manager retains control of the project even in good states 
of economy.   The efficiency of hybrid securities in development of financial systems and as 
a continuous-workout financial solution is discussed in Shiller et al. (2013), Ebrahim and 
Hussain (2010) and Shiller (2008), respectively.   
In reprieve to financial exclusion, the essay discusses the importance of developing 
institutions to fill the financial gap of for-profit financial providers, eg. charitable institutions 
that do not carry a for-profit mandate.
5
  This perspective is elaborated further in our second 
essay.  With respect to the underdevelopment of the Muslim world, we attribute it to the 
weaknesses of the political elites and Islamic jurists to uphold the essence of the ribā 
injunction in (i) protecting property rights, resulting in economic agents’ disinclination to 
establish formal markets; (ii) structuring efficient fragile free financial contracts, emanating 
                                                                                                                                                              
in vanity, but let there be among you traffic and trade in good will”.  We exemplify the expropriation of 
wealth aspect of pure interest-based debt and discuss the potential solution in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
5  The need to investigate the economic aspect of philanthropy in the 1960s has paved the way for 
recognition of altruism in economic conduct to the extent that this subject is recognised as a research area 
on its own right.  In Islam, philanthropic endeavour plays a significant role as it accounts for one of the 
five pillars of Islam and is evident in the revealed sources (eg. Qurānic verse 2:276-277, 2:280).  The 
importance of philanthropy in Islamic social development and the various mechanisms deployed are 
discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis.        
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from the Shari’ah infatuation to deploy classical commutative contracts without assessing its 
economic and financial efficiency in present day markets; and (iii) enjoining institutions that 
assist in the economic pursuits of the underprivileged, with knock on effect on the state’s 
economic sustainability.  The significance of all three factors is founded in studies on 
economic history (Ibn Khaldun, 1967), institutional economics (North, 1981; Acemoglu et 
al., 2005), financial economics (Fisher, 1933; Minsky, 1992; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Johnson et al., 2002; Levine, 2005) and economic development (Beck et al., 2003; Claessens 
and Laeven, 2003).    
4.2 Can an interest-free credit facility be more efficient than a usurious payday loan? 
In the second essay, we draw from a survey by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) in 2009 that reports cohorts of American households suffering from 
credit rationing or outright financial exclusion by mainstream financiers.  To bridge their 
consumption needs, these households have had to subscribe to the services of alternative 
financial service providers including payday lenders.  Critiques of the payday loan industry 
point to the expropriation of wealth associated with this high cost credit.  Invariably, studies 
on payday loans revolves on the credit behaviour of these borrowers, who are said to exhibit 
naive quasi hyperbolic discounting tendencies, i.e., overly optimistic expectations of future 
outcomes or ability to absorb future shocks that reflects self-control issues.  The other strand 
of the literature investigates the welfare effects of this form of credit on the borrowers with 
mixed observations.  We depart from this flow of studies by focusing on structuring a 
financial alternative to high cost payday lending.  In particular, the study seeks to answer: 
Can an endogenous interest-free payday loan circuit provide a more efficient credit solution 
in contrast to current payday lenders and mainstream financiers?     
This involves modelling an institutional design that draws from the groundings of 
institutional economics combined with cultural beliefs (i.e., Islamic charitable teachings).  
The former emphasises structuring efficient institutions that adapt to the environment to 
deliver services in a cost effective manner (see Coase, 1937; Alchian, 1950), whilst the latter 
recognises the instrumental role of beliefs in shaping policies and institutions (see Acemoglu 
et al., 2005).  Endogenous circuit referenced here is synonymous with Rotating Savings and 
Credit Associations (ROSCA), Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations (ASCRA) and 
the more advance mutual and financial cooperatives.  These establishments are revered for 
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their developmental role in the nineteenth century (see Commons, 1931; Besley et al., 1993; 
Bouman, 1995; Dagnelie and Le-May Boucher, 2012).   
The assimilation of interest-free loan (qard) in our endogenous circuit permits direct 
contrast of the economic efficiency of this conduit with current usurious payday loans and 
credit rationing [outright exclusion] by mainstream finance.  Furthermore, the application of 
this interest-free facility is unique as it critically challenges the economic literature that 
predicates interest as an efficient resource allocation tool.  Even the well-known Islamic 
scholar Fazlur Rahman (1964) argues, “the rate of interest occupies the same place as price 
and performs the all-important function that any price-mechanism performs, viz., of 
regulating the supply and demand of credit and rationing it among customers.  If the rate of 
interest, i.e., the price of loaning money, is reduced to zero, then we would be faced with 
limited supply and an infinite demand” (p.37).6  Unsurprisingly, in closing he states, “No 
economy can be built today, nor was one built by our forefathers on qard hassan (qardah-yi 
hasanah), although private institutions should be encouraged in this direction for purely 
philantrophic purposes” (p.39-40). 
In our model, risk-neutral economic agents converge to form an endogenous leveraged 
member-based circuit that offers inexpensive (i.e., interest-free), short-term liquidity facility 
to smooth their inter-temporal exogenous income shocks.  Capital is attained from the 
members’ periodical contributions and each member qualifies for the liquidity facility after 
satisfying a cooling off period.  By pooling member financial resources, it supports 
mobilisation of funds that would have been kept out of circulation.  Aside from this liquidity 
transformation function, the model demonstrates the risk sharing element of mutual scheme 
in Islamic insurance (takaful) where members guarantee each other from unexpected 
misfortune.  Furthermore, in contrary to Rahman (1964) we demonstrate the structure of 
endogenous circuits facilitates the availability of funding despite the interest-free financing 
element.   
We include specific instruments to control for adverse selection and moral hazard effect 
as follows. The periodic contribution (i) moderates adverse selection (especially during the 
                                                   
6  See Section 3 of Chapter 3 on the probable reason for the above comment by Rahman (1964).  However, 
we demonstrate that lending is revived by embedding the interest-free credit facility within a circuit, which 
promotes group insurance.  In particular (Models 2 and 3 in Chapter 3), funding is provided by the 
temporary idle funds of a proportion of members (non-borrowers/ lenders) to other liquidity strapped 
members (borrowers). 
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gestation period), as it reveals the financial status of the prospective borrower through an 
income constraint; (ii) forms an equity buffer that minimises member default; and (iii) acts as 
a commitment device that moderates self-control issues.  The moral hazard element is 
addressed by: (i) instituting a loan constraint that is linked to the borrower income capability 
and circuit resources; (ii) implementing a collateral constraint in the form of a co-signer; and 
(iii) integrating compulsory financial programs aimed at enhancing the member financial 
capability.     
As mentioned above, our interest-free payday loan facility competes with interest-
bearing scheme of mainstream credit and current payday lenders.  Through discounting the 
net financial flows of the circuit (generally the accumulated member contributions less loan 
disbursement after recoveries from defaulting members and repayment of savings to non-
defaulting members) and using net present value to analyse the economic efficiency of these 
competing facilities, we find the interest-free payday loan is at par with competing (interest-
based) solution where the equality sign holds.  On the other hand, a resultant greater than 
inequality sign signifies that the former is economically efficient to its interest-bearing 
competitors.                   
4.3 Reinforcing resilience of the financial architecture with default-free collateralised 
loan 
The third essay explores the central issue of financial fragility given the agency cost of 
debt inherent in interest-based financial contracts.  This essay focuses on collateralised loan 
due to its significant representation in the financial institution balance sheet and 
intermediation activities.  As presently seen, the traditional form of collateralised loan that is 
tied to real productive sector is now further churned to meet other financial obligations, i.e., 
securitisation and rehypothecation of debt to fulfil other financial obligations (see Gorton and 
Metrick, 2009; Singh and Aitken, 2010; Das, 2013).  String of defaults permeating the recent 
financial crisis advocates a review of established literature on the functioning of collateral in 
moderating agency cost of debt (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Smith and 
Warner, 1979a,b; Barnea et al., 1981b).  Thus, our third essay is pertinent in that it presents a 
timely discourse on the riskiness of collateralised loan contract accruing to the endogeneity of 
agency cost of debt (even in symmetric information setting).   
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Here, we contrast the economic efficiency of pragmatically default-free collateralised 
loan against a default-prone (risky) solution.  In this essay, we classify a pragmatically 
default-free solution as one that does not allow the put option to default to be significantly in-
the-money.  That is, the project terminal payoff exceeds the loan balance to its tenure with 
very high probability.   On the other hand, a default-prone solution either has or will have a 
put option to default in-the-money due to the potential default in states of economy.  The 
embedded put option to default is deep-in-the-money the greater the relative divergence of 
the project payoffs with the outstanding loan.  Where the recovery rate is stochastic, this 
further impinges on its efficiency.  If the recovery rate is extremely low, default-prone 
collateralised loan is untenable resulting in default-free solution as the only economically 
efficient alternative.   
We exemplify the financial ramification of each collateralised loan structure on the 
asset transformation (loan to deposit payoffs) in the financial system using three different 
permutations: (i) default-prone collateralised loan payoffs without deposit insurance; (ii) 
default-prone collateralised loan with deposit insurance; and (iii) default-free collateralised 
loan without deposit insurance.  In the first and second permutation, default-prone 
collateralised loan leads to financial fragility particularly where borrower equity is deep 
underwater with spillover effect on the financial intermediary capacity to meet its deposit 
obligations.  However, potential bank run is capped by the presence of deposit insurance.  
Nonetheless, this does not address the distress state and costly bailout of the intermediary.  
This is opposed to the default-free loan that allows the intermediary to earn economic surplus 
by sterilising the put option to default.  Furthermore, this preserves the sanctity of depositors’ 
interest without the need to institute a public safety net.     
We extend a similar approach to study the liquidity effect of default-free [default-
prone] solution to repurchase agreements (repo).  The sensitivity of the repo terms to the 
quality of the underlying collateral highlights the pertinence of proper pricing of the loan to 
avert default.  Flowing from this, we intuitively discuss the pricing of this pragmatically 
default-free loan structure.  The object is to properly price the collateralised loan that 
restrains the embedded put option to default arising from principal-agent conflict of interest 
in agency cost of debt.  It warrants ensuring that the borrower retains ‘skin in the game’ that 
moderates the likelihood of exercising the put option to default, i.e., equity does not enter into 
a negative region.  By addressing the welfare of the principal and agent in the debt pricing, it 
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moderates financial fragility attributed to the Islamic injunction on ribā an-nasi’ah.  This 
study also sets the framework for other research on the economic implication of trading of 
debt for debt and short-selling, issues that are debatable under the Islamic law.   
5. Contributions 
5.1 Has the prohibition of ribā an-nasi’ah hindered the economic development of the 
Muslim world? 
 In the first essay, we unravel the economic rationale for the Islamic ribā an-nasi’ah 
injunction puzzle.  By applying capital structure paradigm involving trading financial claims 
between risk-averse entrepreneur-manager and financier, we deduce this injunction in Islam 
avoids dysfunctional commutative transactions from four perspectives.  First, it mitigates 
deficient financing structure mired by endogenous agency cost of debt.  Second, it curbs 
expropriation of wealth by each contracting party, which promotes sustainable long-run 
equilibrium.  Third, the resultant effects from the above, contributes towards overall 
reduction in the financial system fragility.  Finally, by ensuring equity in transaction it 
addresses financial exclusion of borrowers, whose participation may have been previously 
curtailed by credit terms that expropriates her/his wealth.   
 The above results debunk the observation of several scholars who deem this Canonical 
injunction as impeding development of the Muslim world.  Instead, we view the economic 
underdevelopment emanates from the failure to uphold the economic essence of this Islamic 
injunction, including protection of property rights from expropriation of wealth,  promoting 
robust financial contracts and institution of charitable bodies for the advancement of the 
underprivileged interests.   
 Additionally, based on our capital structure approach we observe an amalgamation of 
the Pecking Order and Static Trade-Off Theories (even with symmetric information and 
absence of taxes).  This concurs with Leary and Roberts (2010), and Fama and French (1998, 
2002, 2005) who highlight the difficulty in disentangling the effect of both theories in 
empirical capital structure studies.  From the model, we also observe a hierarchical 
decreasing economic efficiency of equilibria of risky debt with increasing agency cost of 
debt.   
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5.2 Can an interest-free credit facility be more efficient than a usurious payday loan? 
 In respect of the second essay, it proffers interest-free credit facility as an alternative to 
usurious liquidity-stripping current payday loans.  By this, it also supports public policy 
objects of extending affordable credit.  Our results are distinct for it demonstrates the 
economic viability of this form of benevolent loan in current financial settings.  That is, 
funding can still be deployed through endogenous leveraged circuit-based structures that pre-
date to practices of ROSCA, ASCRA and their modern hybrids; mutual and financial 
cooperatives. It showcases interest-free credit facility as a financial development tool and 
challenges the closed view of Rahman (1964) who labels interest-free financing structures to 
only philanthropic endeavours.   
 Our interest-free liquidity facility also overcomes the credit rationing by mainstream 
financiers through ‘democratisation of finance’ to the masses.  The integration of interest-free 
financing in providing the liquidity facility supports the institutionalisation of charitable 
mediums mentioned in the first essay above.  Furthermore, the structure of our interest-free 
liquidity facility outlined in the second essay functions as a commitment device to correct 
partially naive quasi-hyperbolic discounting tendencies associated with payday loan 
borrowers.  
5.3 Reinforcing resilience of the financial architecture with default-free collateralised 
loan 
    This essay firstly, demonstrates principal-agent conflict remains even when information 
asymmetry ceases to be an issue.  Second, our study treats agency cost as an endogenous 
factor relative to other studies on the matter, which potentially points to the disparate 
empirical results observed by the latter.  Third, our approach of segregating the welfare of the 
parties to contract provides structurally stable equilibria than that of Myers (1984b) and 
Strebulaev (2007), who aggregates the welfare of both parties.  Fourth, our loan pricing 
model that treats default accruing to agency cost differs from the contingent claims pricing 
models as follows.  The endogeneity of default in the structural-form of Black-Scholes-
Merton (1973, 1974) arise from agent-firm value conflict.  On the other hand, the reduced-
form models of Jarrow-Turnbull (1995) and Duffie-Singleton (1999) treat default as 
exogenous and centres on pricing the economic cost of default.  In terms of public policy 
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objects, a pragmatically default-free collateralised loan that controls agency cost reduces the 
financial fragility within the system and averts costly financial institution bailouts.      
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Chapter 2: Has the Prohibition of Ribā An-
Nasi’ah Hindered Economic Development 
of the Muslim World 
 
“Islam's formal commitment to the interest ban deprived the Islamic world 
of a prime engine of growth”.  
Kuran (2005, p.603) 
1. Introduction 
An established body of literature affirms the positive contribution of developed 
financial systems towards a nation’s economic growth.  The earliest study on this finance-
growth nexus is traced to Bagehot (1878) and Schumpeter and Opie (1934), followed by 
empirical evidence from Goldsmith (1969) and McKinnon (1973).  Financial systems 
perform a crucial intermediation function.  This function serves to ameliorate market frictions 
accruing from information asymmetry and transaction cost, which impede efficient 
investment decisions, allocation of scarce capital and transmission of financial transactions 
(Coase, 1937; King and Levine, 1993).  This intermediation function in turn influences 
capital accumulation decisions and technological innovations that are vital in defining the rate 
of a nation’s long-term economic trajectory (King and Levine, 1993).  Whilst traditional 
intermediation remains an essential functional characteristic of a developed financial system, 
the growth of financial markets and rise in financial innovations has also precipitated the 
metamorphosis of intermediation to encompass risk management and risk-trading capabilities 
(Allen and Santomero, 1997).  Of late, research on financial development and economic 
growth has been augmented with analysis that emphasises the instrumental role of financial 
development in poverty and income inequality reduction.  This is achieved foremost through 
economic growth and indirectly through the ‘McKinnon conduit effect’ of savings and the 
consequent credit channel (Jeanneney and Kpodar, 2011).  
Financial development and economic growth are crucial in addressing poverty and 
income inequality, and perhaps go some way to explain the persistent poor economic 
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performance of the majority of Muslim countries.
7
  Various exploratory studies have sought 
to identify the causes of this underdevelopment.
8
  The motivation for this paper is set-out by 
Kuran (2005, 2009) and Rubin (2011) who argue that rigidities of the Islamic institutional 
framework, including the prohibition on interest, have blocked financial modernisation and 
caused the growth of Muslim economies to falter.
9
  The argument goes that this prohibition 
(together with other constraints) has increased transaction costs, ultimately leading to a long-
term drag on Muslim states’ economic efficiency (El-Gamal, 2009).  It is against this setting 
that our paper seeks to shed light on the following intriguing questions: (i) Why has Islam 
prohibited ribā an-nasi’ah in financial transactions? and (ii) Has this injunction impeded 
Muslim economic growth historically?  
The strategy adopted in this paper is to first study the prohibition of ribā an-nasi’ah 
from a conventional capital structure perspective illustrated through a pure debt structure and 
highlights the limitations of this structure and its problems.
10
  This involves modelling a pure 
interest-based financing contract between risk-averse entrepreneur-manager and financier, in 
a simple general equilibrium setting, with the framework of rational expectations.
11 , 12
  
                                                   
7  Despite accounting for nearly 22% of the total world population, Muslim countries constitute only 6% of 
the world’s Gross National Income (Pew Research Centre, 2009; World Bank, 2010).  Based on the United 
Nations Human Development Index for 2010, 22 of the 56 Muslim countries received low scores, whilst 
only four were in the very high categories.  Of the 14 Muslim countries included in the Financial 
Development Index 2010, five remained in the lowest quartile with marked deterioration from the 
preceding year’s ranking (Bilodeau and Harrry, 2010).   
8  For studies on Islam from perspective of: (i) historical economics see Ragab (1980); Kuran (2004, 2005, 
2009); Rubin (2011) and Grosjean (2011); (ii) political economy see Chapra (2008); and (iii) economic 
development see Guiso et al. (2003) and Noland (2005).   
9  Rubin (2011) is the closest paper to that of ours. Unlike our paper that studies the welfare effects of 
conflict of interest between borrowers and lenders from an agency theoretic perspective, Rubin’s prognosis 
centres on connecting the economic disparity between Muslim and Christian worlds by modelling the 
conflict of interest between the ruling elite and the religious establishment in a game theoretic perspective.  
The outcome of his model is contingent on the extent to which early political authority derived their 
legitimacy from religious ones.  Where there is low dependency, the political elite are more likely to relax 
interest regulations that impede commerce, this then feedbacks into gradually constricting the powers of 
the Church.  These interactions did not take place in the Muslim world despite similar economic 
conditions.  Our observation on the ‘long divergence’ of the Muslim world as elaborated in Section 6 of 
this paper contrasts that of Rubin (2011).   
10  It should be noted that our model is conceived in a framework of well-functioning financial and capital 
markets.  This may seem to be inconsistent with the seventh century in Islam, when these markets were 
absent.  Nonetheless, our paper focuses on bridging the rationale for this ban with the issues surrounding it 
in the literature.  
11 We choose the general equilibrium modelling approach due to its rigour and strong following in the 
academic and policy communities (see Zame, 2007).  Additionally, we opt for a setting involving 
symmetric information, as equilibrium asset prices aggregate and reveal private information (see Biais et 
al., 2010).  This draws upon the Efficient Market Hypothesis (see Fama, 1970; Bray, 1981; Malkiel, 2003).  
Based on this, financial market participants can easily decipher any private information held by any 
counterparty through observing their trading patterns. 
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Consistent with Allen (2001), we incorporate conflict of interest (agency perspective), by 
segregating the demand and supply side of financing under exogeneity of the costs of 
bankruptcy.
13, 14,
 
15
  Pure interest-based debt contracts is used due to its connotation with the 
prohibited ribā an-nasi’ah by academics and Muslim scholars.  We solve our model and 
derive results rationalising the injunction.  We then link the results with recent literature on 
charitable teachings that are espoused as an alternative in Islamic scriptures (discussed 
below).  
Our results suggest that the prohibition of ribā an-nasi’ah is welfare-enhancing, as it 
averts dysfunctional commutative transactions.  Specifically, it mitigates: (i) deficient 
financing structures encumbered by the endogenous agency cost of debt; (ii) the market 
power of lenders or borrowers to expropriate each other’s wealth, thereby leading to non-
                                                                                                                                                              
12 Maddock and Carter (1982, p.41) define rational expectations as “the application of the principle of 
rational behavior to the acquisition and processing of information and to the formation of expectations”.  
It is ‘self-fulfilling’ in the sense that the economic agents form correct expectations, given the pricing 
model and information (Bray, 1981). 
13 Agency cost of debt refers to distortions in managerial decision making that are caused by conflicts of 
interest between stockholders and debtholders.  The finance literature generally attributes agency issues to 
the presence of asymmetric information from ex-ante adverse selection and ex-post moral hazard issues 
(see Leland and Pyle, 1977; Harris and Raviv, 1991; Allen, 2001).  Financing of real assets in a venture, 
however, constitutes a special case, where lenders (principals) can decipher any proprietary ex-ante 
information (i.e., adverse selection) held by borrowers (agents) through: (i) staged financing and board 
representation in the venture capital industry (see Gompers and Lerner, 2001); (ii) trading financial claims 
over a multi-period horizon, as illustrated in the literature on insurance contracting (see Cooper and Hayes, 
1987; Hosios and Peters, 1989); and (iii) by incorporating amortisation (i.e., a restrictive form of sinking 
fund provision) in the financial contract (see Wu, 1993).  Specifically in our model, the interest-based 
financing is a collateralised one.  Thus, the lender is able to use ex-post information on the risk-return of 
the collateralised asset to evaluate the potential ex-ante return of the business venture/ project to control for 
adverse selection issues.  On the other hand, moral hazard is addressed by ensuring that the tangible asset 
is adequately serviced (i.e., properly maintained, insured and payment of relevant taxes). 
14 Moral hazard arises when economic agents maximise their own welfare to the detriment of others, 
especially in situations where they do not bear the full consequences of their actions.  They therefore have 
a tendency to act less carefully than they otherwise would; leaving another party to bear some 
responsibility for the consequences of those actions (see Kotowitz, 2008).  Moral hazard is generally 
considered in the literature as ensuing from ex-post information asymmetry.  This too can be mitigated by 
underwriting iron-clad covenants in the financial contract (see Smith and Warner, 1979a; Billet et al. 
2007). 
15 This approach allows us to endogenously determine the equilibrium parameters of a loan.  This is contrary 
to the prognosis of Modigliani and Miller (MM - 1958, 1963) and Miller (1977).  The MM model 
aggregates the two adversarial claimants’ (debt and equity) objective functions, thereby depriving the 
analysis of supply and demand functions and hence the optimal pricing parameters of debt.  It is construed 
under risk neutrality (akin to a linear programming model), yielding a multitude of solutions (i.e., the well-
known invariant result) in the absence of market imperfections (such as taxes), and a corner solution (i.e., 
100% debt financing) under corporate tax deductibility of interest.  A crucial assumption of the above 
invariant result is that individuals resorting to MM (1958) arbitrage have the same negotiating prowess 
with financiers as available to institutions.  It should be noted that the Miller (1977) model is also subject 
to the same limitations as the MM (1963) analysis.  
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sustainable long-run equilibrium; (iii) fragile financial systems; and (iv) financial exclusion.
16
  
Thus, our results not only respond to the puzzle pointed out by Kuran (2005, 2009) and Rubin 
(2011), but also provide recommendations on structuring the financial architecture of the 
Muslim world.  Our recommendations distinctly differ from notable Islamic economists such 
as Siddiqi (1983) and Chapra (2006). 
The ramifications of our results are profound.  We not only shed light on the historic 
underdevelopment of the Muslim world, but also provide the much needed framework for 
financial development to stem this decline and invigorate growth.  Our results also illustrate 
the naivety of religious scholars in matters related to financial economics.  This should lead 
to closer scrutiny on their rulings (ijtihad) and reopen inquiry (see Hallaq, 1984).     
In addition to the above key findings, our capital structure model also reveals an 
amalgamation of the prominent Pecking Order (in the absence of asymmetric information) 
and Static Trade-off Theories (in the absence of taxes).  This result concurs with Leary and 
Roberts (2010), Fama and French (1998, 2002, 2005) who highlight the difficulty in 
empirically separating the capital structure outcomes predicted by each of these two 
competing theories.  Consistent with Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977, 2001), 
we also find in our model a hierarchical order of decreasing economic efficiency of equilibria 
with increasing agency cost of debt.   
This paper is divided into seven parts.  Section 2 provides a discussion on interest-
based financial practices. Notably, its foundation in the three Abrahamic religions, the 
subsequent diasporas, and related issues in contemporary financial markets.  In Section 3, we 
develop a capital structure model using pure interest-based debt contract to illustrate the 
rationale for this prohibition.  Section 4 provides a review of a higher form of economically 
efficient financing structure that moderates expropriation of wealth and financial fragility 
associated with pure interest-based debt contracts.  In Section 5, we discuss the concept of 
charitable practices in bridging financial exclusion.  To complete the paper, we incorporate in 
                                                   
16 Our observations are deduced from the Holy Scriptures of the Qur’ān (Muslim Holy Book - translated 
A.Y. Ali) and Sunnah (the Tradition of Prophet Muhammad), and grounded in economic theory.  The 
primary revelations in the Qur’ān: (i) renounce those consuming ribā, for it leads to expropriating another 
person’s assets or their resources (2:275, 2:278-279, 2:281, 3:130-132, 4:161, 30:39); (ii) ask lenders to 
give respite to their debtors (2:280); and (iii) contrast charity with ribā (2:276-277, 30:39).  This is 
explicated further by the Sunnah which identifies the categorical aspects of assets and practices that are 
subjects of this prohibition (amongst the narrated Traditions of the Prophet relating to ribā include Sahih 
Al-Bukhārī - translated M. M. Khan Vol. 3, 34:2134 and 40:2312; Sahih Muslim - translated N. al-Khattab 
Vol. 4, 22:1584 and 22:1594). 
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Section 6 our observation on the central cause of the centuries of Muslim economic 
underdevelopment.  Finally, Section 7 provides the concluding comments. 
2. Contours of interest-based practice in antiquity to the modern state 
Islam is an Abrahamic faith that shares common ground with various aspects of 
Judaism and Christianity, including injunction against ribā (Qur’ān 2:274-280, 3:130, 4:160-
161, 42:13) that is widely associated with interest-based commutative exchanges.
17
  
Etymologically, interest and usury are synonymous, both traditionally having been used to 
refer to additional payment on money or goods lent.  However, there has been a long and an 
on-going debate over the prohibition of interest and usury by academics and jurists, and 
whether these mean the same thing.  From the stand point of Aquinas and Aristotle, the act of 
exacting interest is evil, since “money was sterile and hence that the breeding of money from 
money is unnatural and justly hated” (Homer, 1963, p.71).  It invades property rights and has 
even been declared equivalent to robbery; a sin censured under the Seventh Commandment.  
Nonetheless, beginning from the eleventh century and thereafter, this Canonical 
understanding took on a more liberal tone.  The Reformation by contemporary Christian 
exegesis marked the delineation between usury and interest.  Usury, according to Calvin, 
relates to excessive interest that adversely impacts contracting parties.  This narrow-bound 
interpretation fitted in well with the emergence of views on risk and time value of money 
(Mews and Abraham, 2007).
18
  It also provided latitude to monetary gains in an economy 
dogged by inflation and an already weak enforcement system (Koyama, 2010).  Interest, as 
presently practised, is now legalised and deemed as compensation owed to creditors arising 
from an opportunity loss incurred through lending (Homer, 1963).   
As with Judeo-Christianity, the prohibition of ribā in Islam is revealed in the Qur’ān 
and reinforced in the Sunnah.  There is no specific ruling in the original Sources identifying 
ribā with interest. Inferences on the matter are driven by Islamic jurists through the conduct 
of ijtihad (legal reasoning) where the primary aim is to identify the ‘illah (ratio legis or pre-
conditions) from the original Sources.  Generally, Islamic exegesis justify the interest 
                                                   
17 The prohibition is also explicated in the religious books of Judaism (Deuteronomy 19:20) and Christianity 
(Bible – Ezekiel, 18:8, 13:7, 22:12) (see Cornell, 2006).  
18  Weber (1930) argues that the Calvinist doctrine is the impetus for the capitalist spirit.  Calvin ascribes that 
man’s predestination lies in application of his labour in worldly activities.  This sets forth a paradigm shift 
in the Christian worldview with respect to economic gains and materialism, precepts which were 
previously scorned by the Church.  
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prohibition to a simplistic juristic view of any ‘increase or growth’ of the principal advanced.  
This stems from the grammatical delineation of the noun encompassing the Arabic word 
‘ribā’ (see Alfattouh et al., 2006; Al-Zuhaili, 2006).19  This is further segregated into evident 
and hidden interest (see Table 1).  The former, also known as ribā an-nasi’ah, relates to 
deferred credit practices of pre-Islamic Arabia, when creditors increased the outstanding debt 
for delays in settlement by the borrower.  Instead of granting financial reprieve, the creditor 
expropriates the debtor’s property, potentially leaving the borrower in a dire financial 
situation.
20
   
Hidden interest or ribā al-fadl in the Sunnah is prohibited in order to block the means 
that could lead towards ribā an-nasi’ah (see Ibn Qayyim, 1973).21  This governs deferred 
commodity exchanges without equivalent counter values, exchange of similar commodity 
with differing quantities, and trading of money for itself (see Sahih Al-Bukhārī Vol. 3, 
34:2134; Sahih Muslim Vol. 4, 22:1584).  Economic wise, such transactions involving barter 
may lead to inequities and abuse, thus impacting either party’s property rights.22  A just 
exchange of disparate commodities is best served through monetisation of transactions.  
Therefore, stability of monetary value is of utmost importance and this is only feasible if the 
currency is not traded for itself (Thomas, 2006).
23
   
  
                                                   
19 Linguistically, ribā in the Qur’ānic texts connotes a positive nuance of increase, rise, swell, grow, raise or 
attributed to the nurturing or teaching (Alfattuoh et. al, 2006; Al-Zuhaili, 2006).  It is from the theological 
context that ribā or increase in financial transactions without an equivalent counter value in a commutative 
transaction is impermissible (Al-Zuhaili, 2006).  
20 This is against the ribā injunction in the Qur’ān (2:279), which calls for preservation of rights of both 
parties, “If ye do it not, take notice of war from God and His Apostle: But if ye turn back, ye shall have 
your capital sums: Deal not unjustly, and ye shall not be dealt with unjustly”.  The term ‘war’ relates to the 
call for liberation of debtors from unjust dealings and oppressions (Ali, 2002).  This is accentuated in the 
legal maxim ‘bi-al-batil’, which criticises those who consume other people’s property without right, and 
thus causing hardship on the affected person (Ibn Qayyim, 1973). 
21  It should be noted that our paper cites the recent publications of early Islamic scholars such as Ibn 
Khaldun, Ibn Qayyim and Ibn Taymiyah. 
22 El-Gamal (2009) rationalises the inequities of the barter economy based on the Sunnah, where the Prophet 
Muhammad is reported to have recommended his companion Bilal to sell low quality dates for money and 
use the proceeds to buy high quality dates (see Sahih Al-Bukhārī Vol. 3, 40:2312; Sahih Muslim Vol. 4, 
22:1594).  See also Guriev and Kvassov (2004) for arguments on the exploitative nature of barter 
transactions. 
23  Explicating Aristotle and Aquinas’ argument on the sterility of money, Ibn Qayyim (1973, p.264) 
succinctly explained that “money is not sought as individual objects, but what is sought is use of it as a 
means to commodities.  If it itself becomes commodities sought as individual objects, then the affairs of the 
people become corrupted”. 
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Table 1: Classical Shari’ah scholars’ perspective on the ribā prohibition 
 Category  
Ribā al-fadl - the hidden ribā Ribā an-nasi’ah - the evident ribā 
 Application  
Relates to spot exchanges  Relates to deferred exchanges 
  Legal Cause   
Excess in exchange without an equivalent 
counter value 
Delay in payments with an increase above the 
original amount at the settlement date; or vice-versa 
(i.e., lowering the debt in return for an accelerated 
payment) 
     
 Specifically prohibited in transactions involving the six commodities in the Sunnah (see 
Sahih Al-Bukhārī Vol. 3, 34:2134; Sahih Muslim Vol. 4, 22:1584).  Impermissibility of 
other commodities is generally based on the nomenclature developed by the Shari’ah 
scholars from the major Sunni schools of thought, namely: (i) intrinsic or monetary value; 
and (ii) volume or weight.   
However, there are additional conditions that are not shared amongst the major Sunni 
schools, that is: (i) the commodity being edible, nutritious or storable; (ii) the threshold for 
which the condition on weight or volume becomes applicable; and (iii) the interpretation 
on ‘oneness in kind’ or genus of the exchanged commodities.   
Following this nomenclature, commodities that do not have these characteristics are 
excluded from the ribā prohibition: (i) non-fungibles or (ii) fungibles that are measured by 
length or counted; which may in effect be significant.  For example, in the exchange of 
animals or cloth.    
 
 Rationalisation  
 The ribā prohibition is aimed at avoiding exploitation and fraud for the protection of one’s 
property, fairness and justice.  The injunction of ribā al-fadl arises as blocking means to 
the evident ribā that is preventing access to a greater evil.  The restriction on the exchange 
of the six commodities in the Sunnah extends from them, representing food staples and 
currencies, which during the period of the Prophet Muhammad and Caliphs (successors) 
were essential for survival and measure of price, respectively.  
 
Source: Ibn Qayyim (1973), Ibn Rushd (1997), Alfattouh et al. (2006), Al-Zuhaili (2006) 
This simplistic juristic explication by classical scholars has led to the quagmire in 
present Islamic finance.  Categorically, there is a narrow and broad interpretation of interest.  
One interpretation is that the ribā prohibition incriminates only excessive amounts of interest 
and even this restriction may be lifted if there is a greater benefit to be met.  This is parallel to 
the more liberal stance of contemporary Judeo-Christian views and advocated by Muslim 
scholars such as Al-Sanhuri (1956) and Rahman (1964).
24
  In contrast, proponents of a broad 
                                                   
24  Kuran’s (2005, 2009) view stems from this liberal stance stated in his paper “...what the Qur’an explicitly 
prohibits is riba, an ancient Arabian practice whereby the debt of the borrower doubled if he failed to 
make restitution on time (Qur’an 2:274-280, 3:130, 4:160-161).  Riba commonly resulted in confiscation 
of the borrower’s assets, even his enslavement, so it was a potent source of communal tension.  In banning 
the practice, Islam effectively prohibited enslavement for debt (Rahman, 1964)” (Kuran, 2009, p.595).  Our 
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interpretation of interest, termed as ‘neo-Revivalists’ by Saeed (1996, p.2), emphasise the 
“permanence and immutability of the rulings or instructions given in the Qur’ān and 
Traditions” and object to any fundamental reinterpretation of this Islamic prohibition.   
Despite interest being deeply entrenched in mainstream finance, it is not without its 
critics.  Adam Smith and Gilbert K. Chesterton, strong proponents of the free market, faltered 
at allowing the market rate to find its own equilibrium due to concerns about abuses and the 
allocation of resources to only a limited segment of society who can satisfy the market rates, 
whilst disregarding those with pure entrepreneurial capabilities (Jadlow, 1977; Mews and 
Abraham, 2007).  This is mirrored by the present issues of predatory pricing associated with 
usurious rates, repressive contractual terms, market manipulation and unfair trading that puts 
the underprivileged at comparatively greater risk (Carr and Kolluri, 2001; Thomas, 2006).
25
  
From an economic perspective, Minsky (1992) in his financial instability hypothesis alludes 
to the susceptibility of an interest-based financial system to ruptures from economic and 
financial disequilibrium.  Such shocks can be exogenous, led by events in the real sector that 
impair the debt servicing capability of economic agents (Kindleberger, 2000), or endogenous 
due to the inherent characteristics of the financial system (Fisher, 1933; Minsky, 1992).  
Thus, it is unsurprising that despite concerted intervention and regulatory policies aimed at 
attenuating excessive volatilities within the system, an interest-based economy remains 
susceptible to business cycles extremities.   
3. Model development 
This essay investigates the welfare effects of interest-based finance and the economic 
rationale (hikmah) for the Islamic injunction from a capital structure perspective, rather than 
analogical reasoning of the common cause (‘illah) to which the prohibition in the revealed 
Sources applies.  It also contrasts with Islamic economists who are criticitised for their 
normative underpinnings (see Siddiqi, 1983; Chapra, 1985, 2006).  
                                                                                                                                                              
perspective is different from Kuran (2005, 2009), as we investigate the ban on interest-based contracting 
from a fundamental and thorough Shari’ah basis to explain the Muslim economic underdevelopment.    
25  See Glaeser and Scheinkman (1988) for discussion on usury laws as a form of social insurance and 
regulatory tool.   
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We capture these effects by modelling the interaction of two agents (namely, an 
entrepreneur–manager and a financier) in the business sector of the economy. 26   For 
simplicity and mathematical tractability, we assume a two period economy.  Variables 
denoted by EM and L signifies that of the entrepreneur-manager and financier, respectively.  
Description of each variable is provided in sections 3.1 and 3.2.  In the model, both agents: (i) 
are endowed with distinct amounts of numeraire good in our economy )e,e,e,(e L1
L
0
EM
1
EM
0 , at 
times t = 0 and t = 1; and (ii) they maximise their respective welfare at t = 0.
27,
 
28
   
There are two types of assets (investments) in our economy, a real asset and an 
interest-based financial asset.  The real asset encompasses a project, whose payoffs at time   
t = 1 constitutes: (i) a Net Operating Income ( 1q
~ ); and (ii) a terminal value (
1P
~
), where 1q
~  
and 1P
~
 are non-negative random first-order Markov processes whose probability distribution 
is known to the agents.  The financial asset includes a plain vanilla risk-free or a risky loan, 
encumbering the underlying real assets (of the project) and involves the trading of claims 
against its payoffs.  The decomposition of the financial assets allows a higher order analysis 
of the economic efficiency between the two interest-based components.   
The variables (described in sections below), representing (i) capital resources: 
DQ – 
amount of numeraire good borrowed (i.e., demand for funds), 
SQ  – amount of numeraire 
good disbursed (i.e., supply of funds), 0P – initial project value, 1q
~ , 1P
~
; or (ii) consumption 
parameters of the two agents: L1
L
0
EM
1
EM
0 c
~,c,c~,c , are denominated in terms of the numeraire 
good (in real terms).
29
  The numeraire good is perishable, which thus warrants the 
entrepreneur-manager and lender to invest in the real and financial assets, respectively.  Our 
                                                   
26  We implicitly assume the existence of information architecture, where property rights, foreclosure 
procedures needed for the underlying real assets of a firm to serve as collateral and accurate methods of 
valuation are well established (see Levine et al., 2000). 
27 Our model employs a two-period version of the well-known Lucas (1978) model to price equity under risk-
free and risky debt claims.  Extension of model beyond this period enhances symmetric information as 
multi-period contracting reveals the behavioural preferences of the entrepreneur-manager (see Hosios and 
Peters, 1989). 
28 For simplicity, we assume that the endowments are not stochastic.  If they were to be stochastic, then the 
asset and loan pricing conditions would be contingent on the correlation between the endowment and the 
portfolio owned by either investor.  Nonetheless, the quality of our results would not change with the 
addition of this intricate feature of the endowment. 
29  If QD < 0, we will invert the model by making the entrepreneur-manager a lender and vice-versa.  
However, in the model we treat the entrepreneur-manager as having sole access to the project (eg. 
specialised skill) and the lender does not. 
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analysis is carried out foremost by modelling both agents in this economy (Sections 3.1 and 
3.2), imposing market clearing conditions for both loans and the project (Section 3.3), and 
solving the model (for the loan amount, fractional investment in the project and interest rate), 
and the resultant discussion (Section 3.4).   
3.1 The entrepreneur-manager (as an agent in the financial contract) 
The goal of this agent is to optimally undertake ‘s’ fraction of the project and 
DQ
amount of debt, in order to maximise her expected consumption utility.  
Max. )}c~γU(){U(cE EM1
EM
00   
 (in s,e,e,Q EM1
EM
0
D ) 
subject to her temporal budget constraint 
]Q[sPesPQec D0
EM
00
DEM
0
EM
0    (1) 
)i
~
(1Q)P
~
q~[s(ec~ D11
EM
1
EM
1    (2)  
Where: 0E {
.} is the expectation of the entrepreneur-manager at time 0. 
U (.) is a strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable (Von Neumann-
Morgenstern) utility function.  
EM
0e  and 
EM
1e  are respective endowments at times 0 and 1. 
γ  is the discount factor where (0,1)γ .  
s is the fractional investment in the project. 
DQ  is the amount of numeraire good borrowed. 
0P  is the endogenous price of the project (incorporating all relevant transaction 
costs). 
i
~
is the real interest rate.
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1q
~ is the net operating income of the project. 
1P
~
 is the terminal value of the project. 
                                                   
30  It is fixed for a risk-free loan and stochastic for a risky one.  In contrast to existing literature (Glaeser and 
Scheinkman, 1988; Rubin, 2011), we do not distinguish between loans for consumption and those for 
investment.  This is because investments are undertaken by economic agents to smoothen consumption.  
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EM
1
EM
0 c
~,c are the consumption of the entrepreneur at times 0 and 1, respectively. 
The budget constraint at t = 0 (Equation 1) illustrates consumption utilisation of the 
initial endowment ( EM
0e ), after deducting 0sP for the purchase of ‘ s ’ fraction of a project 
financed by an interest-based loan of
DQ .  The budget constraint at t = 1 (Equation 2) 
incorporates consumption from the future endowment (
EM
1e ) in addition to the net payoffs of 
‘s’ fraction of a project after deducting the loan payment with interest 
)].i
~
(1Q)P
~
q~[s( D11    Therefore, non-project resources ensuing from the initial 
endowment and loan proceeds are expended in period zero to consume payoffs from project 
(net of loan payment) in period one. 
The Lagrangian L can be written as 
]}c~)]i
~
(1Q)P
~
q~[s(γ[eλ]cQsP[eλ)c~γU(){[U(cEL EM1
D
11
EM
11
EM
0
D
0
EM
00
EM
1
EM
00 
 
The First Order Necessary Conditions (F.O.N.C.s) are: 
(i) At the optimum, the benefit of borrowing is equal to its associated cost.  This simplifies 
the demand function for the loan described as follows.  The inter-temporal marginal 
rate of substitution (IMRS) of the entrepreneur-manager )]
)(cU'
)c~(U'
γ([IMRS
EM
0
EM
1
EM   times 
the compound factor, consisting of one plus the real rate of interest, is equal to the unit 
value of funds loaned.  
1}
)(cU'
)i
~
)(1c~(U'
{γE
EM
0
EM
1
0 

 (3) 
For a risk-free (RF) loan (see Figure 1) Equation (3) can be rewritten as 
1}
)(cU'
)i)(1c~(U'
{γE
EM
0
RF
EM
1
0 

 (3a) 
Figure 1 illustrates the profile of loan payoffs in normal (default-free) states of the 
economy.  The model assumes only two claimants to the project payoffs, the lender and 
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entrepreneur-manager.  The equity payoffs reflect that the latter earns the residual value 
after meeting the loan and interest accruing to the lender.   
Figure 1: Risk-free loan and equity payoffs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For a risky loan (see Figure 2), Equation (3) can be rewritten as 






Z
EM
0
Risky
EM
1j
'Z
0
D
Risky
EM
0
1j1j
EM
1j
1
)(cU'
]i)[1(cU
γdj
)Q(cU'
]P
~
q~)[c~(U'
γ  (3b)
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Unlike the risk-free alternative, Figure 2 of Equation 3(b) incorporates two integral 
components: (i) default states (AFBG) before reaching the critical state ‘Z’; and (ii) 
normal states above it.  The critical state ‘Z’ is defined as the future state of the 
economy up to which the entrepreneur-manager is technically in default of her loan 
obligations, that is Zj),P(q)i(1Q 1j1jRisky
D
Risky 
. 
  
                                                   
31 The notation dj is defined as follows: dj = f(q1j + P1j)d(q1j + P1j), where f(
.) represents the joint 
probability density function of (q1 + P1). 
State of economy (j) 
Risk-free loan 
payoffs 
Loan + interest 
State of economy (j) 
Equity 
payoffs 
+ 
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Figure 2: Risky loan and equity payoffs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(ii) At the optimum, the entrepreneur-manager will only bid for that fraction of a project 
that makes the net benefit of ownership equal to zero.  Similarly, she will avoid 
investing in a project if net benefits are less than zero.  This simplifies the demand 
function for a project described as follows.  The price of the project bid by the 
entrepreneur-manager is equal to the IMRS of the entrepreneur-manager ( EMIMRS ) 
times the proceeds from the net operating income plus the residual value. 
}
)(cU'
]P
~
q~)[c~(U'
{γEP
EM
0
11
EM
1
00

  (4) 
For a risk-free loan, Equation (4) retains as follows 
}
)(cU'
]P
~
q~)[c~(U'
{γEP
EM
0
11
EM
1
00

  (4a)  
For a risky loan, Equation (4) can be rewritten as  

 

Z
EM
0
1j1j
EM
1
0 dj
)(cU'
]P
~
q~)[c~(U'
γP  (4b) 
Z 
A 
 F 
G 
B H 
Actual project 
payoffs 
Expected 
State of economy (j) 
Risky loan 
payoffs 
Loan + interest 
State of economy (j) 
Equity 
payoffs 
+ 
Destruction in asset value.  This 
contributes to financial fragility. 
‘Tainted equity contract’ displaying a 
profile akin to a call option. 
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It should be noted that a risky loan is welfare reducing, as the entrepreneur-manager 
loses her key asset in the default state of the economy (AFBG), below the critical state ‘‘Z’ 
(see Figure 2).     
3.2 The lender (as the principal of the financial contract) 
Similar to the previous case, the goal of the lender is to optimally fund the project with 
SQ amount of debt to maximise his expected consumption utility. 
Max. )}c~V(γ){V(cE L1
LL
00   
 (in L1
L
0
S c,c,Q ) 
subject to his temporal budget constraint 
SL
0
L
0 Qec   (5) 
)i
~
(1Qec~ SL1
L
1   (6) 
Where: V(.) represents a strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable (Von 
Neumann-Morgenstern) utility function of the lender. Finally, the notations with 
primes have the same meaning as that for the entrepreneur-manager. 
The budget constraint at t = 0 (Equation 5) denotes consumption stemming from the 
initial endowment ( L0e ) after disbursing a loan of 
SQ .  The budget constraint at t = 1 
(Equation 6) represents consumption resulting from the future endowment (
L
1e ) along with 
the net reimbursement of the loan payment with interest )]i
~
(1[QS  .  Here too, non-project 
resources emanating from the initial endowment are expended in period zero to consume loan 
payoffs in period one. 
The Lagrangian L can be written as 
]}c~)i
~
(1Q[eγλ]cQ[eλ)]c~V(γ){[V(cEL L1
SL
1
LL
1
L
0
SL
0
L
0
L
1
LL
00
L   
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The F.O.N.C.s  is: 
(i) At the optimum, the benefit of lending should equal its associated cost.  This simplifies 
the supply function for a loan, described as follows.  The IMRS of the lender (
LIMRS ) 
times the compound factor, consisting of one plus the real rate of interest is equal to the 
unit value of the funds loaned. 
1}
)(cV'
)i
~
)(1c~(V'
{Eγ
L
0
L
1
0
L 

 (7) 
For a risk-free loan Equation (7) simplifies to 
1}
)(cV'
)i)(1(cV'
{Eγ
L
0
RF
L
1
0
L 

 (7a) 
For a risky loan Equation (7) simplifies to 






Z
L
0
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L
1j
'
L
Z
0
S
Risky
L
0
1j1j
L
1jL 1
)(cV'
]i)[1c~(V
γdj
)Q(cV'
]P
~
q~)[c~(V'
kγ    (7b) 
Equation (7b) is derived by decomposing the expectation operator in Equation (7) into 
two integral components: (i) incorporating default states (AFBG) prior to the critical state 
‘Z’; and (ii) normal states above it (see again Figure 2).  The first integral reflects the fact 
that, in bankruptcy, the lender recoups a fraction ‘k’ (i.e., recovery rate) of the NOI (net 
operating income) plus terminal value of the project by foreclosing it on default.
32
  In 
contrast, the second integral reflects full contractual payments of principal and interests in the 
normal states of the economy. 
A unique constrained maximum of both agents’ objective function (under each of the 
risk-free and risky loan) requires that the following conditions are satisfied: First, the 
deterministic budget constraint (at t = 0) represented by Equations (1) and (5), along with the 
stochastic budget constraint (for each state of the economy at t = 1) as depicted by Equations 
(2) and (6) are satisfied; Second, the simplified versions of the F.O.N.C.s, i.e., Equations 
(3a)/(3b), (4a)(4b) and (7a)/(7b) are satisfied.  The second order conditions for a maximum 
                                                   
32  This assumption implies (1-k)% is the sum of direct and indirect costs of loan default. 
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are automatically satisfied, based on Chiang’s (1984) result for a strictly concave and twice 
continuously differentiable utility function with linear constraints. 
3.3 Market clearing condition and regulatory constraint 
The following conditions are necessary for equilibrium: 
(i) For the debt market to be in equilibrium: 
Funds Borrowed (
DQ ) = Funds Lent (
SQ ). (8) 
(ii) For the asset (project) market to be in equilibrium: 
The fractional ownership of a project owned must total 100%. Since entrepreneurs do 
not like to relinquish control of the venture to financiers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Sargent, 1987).  
s  = 1 (9) 
 3.4 Model solutions 
Assuming competitive markets and no initial capital constraints, two unique and 
distinct Rational Expectations Equilibria (REE – implying a maximum of two equilibria) are 
feasible for the risk-averse entrepreneur-manager under interest-based risk-free and risky loan 
features, upon satisfaction of their F.O.N.C.s, as derived in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. 
3.4.1  Necessary conditions for model solutions 
Proposition 1: A REE for a risk-free loan requires satisfaction of the following 
necessary conditions: 
(i) Basic Condition: The payoffs of a project (composed of the sum of its NOI plus 
terminal value) are strictly positive even in the worst state of the economy (in the 
following period).  That is, min. (q
1j 
+ P
1j
) > 0.  This requires the underlying real assets 
of the project to be of high quality.  This condition is consistent with the prognosis of 
Shleifer and Vishny (1992).
33
 
                                                   
33 Shleifer and Vishny (1992) find liquidation value as a significant factor in debt capacity decisions.  This is 
also found in Benmelech et al. (2005).  
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(ii) Debt Pricing Condition requires equality between the demand and supply functions for 
loan financing. 
1
)(cV'
)i)(1(cV'
{Eγ}
)(cU'
)i)(1c~(U'
{γE
L
0
RF
L
1
0
L
EM
0
RF
EM
1
0 



 (10a) 
The above equation implies that for equilibrium to exist, the IMRS of both agents in the 
economy must adjust to solve for the unique price of the loan in terms of the interest 
rate and the loan amount.  
(iii) Asset (Project) Pricing Condition requires the price of the project bid by the 
entrepreneur-manager to be equal to the expected value of the product of the IMRS of 
the entrepreneur-manager (
EMIMRS ) times the project payoffs stemming from the NOI 
and the terminal value. 
}
)(cU'
]P
~
q~)[c~(U'
{γEP
EM
0
11
EM
1
00

  (11a) 
Proof:  See the Appendix. 
Proposition 2: A REE for a risky loan requires satisfaction of the following necessary 
conditions: 
(i) Basic Conditions: (a) The loan is structured in such a way that it involves default in 
some state of the economy in the following period; (b) The interest rate contracted for 
the risky loan is greater than that for the corresponding risk-free loan solution 
determined above; (c) Finally, the debt ratio for the risky loan is greater than that for 
the corresponding risk-free loan solution determined in Proposition 1. 
(ii) Debt Pricing Condition requires equality between the demand and supply functions for 
risky loan financing. 
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(iii) Asset (Project) Pricing Condition requires: 
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 
  (11b) 
Proof:  See the Appendix. 
3.4.2 Key results 
3.4.2(a) Theorem 
 Project financing is undertaken in an economically efficient financial package that 
minimises the endogenous agency cost of debt.  The following general results can be inferred 
from the model.  First, if agency cost (stemming from the risk of the project and the costs of 
default) is low, then the risky loan is at best economically at par or neutral (and not 
economically more efficient) to its risk-free competitor.  It also depicts a hierarchical order of 
decreasing economic efficiency with increasing agency cost of debt (attributed to default 
costs).  In either case, the loan is priced to satisfy the Basic Condition, Debt Pricing 
Condition and Asset Pricing Condition described in Propositions 1 and 2.  In the case of a 
risky loan, the debt pricing condition incorporates the risk of the project that is transmitted to 
the lender along with the costs of default (see Equation 10b).  Our result also indicates an 
amalgamation of the Pecking Order Theory (in the absence of asymmetric information, i.e., 
by internalising the agency cost of debt – see Myers and Majluf, 1984) and Static Trade-Off 
Theory (in the absence of taxes, i.e., due to consumption smoothing – see Myers, 1984a).  
This, thus, debunks the criticality of asymmetric information and taxes that belies both 
theories, respectively.       
Second, the equilibria indicate the potential of either lender or entrepreneur-manager to 
expropriate wealth from each other if i > runleveraged or i < 0, respectively, where runleveraged is 
the expected unleveraged return from the project.
34, 35
  To mitigate expropriation of wealth by 
                                                   
34  Expropriation of wealth by either lender or entrepreneur-manager need not necessarily exist in only 
uncompetitive markets (see discussions by Bond et al. (2009) on mortgage financing market, Henderson 
and Pearson (2011) on structured financial instruments, Palank (2010) on real estate financing, and 
Harding et al. (2010) on emergency credit facilities provided by the Federal Reserve).   
35  If our two-period (i.e., short-run) economy is extended to a multi-period (i.e., long-run) one, both 
solutions, that is i > runleveraged or i < 0, yield non-sustainable equilibria.  Intuitively, the entrepreneur-
manager (or financier) will exit the project (or the financial intermediation market) respectively, if their 
resources are progressively dissipated. 
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either lender or entrepreneur-manager, we posit that a just and an equitable return should be, 
as a rule of thumb, within the following bounds:
36
  
0 ≤ i ≤ runleveraged         (12)
 
 
Third, the economically neutral risky debt solution conveys fragility to the financial 
system.  This is due to the interconnectedness of businesses and financial markets (Anand et 
al., 2013).  When the entrepreneur-manager defaults, this can have a domino effect on her 
suppliers as well as clients.  If suppliers and/or clients are serviced by the same financial 
institution, this has an overall negative impact on the financial system (see Figure 3).  Where 
there is a high level of uncertainty regarding the solvency of the firm or financial institution, 
this can lead to a freeze in trade and/or credit markets (see: (i) Akerlof (1970) for an example 
of a breakdown in the used car market; and (ii) Milne and Wood (2008) on the impact of a 
credit freeze ensuing from the bankruptcy of Northern Rock in the United Kingdom).  In the 
worst case, it could exacerbate systemic risk and cause financial contagion in neighbouring 
networks.  
Figure 3: Stylised financial system network 
 
                                                   
36 An alternative payoff structure based on a collateralised financial package is discussed in Besley and 
Ghatak (2009, p.21).  The authors posit that for proper recompense of the lender, his risky interest rate  
should be supported by the collateral value of the pledged asset and opportunity cost of the loan.  It should 
be noted that this result is derived in a partial equilibrium framework (assuming the exogeneity of default) 
in contrast to our general equilibrium one with endogeneity of default. 
Firms 
International banks 
Domestic banks 
Credit defaults 
Credit links 
Equity links 
Source: adapted from Anand et al. (2013) 
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Fourth, if the three conditions (i.e., Basic Condition, Debt Pricing Condition and Asset 
Pricing Condition) in Propositions 1 or/and 2 are not satisfied, we will fail to have an 
equilibrium.  This implies that endogenous agency cost of debt deter the exchange of 
financial claims leading to autarky.  This situation is akin to financial exclusion of the 
entrepreneur, which necessitates intervention in the market.  An example of government 
policy intervention is the Small Business Administration (SBA) in the United States, 
established to assist entrepreneurs with low cost loans by providing credit guarantees.
37
  The 
Islamic equivalent is the employment of charitable sources to nurture those borrowers who 
are not catered for by mainstream intermediaries. 
Proof: see the Appendix. 
3.4.2(b) Explanation of the above results 
 The presence of agency cost of debt stemming from project volatility and asset 
recovery rates (default risk) influences the hierarchical order of economically efficient 
financing structures.  First, the prominence of the risk-free loan equilibrium under zero 
agency cost of debt is consistent with the prognosis of Myers (2001, p.96) who states that, 
“Conflicts between debt and equity investors only arise when there is a risk of default.  If debt 
is totally free of default risk, debt holders have no interest in the income, value or risk of the 
firm.  But if there is a chance of default, then shareholders gain at the expense of debt 
investors”.  Second, risky loan equilibrium is contingent on the high risk-tolerance of lenders 
and low costs of default.  This facility is at best economically neutral to that of a risk-free 
loan.  With the occurrence of default, lenders recoup only a fraction of the projects terminal 
value, whilst in a normal state, the lender secures full payment of his principal and the 
contracted interest.  Additionally, risky loans also suffer from underinvestment issue 
discussed in Myers (1977).  From the perspective of the entrepreneur-manager, risky loans 
are welfare reducing, since the lender embeds the default cost when pricing the loan, which is 
borne by the entrepreneur-manager.  Finally, where the quality of the underlying asset is poor 
or there is excessive cost of default, leverage is not feasible, leading to autarky.  This result is 
                                                   
37 See Garvin (1971) on presence of capital gap for small businesses, particularly in the context of minority 
enterprises in the United States.  
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aligned with Jensen and Meckling (1976) who argue that in extreme situations, the 
entrepreneur-manager is left to bear the brunt of the agency cost of debt.
38
 
Thus, our results illustrate an amalgamation of the Pecking Order Theory (in the 
absence of asymmetric information) and the Static Trade-off Theory (in the absence of taxes), 
attributed to endogenising the agency cost of debt and consumption smoothing.
39
  This is 
corroborated empirically in Leary and Roberts (2010, p.348), who state: “...a number of 
studies have shown that information asymmetry is neither necessary nor sufficient for a 
financing hierarchy to arise..... Myers (2003) illustrates how incentive conflicts, in the sense 
of Jensen and Meckling (1976) can generate a similar pecking order because the costs of 
private benefits stay internalized with a debt issuance but are shared with outside 
shareholders with an equity issuance”.  The criticality of tax shields is empirically contested 
in Fama and French (1998), where this is reiterated in their subsequent paper (2005, p.580): 
“The tax benefits of debt in enhancing market values have also proven elusive in direct tests”.  
Additionally, our results highlight the frustrations of researchers such as Fama and French 
(2002), who find it difficult to demarcate the impact of the two competing theories.  The 
futility of such attempts is voiced in their extensive empirical study on firm financing (2005, 
p.580-581): “...it is probably time to stop running empirical horse races between them (i.e., 
pecking order and trade-off theories) as stand-alone stories for capital structure.  Perhaps it 
is best to regard the two models as stable mates, with each having elements of truth that help 
explain some aspects of financing decisions”. 
The likelihood for expropriation of wealth increases where credit markets are 
fragmented, and worsens with borrowers’ poor credit ratings (Bhaduri, 1973).  Lenders may 
engage in predatory pricing to induce default as a means to expropriate further wealth from 
the entrepreneur-managers (Bhaduri, 1977; Bond et al., 2009).  This is despite the lenders’ 
awareness of the existing poor prospects of the entrepreneur-managers.  Bond et al. (2009) 
maintain that such financing with intention to expropriate wealth exacts borrowers’ welfare in 
the form of: (i) equity stripping from the value of the project; and (ii) income stripping linked 
to the servicing of the loan up to its foreclosure.  Even prime borrowers (i.e., those of lower 
                                                   
38  Our result contrasts with Aggarwal and Yousef (2000) who assume the existence of incomplete market that 
is invariant to mechanisms deployed to attenuate the twin issues of adverse selection and moral hazard (see 
Footnotes 13 and 14). 
39  The need for consumption smoothing is reiterated in Jensen and Meckling (1976, p.343), “…even in the 
absence of these tax benefits, debt would be utilized if the ability to exploit potential profitable investment 
opportunities is limited by the resources of the owner”. 
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risk) are exposed to expropriation, specifically where the equity value of the project is 
significant.  Such market power abuses can trigger breakdown of morality and trust in the 
market with repercussions akin to Akerlof’s (1970).  Expropriation risk from the agency cost 
of debt also arise where: (i) entrepreneur-managers are incentivised to transfer downside risk 
of the project to lender (Smith and Warner, 1979a; and Barnea et al., 1981a, term this as risk 
shifting or asset substitution); or (ii) when they refrain from investing if the generated wealth 
is perceived to flow solely to the lender (Myers, 1977, terms it as the underinvestment issue).  
In the case of negative equity or investment ‘underwater’, the entrepreneur-manager can 
inflict harm on the lender by engaging in strategic default (Foote et al., 2008). 
The economic neutrality of risky debt highlighted in our Theorem illustrates that pure 
interest-based debt contracts promote financial fragility. This accrues to the inflexibility of 
the arrangement to market changes.  This is because financing terms based on projected 
returns “...contain innumerable variables...Only in imagination can all these variables 
remain constant and be kept in equilibrium” (Fisher, 1933, p.337), and “[a]s long as loan 
contracts are expressed in conventional nominal terms, a high and variable rate of 
inflation—or more precisely a significant degree of uncertainty about the future price level— 
can play havoc with financial markets” (Modigliani, 1974, p.1).  With pure interest-based 
loans, the entrepreneur-manager is obliged to discharge the loan payment schedule 
irrespective of the state of the economy, and this is particularly onerous where project cash 
flows are depressed.  Figure 2 illustrates the difference between the theoretical or expected 
payoffs (ABH) with the real project outcome (FGH).  The extent of the departure erodes the 
project’s margin of safety that protects the entrepreneur-manager.  This in turn intensifies the 
project’s leveraged position, which represses its investment value and heightens financial 
distress.
40
  The ability to raise additional or new financing would be affected due to erosion in 
the entrepreneur-manager’s credit rating and net worth resulting in a case of ‘debt overhang’.  
Although it is possible to remediate the loan contract, it is nonetheless a costly option (Myers, 
2001).  When equity goes ‘underwater’, it becomes negative and serves as a ‘free option’ to 
the entrepreneur-manager, who may change her investment strategy by undertaking more 
risk.  This change in behaviour is termed as moral hazard.  As the entrepreneur-manager has 
‘no skin in the game’, she may strategically impair the underlying assets of the project or as 
illustrated in Figure 2, cause destruction to its asset value.  Ultimately, she may resort to 
                                                   
40 The Qur’ān (2:280) calls for creditors to provide latitude to debtors faced with financial hardship.  In the 
second half of the same verse, the Qur’ān enjoins a greater reward to those who forfeit the said debts.  
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strategically default on the project.  Apart from the above, we also find issues with pure 
interest-based debt structure even during good states of the economy.  Specifically, it suffers 
from underinvestment and risk shifting issues due to agency cost of debt.  
Our results that link pure interest-based loans to financial exclusion augment existing 
studies that confine this issue to only resource, self-exclusion, conditions, price and 
marketing (Kempson et al., 2000).  The pervasiveness of financial relations in societal 
functioning causes those having financial difficulties in accessing these services to not only 
being socially excluded, but also triggers other socio-welfare issues (see (i) HM Treasury 
(2004) on spillover effects of financial exclusion; and (ii) Gloukoviezoff (2007) on 
‘financialisation of social relations’ paradox).  In absence of financing from mainstream 
financial institutions, these economic agents resort to high cost alternative financial service 
providers for their financing needs (Kempson et al., 2000; HM Treasury, 2004). 
3.4.2(c) Illustrative numerical example 
Model calibration 
The following numerical simulation illustrates the potential expropriation of wealth by 
either financier (lender) or entrepreneur-manager (borrower) in the model presented in 
Sections 3.1 and 3.2.  Parameterisation in this simulation follows that of Mehra and Prescott 
(1985).  As mentioned, both entrepreneur-manager and lender seek to maximise their 
expected consumption utility, i.e., smooth their consumption streams from periods of high 
endowments to those of low endowments.  Due to the entrepreneur-manager budget 
constraint, she seeks to raise the requisite funds from the debt market in the form of a risk-
free or risky loan.   
We endow the entrepreneur-manager in our model with ‘m’ endowment (wealth 
multiple) of the lender in both periods, t = 0 and 1.  The values of endowment for both 
economic agents are as follows.  The endowment of the entrepreneur-manager ( EM0e ) is 
assumed to be (e – x), while that of lender ( L0e ) is assumed to be (e + x).  The two are related 
as defined by the equation: (e + x) = m(e – x), where m = 1 to 10.  We also assume the sum 
of the endowments of both parties in the beginning (t = 0) is 2 (i.e., 2ee L0
EM
0  ), while at 
the end of the period (t = 1) is 0.2 (i.e., 2.0ee
L
1
EM
1  ).  We solve for the individual 
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endowments over the two periods by alternating the values of m ranging from 1 to 10, where 
m = 1 illustrates homogeneity of wealth, while m > 1 illustrates heterogeneity of the same. 
Behaviour of both economic agents is represented by a Constant Relative Risk 
Aversion (CRRA) utility function, with the coefficient of risk aversion α ranging from 0.25 to 
5.   For mathematical tractability, we assume the project follows an equi-probable binomial 
distribution with the following payoffs: min. (q
1 
+ P
1
) = 1 – σ and max. (q
1 
+ P
1
) = 1 + σ, 
where the risk of the project varies from σ = 0% to 25%.  For simplicity, we assume there is 
just one binomial tree for the joint payoffs.  As with Mehra and Prescott (1985), the discount 
factor is set at γ = 0.99.  
 Model Solution
41
 
We solve simultaneously the debt pricing and asset (project) pricing conditions for the 
risk-free loan model comprising Equations (10a) and (11a).  Figure 4 illustrates our results 
for risk-free interest rates (iRF) and the unleveraged project returns (runleveraged) in relation to 
the wealth multiple (m).  An increase in wealth (i.e., m) for lenders, leads to a decrease in the 
interest rates (i.e., iRF).  This accrues to consumption smoothing and reduction of effective 
risk aversion due to wealth effects (see Guiso and Paiella, 2008).
42
  Where m > 5, we observe 
expropriation of wealth of lender by borrower as the unleveraged project return is greater 
than the equilibrium risk-free loan interest rate, i.e., r
unleveraged
 > iRF.  Changes in m from 1 to 
10 (not illustrated here) also lead to an increase in the debt ratio.  This is attributed to the 
expansion of the supply of loan (due to a decrease in interest rate) and a simultaneous 
decrease in the value of the project value as illustrated in Figure 4 (increase in r unleveraged). 
                                                   
41  The simulation is computed using Mathematica 8 software package. 
42  Due to the above mentioned inter-relation in the endowment for both agents, whereby an increase in 
wealth for the lender leads to a simultaneous decrease in the same for the entrepreneur, this results in 
heightened risk aversion for the entrepreneur-manager.  In accordance with Guiso and Paiella (2008), this 
thus leads to (i) reduction in the entrepreneur-manager project price bid (sP0); and (ii) an increase in the 
unleveraged project returns (runleveraged).  
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Figure 4: Risk-free loan interest rate (iRF)/ unleveraged project returns (runleveraged) 
relationship with wealth multiple (m) 
 
 Next, we solve for the risky loan debt pricing and asset (project) pricing conditions 
comprising Equations (10b) by varying the costs of default (1–k%) and Equations (11b), 
respectively.  As a base case of our model solution, we assume (i) highest project risk of σ = 
5%; and (ii) wealth multiple m = 10.  For this particular wealth multiple, we realise 
endowment for the entrepreneur-manager at t = 0 and t = 1 of EM0e = 0.18182 and 
EM
1e = 
1.8182, respectively.  On the other hand, the endowment for the lender is L0e = 0.018182 (t = 
0) and 
L
1e  = 0.18182 (t = 1).  At the selected project risk of σ = 25%, we do not realise any 
solution for coefficient of risk aversion α > 0.25.  This thus demonstrates that a low risk 
aversion level leads to unique solution illustrating the above point of view of leverage along 
with consumption smoothing.  On the other hand, a high risk aversion level leads to autarky 
(i.e., no solution).   
 Table 2 illustrates the equi-efficient solutions, where the lender prefers the risky loan, 
whilst the entrepreneur-manager prefers the risk-free alternative.  The choice of the lender is 
attributed to expropriation of wealth by him, as the equilibrium risky loan interest rate is 
greater than the unleveraged project return, i.e., iRisky > runleveraged,  for default costs (1–k%) 
ranging from 0 to 0.1.
43
  Note that for values of k below 0.8, there are no risky equilibrium 
indicating the detrimental impact of agency cost of debt in pure interest based loans.  The 
                                                   
43  This implies a recovery rate of 0.9  k  1. 
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entrepreneur-manager preference for risk-free loan is attributed to the expropriation of wealth 
by her as the interest rate is less than zero, at iRF = -1.69%.   
Table 2: Simulation results for risk-free and risky loans with risk aversion 
level αEM = αL = 0.25 
Case A (Risk-free loan) 
 P0 Q 
Debt ratio 
(%) 
 
runleveraged 
(%) 
 
iRF 
(%) SumU(Eq) SumU(D) 
 0.90193 0.7710 85.48 10.87 -1.69 0.56245 2.64019 
        
Case B (Risky loan) 
k P
0
 Q 
Debt ratio 
(%) 
 
runleveraged 
(%) 
 
iRisky 
(%) SumU(Eq) SumU(D) 
1.00 0.9302 0.8181 87.95 7.50 11.09 0.5199 2.7422 
0.95 0.9149 0.7998 87.41 9.30 11.43 0.5251 2.7434 
0.90 0.8989 0.7805 86.83 11.25 11.73 0.5308 2.7438 
0.85 0.8819 0.7602 86.20 13.39 11.95 0.5372 2.6355 
0.80 0.8638 0.7386 85.51 15.77 12.07 0.5443 2.6256 
Notes: The model is solved for the endogenous variables P
0
, Q and i where P
0 
is the price of the project, Q is the 
loan amount, and i is the interest rate.  These are used to derive the values of the sum of expected utilities of the 
entrepreneur and the lender, denoted as SumU(Eq) and SumU(D), respectively.  The exogenous parameters are 
assumed to be as follows: (i) all agents have CRRA utility, αEM (coefficient of risk aversion) = αL = 0.25, γ 
(discount factor) = 0.99, endowments for the periods t = 0 and t = 1 are: 
EM
0e = 0.18182, 
L
0e = 1.8182, 
EM
1e = 
0.018182, 
L
1e = 0.18182; and (ii) the income plus liquidating value of the project follows an equi-probable 
binomial distribution such that: min (q
1
 + P
1
) = 0.75 and max (q
1
 + P
1
) = 1.25. 
4. Mechanism to mitigate expropriation of wealth and financial fragility  
Given this essay’s argument and other studies highlighting concerns on the 
expropriation of wealth and fragility of a financial system built centrally on pure interest-
based debt contracts, a more fundamental step is required to calibrate the core microstructure 
of financial contracts.  Studies on optimal capital structures such as Smith and Warner 
(1979a) and Billet et al. (2007) provide some initial solutions.  Our paper extends the 
framework of Ebrahim and Hussain (2010) augmented with that of Shiller (2008) on quasi-
equity structures (see Figure 5) that incorporates risk sharing between the lender and 
entrepreneur-manager.
44
   
                                                   
44 Information asymmetry has been cited as one of the reason for Islamic financial institutions’ reluctance to 
fully deploy profit and loss sharing financial modes (Kuran, 1995).  The primary reason for the prevalence 
of debt based contracts is for mitigation of the twin issues of information asymmetry and moral hazard.  
These are easily resolved in the business sector of the economy, as elaborated in Footnotes 13 and 14.  
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This participatory structure is attractive, for it ranks higher than pure interest-based 
debt, and is generally preferable to a convertible debt.  First, if this is configured to avoid 
expropriation of wealth, it leads to a more equitable resource allocation and enhances 
accountability in the project.  Second, quasi-equity structures exhibit economic efficiency 
along with a reduction in financial fragility (see Corollary p.160 in Ebrahim and Hussain, 
2010).
45
  Its malleability allows moulding the returns based on various combinations of the 
project specific value generation; namely appreciation, income or equity based (see Figure 5).  
The lender may choose to subsidise the project’s capped fixed lease payment in return for a 
share in the appreciation (Shared Appreciation Debt - SAD) or income (Shared Income Debt 
- SID) in excess of the critical capped amount of the project.  Alternatively, he may choose a 
Shared Equity Debt (SED), where he then becomes a co-owner of the project and shares in 
the income of the operations.  Through this, the lender can fulfil his financial objectives as 
well as map his risk preferences.
46
  Third, the options embedded in a quasi-equity contract 
provide the ‘equity kickers’ for alleviating risk-shifting or asset substitution issue of agency 
cost of debt (see Barnea et al., 1981a).  These ‘equity kickers’ enhance efficiency arising 
from the diversification within the financing structure as well as long run returns attributable 
to the equity returns.
47
  Fourth, the project collateral of tangible assets mitigates other aspects 
of agency cost of debt associated with underinvestment and debt overhang issues (see 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1992).  Nonetheless, agency issues can still emerge in the extreme 
situation of the SED.  This reflects the criticality of agency costs in capital structuring 
decisions.
48
  Finally, in contrast with convertible debt, quasi-equity contract allows the 
entrepreneur-manager to retain control rights over the project even in good state.     
On a macroeconomic perspective, a financial system operating on a participative mode 
exhibits loss enduring capacity due to the direct linkage between the banks’ assets and 
liabilities side.  Furthermore, a financial system, that allows quasi-equity participation by 
                                                   
45  Shiller (2008) views that quasi-equity structures (such as continuous-workout mortgages proposed by him) 
allow the continuance of the project despite faced with economic volatility.  This averts accumulation of 
problems to that of crisis level, which would in the current form of interest-based debt financing, trigger 
foreclosure calls by the lender (see also Shiller et al., 2013).  
46  Its malleability can address the concerns on reward-risk continuum raised by Kuran (1986).  A hybrid 
facility can also be employed as a primary funding vehicle as well as a workout one in the aftermath of a 
default. 
47 This concurs with established literature on portfolio diversification theory and empirical findings on the 
equity premium puzzle (see Markowitz, 1952; Mehra and Prescott, 1985; Kocherlakota, 1996).  
48 This illustrates that the assumption of perfect capital markets in the Modigliani and Miller (1958) Capital 
Irrelevant Hypothesis is quite strong one.  Market imperfections stemming from agency issues are quite 
crucial and should be given due consideration. 
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banks, exhibits economic enhancement as compared to a specialised banking system 
(Ebrahim and Hussain, 2010).  Apart from that, it also fulfils liquidity attributes, since it can 
be structured for trading on the secondary market.  Generally, a quasi-equity structure is 
welfare-enhancing, for it increases expected utility and promotes efficient resource allocation 
(see Ebrahim and Hussain, 2010).  We find that in extreme cases where any form of quasi 
structures are infeasible (i.e., presence of excessive agency costs), only then does the 
optimality of equity is realised, as discussed in Siddiqi (1983) and Chapra (2006).   
Figure 5: Participatory project financing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Mechanism to mitigate financial exclusion 
The existence of widespread financial exclusion within an interest-based financial 
system demonstrates the market’s failure to provide essential financial services, with 
repercussions on economic growth, poverty and income inequality (Beck and Demirguc-
Kunt, 2007).  This has prompted policy makers’ intervention in the market.  Nonetheless, 
given the magnitude, government alone is unlikely to solve the problem.  Our essay furthers 
the study of Salamon and Anheir (1996) on harnessing the ‘third sector’ in financial 
development, and hence economic growth and welfare.   
Here, Islamic societies with their rich heritage of charitable institutions provide an 
alternative avenue to foster indigenous ‘social capital’ to meet the excess demand for 
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financing that is underserviced by for-profits markets (Bremer, 2004).
49
  This concept is 
similarly found in the practices of Judaism.  In response, “each has developed different 
contractual forms of advancing funds for profitable investment that do not violate the 
prohibition of interest” (Lewinson, 1999, p.334).  For example, the existence of Jewish free 
loan societies is linked to the obligation in Judaism for extending free loans to poor persons.  
In the Islamic society, zakāt, sadaqah and other charitable modes are espoused in the 
religious tenets to assist the underprivileged.
50
   
It is recognised that whilst each individual is expected to exert effort to fulfil his/her 
needs, there may still be situations where these needs are unmet.  Therefore, charitable 
institutions would be required at the lower strata to help them move up the economic ladder, 
after which mainstream financial institution can play a better role (Gloukoviezoff, 2007).  
These examples are among the many possibilities towards ensuring financial inclusion of the 
underprivileged.  Nonetheless, the integration of this form of benefit must be structured with 
care to avoid the classic case of Samaritan’s dilemma.51 
6. The economic underdevelopment of the Muslim world  
We present the essence of the injunction on ribā an-nasi’ah is broadly aimed at: (i) 
protecting property rights, especially with regards to expropriation of assets; (ii) mandating 
efficient fragile free financial contracting; and (iii) enjoining the incorporation of charitable 
institutions to assist the economic pursuits of the underprivileged (see Table 3).  With respect 
to protection of property rights from expropriation risk, our paper concurs with that of the 
well-known Islamic historian Ibn Khaldun (1967), who points to the degeneration of the 
Muslim world to its failure to structure institutions to protect these rights.
52
  Before the 
                                                   
49  We recognise the impact of microfinance in improving the economic stature of the underprivileged.  It 
should be noted however, this form of joint liability lending has had its fair share of critics (Ghatak and 
Guinnane, 1999; Banyan, 2010).    
50 Linguistically, zakāt means cleansing or purity. Theologically, it means spiritual purification resulting 
from the giving of zakāt.  It is an obligation on wealth of the rich for the benefit of the recipients, 
institutionalised in the Qur’ān.  The aim is to uphold the principle of care that is essential in ensuring 
cohesiveness in communities’ well-being (Qur’ān 9:60; Esposito, 2003).  Sadaqah on the other hand is 
categorised as voluntary offering or alms from a person’s wealth and is a virtue that is highly promoted in 
Islam.  Selected Qur’ānic verses with specific references to charity include verses 2:43; 2:110 and 2:177. 
51  Although Islam enjoins charitable deeds (eg. Qurānic verse 5:2), it prohibits begging as it is best for the 
individual to be actively employed to uplift his economic status (Sahih Al-Bukhārī Vol. 2, 24:1470-1471; 
Sahih Muslim Vol. 3, 12:2396, 2400 and 2404).  Samaritan’s dilemma highlights concern on the potential 
permanent reliance on aid, which is contrary to the objective of these charitable funds.     
52 Its importance is reiterated by Ibn Taymiyah (1983, p.95) as follows: “God upholds the just state even if it 
is unbelieving, but does not uphold the unjust state even if it is Muslim”, for the Qur’ān enjoins the 
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conception of formal markets, an informal system shaped by religious precepts and social 
norms were efficient in governing exchanges. However, shifting paradigms warrant the 
institutionalisation of rights in the shape of a formalised and independent judiciary and legal 
system (North, 1981; Acemoglu et al., 2005).  In these Muslim states, the judiciary has not 
been allowed to be independent of the executive branch of their countries.
53
  This creates 
serious ramifications on governance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), entrepreneurial incentives 
(Johnson et al., 2002; Besley and Ghatak, 2009), and resource allocation (Beck et al., 2003; 
Claessens and Laeven, 2003).  In absentia, trading and contracting of usufruct, a core feature 
of any market economy (Hart and Moore, 1990; De Soto, 2000; Besley and Ghatak, 2009), 
will not thrive.  As highlighted by Levine (2005, p.68) “[States] with less effective investor 
protection laws tend to make shareholders and creditors reluctant to invest in firms, which 
drives down the price of corporate securities and increases the cost of capital to firms…Legal 
systems influence the effectiveness of property right protection and hence the ability of firms 
to raise capital and grow”.  
Table 3: Economic perspective of the ribā prohibition 
 Category  
Ribā al-fadl - the hidden ribā Ribā an-nasi’ah - the evident ribā 
 Application  
Barter transactions  Pure interest-bearing debt contracts 
  Rationalisation   
Exchange is inefficient, as it has the potential 
to expropriate assets of either party in the 
exchange of goods.  
 
The contract is (i) inefficient; and has the potential 
to (ii) expropriate assets of either lender or 
borrower; (iii) exacerbate financial fragility; and (iv) 
induce financial exclusion. 
   
 
  
 In general, the ribā prohibition delineates protection of rights of both contracting 
parties.  This is retrospective of the Shari’ah that accords protection of property rights 
as one of the five essential elements of the objectives of the law.     
 
 
On the issue of mandating efficient and fragile free contracting, we acknowledge that 
prior to the development of literature on financial economics; it was difficult for those 
                                                                                                                                                              
upholding of contractual obligations and abhors those who consume other people’s resources without right 
(Qur’ān 2:188; 4:29 and 161; 5:1; 16:90). 
53 Historically, this has not normally been the case, as exemplified by the actions of ‘Umar ibn Khattab, the 
successor (Caliph) of Prophet Muhammad who instigated the appointment of ‘Ubāda bin Sāmit as a judge 
(Qādi) and a preacher of Syria to ensure the upholding of proper governance (Footnote 2028, Hadith No. 
3852 Sahih Muslim). 
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untrained in this branch of social sciences, especially the religious scholars to reorient their 
juristic views with contemporary times.  The Shari’ah lethargy, illustrating the infatuation 
with classical financial contracts that were employed in a time of imperfect financial markets 
of the Prophet (PBUH) and Caliphs (Waywell, 2006; Khan, 2010), has led to the employment 
of hilah (legal stratagem) to the detriment of financial development, and hence economic 
growth.  Current time warrants incorporation of not only theological but also theoretical 
founding of finance and economic sciences in reforming Shari’ah interpretations.  To move 
forward, Islamic financial instruments and markets must satisfy the rigours of current 
economic settings.  Without this, innovation that just replicates economic outcomes of 
mainstream interest-based financing would only emit financial fragility in the financial 
markets and Muslim economic state.  Lastly, the necessity of establishing charitable 
institutions brings to fore the importance of sustainable economic growth.  Sustainability is 
secured not only through respect for property rights but also embedding charitable institutions 
within the system.
54
  This important element is distinctly weak in the present Muslim 
economic world, as illustrated by Kuran (2003) and needs to be addressed.   
To reiterate, we identify and connect the centuries of underdevelopment of the 
Muslim world to ‘poverty traps’ stemming from being stuck in a sequence of economic-
inferior equilibria.  Principally, this is attributed to: (i) obscure property rights stemming from 
‘extractive institutions’ established and promoted by the political elites to maximise their 
economic rents with disregard to societal welfare; (ii) lack of true financial advancement, 
where Shari’ah pronouncements are derived in seclusion of financial and economic 
perspective, thus impinging the robustness of Islamic innovations; and (iii) absence of 
welfare-enhancing institutions for the underprivileged that support equitable opportunity 
across the various sectors of the Muslim economy. 
7. Conclusion 
Premised on the Islamic Holy Scriptures and economic theory, this study illustrates 
how the prohibition of ribā an-nasi’ah in Islamic financing promotes societal welfare.  In 
contrast to classical Shari’ah scholars, we rationalise this religious injunction is to mitigate 
the issues of sub-optimal financial structures, expropriation of wealth, financial fragility and 
                                                   
54  This is rightly highlighted by Ibn Taymiyah (1951) on the contrast made in the Qur’ān (30:39) between 
ribā (with the attribute of expropriating wealth) and charity.  He illustrates that the expropriation aspect of 
interest leads to antagonism in society.  In contrast, charity cements the different social classes and brings 
about social cohesion.     
 56 
 
financial exclusion.  To illustrate the underlying rationale for the prohibition, we employ a 
capital structure model in rational expectations, general equilibrium setting of economic 
agents (entrepreneur-manager and lender) for project financing, thereby internalising the 
agency cost of debt. 
Our findings highlight issues with pure interest-based debt (see again Table 3).  First, 
even in a low agency cost environment, risky loans are at best economically at par or neutral 
to its risk free alternative, which integrates the Pecking Order and Static Trade-off Theories 
in the absence of asymmetric information and taxes.  Our results point to the following: (i) 
subjectivity of asymmetric information and taxes as a critical element in the Pecking Order 
and Static Trade-off Theories; and (ii) difficulty in disentangling the impact of the two 
theories.  This is empirically supported by other studies, such as Leary and Roberts (2010) 
and Fama and French (1998, 2002 and 2005).  Second, with interest-based loans there is 
potential for financiers to expropriate wealth of the borrower if the financial commitment is 
incommensurate with the project returns, and vice-versa.  This imbalance will, in the long-
run, cause non-sustainable equilibrium.  We also find elements of predatory pricing where 
lenders may price the loans to induce default.  In the case of the borrower, she may exercise 
risk shifting strategies, refrain from investing in growth opportunities, or in the extreme, opt 
for strategic default.  All three outcomes lead to sub-optimal resource allocation.  Third, 
given the interconnectedness of credit markets, pure interest-based debt contracts tend to 
amplify financial market volatility, and lay waste to any attempts to fire walls that are built to 
mitigate financial market contagion.  Given the inflexibility to deleverage, any financial or 
economic shocks can precipitate a chain of defaults leading to a financial contagion effect.  
This translates to financial instability that brings about negative repercussions on economic 
growth and poverty reduction.  Last, there may be pockets within a society where market 
clearing conditions can breakdown, particularly in the presence of agency cost of debt.  With 
the increasing financialisation of social relations, financial exclusion can negatively affect the 
economic potential of the underserved and unbanked.  A balanced financial deepening; a key 
element of financial development, is thus frustrated.   
Our response to the interest enigma is unique.  We find Profit and Loss Sharing (PLS – 
pure equity) arrangement, espoused in Islamic finance literature, as weak, whilst pure 
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interest-based debt contract is Shari’ah-economically inferior solution.55  We advocate quasi-
equity contracts which exhibit Shari’ah-economically efficient solution, given the issue of 
agency cost and fragility of pure interest-based debt contracts.  These contracts are also 
characterised by their malleability.  They can be structured to meet the financial objectives of 
the investor, their risk preferences, as well as fulfil liquidity attributes for secondary trading.  
The participatory element moderates inter-temporal marginal rate of substitution associated 
with agency cost issues.  Quasi-equity contracts can also be designed to satisfy the Shari’ah 
conditionality of financial contracts referred in Khan (2010).  Where there is a breakdown in 
the effective functioning of the financial markets, the Holy Scriptures explicate the 
deployment of charitable institutions, specifically zakāt, sadaqah and other charitable modes 
to assist the underprivileged. 
In contrast to other literature, we view the ‘long divergence’ in the financial and 
economic development of Muslim countries with that of developed economies lies in the 
Islamic modern states’ failure to: (i) uphold the protection of property rights that is 
quintessence of the prohibition of ribā an-nasi’ah; (ii) ‘push the envelope’ of ijtihad in 
tandem with contemporary financial progression; and (iii) establish institutions to fund the 
welfare of the underprivileged.  Our results corroborate studies by Inalcik (1969), Balla and 
Johnson (2009) and Kuran (2003).  It is imperative for the Muslim world to recognise its 
failings and address the above issues.  This requires: (i) invigorating joint ijtihad between 
financial economists, practitioners and religious scholars, as recommended by al Alwani 
(1991) to reconfigure instruments, institutions and markets; and (ii) establishing 
independence between the judiciary, legislative and executive branches of the government for 
protecting property rights. This is a critical precursor to unlock the latent economic prospects 
of assets held by economic agents and provide the much needed path to the development of 
the Muslim economy, without which the endowed resources of a modern Muslim state 
remain a mere ‘dead capital’ (De Soto, 2000).  
Lastly, one can argue that the prohibition of ribā an-nasi’ah applies to any deferred 
commutative exchanges.  Thus, it also pertains to other financial exchanges and not only to 
pure interest-based debt contracts as argued by Muslim jurists.  Having said that our capital 
                                                   
55 We term pure interest-based debt contracts as Shari’ah-economically inferior solution for two primary 
reasons attributed to the potential of expropriating wealth.  One, it is not a viable equilibrium in the long 
run if a firm or a financial intermediary’s assets are being gradually depleted.  Two, it creates social 
problems endangering the community at large (see again Ibn Taymiyah, 1951). 
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structure approach can also be extended to other financial exchanges such as hybrid, pure 
equity or leasing structures, to identify whether these contracts are fallible to the three issues 
highlighted above.  
 On a broader perspective, the negative effects of the recent financial crisis calls for a 
closer scrutiny on the form of financial system that best serves society’s welfare. 56  
Additionally, could there be possible convergence of Islamic and Western financial systems 
due to Western economies quantitative easing regime leading to the prevailing low policy 
rate.  Our initial take on the matter is that the present low interest rates (i.e., in some cases 
converging to nearly zero rates) in Western economies are an exception rather than the norm 
as affected states attempt to moderate the impact of economic recession.  The supporting 
funding by the government is still backed by elements of interest-based public debt.  In 
contrast, the prohibition of ribā an-nasi’ah warrants development of financial instruments 
that are non-ribāwi whilst still satisfying the risk-reward trade off to incentivise economic 
activity.   Nonetheless, these are indeed areas of interest for future research work.  
                                                   
56 See the commentary by Gross (2011) on effects of the recent financial crisis on investment incentive, 
sovereign debt market and overall economic growth, and Mohamad (2012) on disrepair of Western 
capitalism.  
 59 
 
Chapter 3: Can an interest-free credit 
facility be more efficient than a usurious 
payday loan? 
 
“Many people, particularly low-to-moderate income households, do not have access to 
mainstream financial products such as bank accounts and low-cost loans. Other households 
have access to a bank account, but nevertheless rely on more costly financial service 
providers for a variety of reasons. In addition to paying more for basic transaction and credit 
financial services, these households may be more vulnerable to loss or theft and often 
struggle to build credit histories and achieve financial security”. 
FDIC (2009, p.10) 
1. Introduction 
A survey by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in 2009 carries 
concerns on the extent of financial rationing faced by American households.
57, 58
  According 
to the FDIC (2009), approximately 17.9% or 21 million households who do have banking 
accounts subscribe to the services of alternative financial service providers.  With respect to 
their credit needs, these households have had to frequent these service providers, including 
payday lenders.  In a separate study, Lawrence and Elliehausen (2008) find 73% of the 
surveyed payday loan borrowers suffered rejection or limitation on their credit application 
(i.e., rationed or completely rationed out) by mainstream financiers, which is three times 
above the United States general population.  The use of payday loans are largely for 
unplanned events that highlights the liquidity constrained status of this cohort.   
Payday loans or cash advances, are structured to function as a short term liquidity 
facility to smooth inter-temporal income shocks.  This involves issuance of single, small, 
short-term and unsecured consumer loan, ranging from $100 to $500.  An average payday 
loan is for less than $300, with repayment period of 7 to 30 days (Lawrence and Elliehausen, 
                                                   
57  A version of this essay co-authored with A. Jaafar and M.S. Ebrahim has been accepted in the forthcoming 
Journal of Economic Organization and Behaviour (see Salleh, et al., 2013) 
58  A further five million households may potentially face similar constraints but have been omitted from the 
above due to paucity of data on their usage of alternative financial services (FDIC, 2009). 
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2008).  The industry has been severely criticised for its high credit cost, in combination with 
wider issues of predatory practices and expropriation of wealth (OFT, 2013).
59
  Undergirding 
these criticisms is the interest servicing burden (Melzer, 2011) faced by these households 
who are in the moderate to low income bracket, and lack financial sophistication (Lawrence 
and Elliehausen, 2008).  The fees reflect the industry’s severe default rates (DeYoung and 
Phillips, 2009).
60
  Interestingly, despite heavy criticisms, there is still persistent demand for 
the products.  Thus, this highlights a pressing need to explore inexpensive financial 
alternatives to assuage the liquidity needs of this market segment.
61
  The fact that these 
households have had to exhaust other credit avenues alludes to the rationed out effect and 
potentially non-economic efficient solution.  To date, studies on payday loans have either 
focused on (i) credit behaviours; or (ii) welfare effect of the borrowers, without delving on 
economic efficient substitutes.   
 Recognising this shortcoming, the primary motivation of this paper is to expound an 
institutional design for the provision of inexpensive, short-term liquidity facility, which 
satisfies the latent demand of these households to smooth their inter-temporal exogenous 
income shocks.  Specifically, our study aims to explore the following question: Can an 
endogenous interest-free payday loan circuit provide a more efficient credit solution in 
contrast to current payday lenders and mainstream financiers?  This is achieved through 
integrating the two strands of literature on: (i) institutional structures related to endogenous 
circuits; with (ii) cultural beliefs (i.e., Islamic tenets) in particular, interest-free loans.
62,
 
63
  
                                                   
59  Predatory lending is characterised by “excessively high interest rates or fees, and abusive or unnecessary 
provisions that do not benefit the borrower” (Carr and Kolluri, 2001, p.1).  
60  The industry’s default rate of 21% is extremely risky compared to the 3% rate experienced by commercial 
banks (DeYoung and Phillips, 2009).  We find that the high cost concurs with credit literature to 
compensate for risk associated with these risky borrowers. 
61  Although we have used the United States as the primary reference base, this does not preclude the 
existence of payday lending in other developed and developing economies.      
62  Forms of endogenous circuits include informal institutions of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations 
(ROSCA) and Accumulating Savings and Credit Association (ASCRA), where members contribute 
periodically an amount of funds to a common pool over a specified period.  In ROSCA, the assignment of 
the pooled funds to each member is determined either (i) on random basis whereby the sequence is only 
known ex-post to the member at the point of disbursement; (ii) through a bidding process to the winning 
member who pledges higher contribution to the pot or one-time side payment to the other members; or (iii) 
fixed/ pre-determined ex-ante by the ROSCA governing authorities.  By pooling resources, it permits the 
mobilisation of funds that otherwise would have been kept out of circulation.  Whilst ASCRA shares 
similar features of its nemesis, there is greater flexibility in the amount and timing of each member 
contribution, larger membership, allocation of the pooled funds, and its greater social function (Bouman, 
1995).  The motives for participating in ROSCA/ ASCRA ranges from savings mechanism to acquire 
durables, fund life-cycle events, self-control commitment device, insurance and investment avenue of 
surplus funds to either protect against social/ marital pressures or generate returns (Besley et al., 1993; 
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Our research motivation is consistent with that of Coase (1937) and Alchian (1950), who in 
their seminal papers rationalise efficient institutions as those that evolve and adapt to the 
environment to deliver services in a cost effective manner. Moreover, the approach taken in 
this paper to intertwine institutional design with culture is reflective of Acemoglu et al. 
(2005, p.424), who reiterate “belief differences clearly do play a role in shaping policies and 
institutions”.     
For the purpose of this paper, the target population are economically active households.  
This is consistent with the underwriting criteria of payday lenders that require borrowers to 
be in employment and bank account holders, as well as with the findings of the FDIC (2009) 
survey.  Additionally, our model is based on risk neutral economic agents.
64
  We illustrate the 
above through an institutional structure of an endogenous leverage circuit formed from 
member based contributions.
65
  This is followed by two stepped extensions that assimilate 
real world elements of having fraction of borrowers within a finite life circuit, and 
subsequently extending the circuit as a going concern with random repetitive borrowing.  The 
objective of the basic framework and the extensions is to solve for economic efficiency by 
simultaneously (i) ensuring availability of affordable credit (where credit is due); and (ii) 
moderating their commitment issues that promotes long-term financial security.  This is 
showcased by mathematically modelling a short term interest-free liquidity facility circuit 
that moderates adverse selection and moral hazard.   The beauty of the model lies in the 
structuring of the circuit, where members help one another to alleviate inter-temporal 
liquidity shocks such that the benefits of borrowing outweigh the cost of it.  This draws from 
the ‘barn raising’ practices in the United States frontiers discussed in Besley et al. (1993) and 
                                                                                                                                                              
Bouman, 1995; Dagnelie and LeMay-Boucher, 2012).  Mutual and financial cooperatives are the more 
advanced and formal forms of these circuits.    
63  Charitable concept of interest-free funding is also present in other Abrahamic faith.  For example, the 
existence of Jewish free loan societies is linked to the obligation in Judaism for extending free loans to the 
poor (Lewinson, 1999).  The integration of Islamic cultural beliefs in the design of this liquidity facility 
exemplifies its universality in ‘democratisation of finance’ to the masses. 
64  The paper adopts a simple framework of risk neutrality to derive close form solutions.  The model can be 
extended to risk-averse agents by incorporating higher opportunity cost of capital or discount rate ‘γ’ that 
comprises an imputed return ‘r’ (see equation (3) in Section 4).  However, we have chosen not to 
incorporate risk aversion as the resultant outcome only increases the threshold that the circuit needs to 
observe to ensure fulfilment of economic efficiency conditions, leaving its fundamentals unaffected.  
Moreover, this would limit financial participation contrary to the injunction of the Qur’ān (verse 30:39) 
which prefers charity over exorbitant cost of funding especially for the underprivileged.  Our approach is 
also consistent with Ebrahim (2009).    
65  We employ a generic term ‘circuit’ to signify all institutions where the principal and agent are the same 
individual.  The structure is akin to that of a non-profit institution. An administrator may be present but is 
not incentivised by rent-seeking motives.   
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captures Commons’s viewpoint (1931, p.651), where he states “... collective action is more 
than control and liberation of individual action-it is expansion of the will of the individual far 
beyond what he can do by his own puny acts”.66    
This paper contributes to existing literature from four perspectives.  First, it averts 
expropriation of wealth of these households through establishing an alternative recourse for 
liquidity funding.  This is in contrast with liquidity stripping from onerous interest charges of 
current payday loans.  It conjointly satisfies public policy call for expansion of affordable 
credit.  Second, our framework allows for satisfaction of liquidity needs of households as 
solution to rationing by mainstream financiers.  Third, we integrate interest-free loans in our 
liquidity facility.  This is drawn from charitable teachings, specifically from Islamic religious 
tenets that are proffered as a remedy to the prohibited ribā an-nasi’ah.  Thus, it unveils the 
economic potential of this antiquated financing, conceived from cultural ideals, as a financial 
development device.  Fourth, by binding eligibility to the liquidity facility with a member’s 
fulfilment of the periodical contributions ruling, it harnesses the commitment technology 
sacrosanct with endogenous leveraged circuit-based institution.
67
  This effectively moderates 
the issue of time-inconsistent preferences closely associated with payday loan borrowers as 
well as shelters them from liquidity gaps arising from exogenous shocks.  
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 details the landscape of 
the payday lending industry and related literature.  Section 3 discusses the rationale for the 
prohibition of ribā and its contrast against charitable modes in Islamic tenets.  In Section 4, 
we develop a simple model to illustrate the economic efficiency of endogenous interest-free 
payday loan circuit in addressing financial constraints of these households and its results.  
Finally, we conclude in Section 5.  
                                                   
66  Our model reiterates the significant developmental role of endogenous circuits in the nineteenth century. 
These circuits permit greater latitude to grant its customers affordable credit compared to profit-oriented 
mainstream financiers.  Recently, the economic importance of endogenous circuits in the United Kingdom 
was further boosted by the legislative reforms that enabled these institutions (i) greater market reach; and 
(ii) flexibility to determine its member incentive structures (see HM Treasury, 2012).  
67  Dagnelie and LeMay-Boucher (2012) provide empirical evidence on the use of ROSCA as a commitment 
device that binds households’ financial conduct from unnecessary spending and protect the savings against 
theft, losses or social pressures that dissipates the saved amount.  Whilst the demand for ROSCA and 
ASCRA is largely for planned endogenous events, Bouman (1995) does state that members are impelled to 
participate in these endogenous circuits to safeguard against emergency expenses arising from illness and 
other misfortunes.  In ASCRA, the insurance element is met through the disbursement of its accumulated 
loans. Unlike ROSCA and ASCRA where the member is required to make compensating payments (i.e., 
higher payment to compensate other members in a bidding ROSCA or interest on the loaned amount in 
ASCRA), our Model 3 (see Section 4) provides similar relief without the additional financial burden.    
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2. Landscape of payday loan industry and related literature 
Payday lending emerged in early 1990s in response to increased demand for short term 
credit following the spatial void created by withdrawal of mainstream banks from small 
loans, low profit margin business segment (OFT, 2010).  The convenience of fast 
disbursement, minimal or non-existent credit checks further adds to its attractiveness (FDIC, 
2009).  An indicator of its growth pace is the extensiveness of payday loan network across 
the United States.  Payday lenders have more branch presence then McDonalds and Starbucks 
combined (Zinman, 2010).  Based on the 2009 FDIC survey, approximately four million 
households have frequented payday lenders, which is now a $38.5 billion industry (FDIC, 
2009; CFSA, 2011).
68
  
Payday loan customers must be employed and banked to subscribe to these services and 
according to a survey by Lawrence and Elliehausen (2008) majority are in the moderate 
income bracket of $25,000 to $49,999.  The subscribers are mostly young, below the age of 
45, married or living with a partner and having children below the age of 18 years. They 
justify these households’ fit the life-cycle stage where credit demand is high.     
The survey by Lawrence and Elliehausen (2008) find majority are infrequent users of 
the payday lending facility.  However, there are selected few; accounting for 22.5% of total 
surveyed who have 14 or more loans in the same year.  These frequent users tend to rollover 
the outstanding loan.  Generally, these loans would run for 2 weeks or less, or over a 3–4 
week periods.  These frequent borrowers are more likely to have exposure to more than one 
payday loan, exhibiting the classic case of borrowing from Peter to pay Paul, where a loan 
drawn on a new payday lender is often used to offset against an old one.         
The primary complaint against payday lenders is the exorbitant finance charge.  Fees 
for a $100 loan range from $15 to $30, with annual percentage rate (APR) of 20%–300%.  
The extremely high cost in contrast to other near credit substitutes raises criticism from 
consumer advocates and public agencies.  According to industry players, the APR is resultant 
from the small loan size, given payday lenders’ high default rates.  Industry players argue that 
the $15 charge is definitely lower than the $50 flat rate returned check fees or a $25 covered 
overdraft (overdraft protection) by depository institutions (Morgan et al., 2012).     
                                                   
68  In the United Kingdom, the payday loan market is estimated to be worth at £2 billion–£2.2 billion in 
2011/2012, with three players controlling 57% of the total market loan value (OFT, 2013).   
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Payday lending is a regulated industry. It is subjected to state and federal laws and 
some players also subscribe to industry standards of the Community Finance Services 
Association (CFSA); an industry self-regulatory organisation (Lawrence and Elliehausen, 
2008).
69
  The United States established a new regulatory body, the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau in July 2011 to oversee matters related to consumer protection, including 
market conduct of payday loan industry.  This independent body is part of the financial 
reforms outlined in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
2010.
70
     
Studies on payday lending have primarily centred on two aspects; namely consumer 
credit behaviours and welfare effects on the availability or withdrawal of this credit.  Skiba 
and Tobacman (2008) seek to rationalise the demand for payday loans despite its excessively 
high fees.  They find that payday loan borrowers exhibit partially naive quasi hyperbolic 
discounting tendencies.  In that, the borrowers demonstrate overly optimistic forecast of 
future outcomes in respect of their own time preference, or their probability of absorbing 
future shocks.  
In a different study, Agarwal et al. (2009) find that the sampled population choose 
payday loans despite having unused liquidity on their credit cards.  This exemplifies 
existence of liquid debt puzzle, whereby individuals undervalue their financial options.  This 
also highlights the individuals’ lack of cognitive ability to discern costs across different 
financial products.  Gathergood (2012) points persistent indebtedness to poor financial 
literacy and self-control problems.  In such a case, individuals are more likely to succumb to 
impulsive consumption.  The ease of credit provided by high-cost credit providers including 
payday loan, further exacerbates this tendency and heighten the likelihood of over-
indebtedness. The study supports paternalistic approaches in regulations, i.e., preventing 
access to credit that pushes consumers to succumb to sub-optimal behaviour.   
In regards to its welfare effects, the evidence is still debatable.  Morse (2011) and 
Zinman (2010) to name a few, argue that accessibility to payday loan is welfare enhancing, 
                                                   
69  The industry is subjected to: (i) the Truth in Lending Act at the federal level that governs disclosure 
requirements; (ii) Fair Debt Collection Act that regulates debt collection practices; and (iii) National Bank 
Act that essentially allows the payday lender to enter into rent-a-bank model, which is now defunct by 
virtue of the stricter FDIC regulation on national chartered banks. The CFSA provides industry best 
practices that are essentially focused on consumer protection.   
70  The governing act for payday loan in the United Kingdom is the Consumer Credit Act 1974 and the 
industry is presently regulated by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT). 
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which is in contrast to Skiba and Tobacman (2009) and Melzer (2011).
71
  Using the 1996 
natural disaster in California as an event that has widespread economic effect on households, 
Morse (2011) finds that presence of payday lenders reduces emergency distress and serious 
criminal incidences.  Zinman (2010) finds that restricting access creates deterioration in 
financial position of Oregon households as opposed to those domiciled in Washington, as the 
control state.  Households in the restricted payday loan state experienced higher 
unemployment and reported an overall poor future financial outlook.  The negative effect of 
the regulatory ban on payday loan is worsened by the lack of affordable financial 
substitutes.
72
  On the other hand, Melzer (2011) construct the presence of payday loans 
impairs the financial welfare of the borrowers due to the debt servicing burden associated 
with this type of credit. 
3. Islamic prohibition of ribā and the contrast against charity 
Salleh et al. (2012) demonstrate that Islamic prohibition of ribā an-nasi’ah in credit 
transactions is attributed to the inclination for expropriation of wealth.  Using a capital 
structure approach, they observe inequity in pure interest-bearing debt structures that leads to 
two equilibrium cases.  First, in the case of financial repression, where the real interest rate is 
negative the lender’s assets are expropriated.  Second, in case of negative leverage, where the 
real interest rate is greater than the unleveraged expected return on the asset being financed, 
then the borrower’s assets are expropriated.  In the long-run, this creates imbalances or non-
sustainable equilibria.  When a borrower defaults, this can create a domino effect, given the 
interconnectedness of credit markets.  It effectively amplifies volatility within the financial 
system and thus precipitates financial fragility, as evidenced in the ongoing financial crisis.  
In extreme cases of agency costs of debt accruing to high project and default risks, this can 
lead to autarky or financial exclusion, with adverse impact on the underprivileged.  Their 
study alludes to interest-based financial contracts as being non-optimal or at best it is 
economic-neutral to a hybrid form.   
                                                   
71  Similar to Skiba and Tobacman (2009), Morgan et al. (2012) find some corroborative evidence of decline 
in Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings post payday loan ban.  However, the authors opine that this require 
further examination to affirm its robustness.  
72  Thirty three states permit payday lending with rules on payday loan terms including maximum fees, 
rollovers, loan size, licensing and examination requirements as well as collection procedures for past-due 
loans. Seventeen states totally prohibit offering of payday loans.  Contrary to the United States, the United 
Kingdom refrains from adopting intrusive regulatory measures, such as stringent price controls or complete 
ban on the services.  The OFT (2010) views such controls as market disruptive. 
 66 
 
Instead, the Qur’ān contrasts ribā with that of charity (sadaqah) (see verses 2:276-277, 
30-39).  Charity, as defined in the practice of Prophet Muhammad PBUH (Sunnah), is not 
only concerned with financial forms but also all types of good deeds (Sahih Al-Bukhārī Vol. 
2, 24:144; Sahih Muslim Vol. 3, 12:2329–2330).73  Piety through charitable deeds inculcates 
a sense of brotherhood and advances social welfare. As highlighted by Bremer (2004, p.7), 
“Charities ...provided a source of support for institutions and interest groups independent of, 
and sometimes in opposition, to the state.  Islamic charities have historically played an 
additional role in society, that of promoter of decentralized economic development. ...In this 
respect, they reflect the blending of religious and secular, the social and economic, that is the 
key characteristic of the Islamic idea”.  From a moral perspective, Ibn Taymiyah (1951), the 
great Islamic scholar, argues the element of charity cements social cohesiveness, whilst usury 
factionalises society.   
The Qur’ān censures the practice of creditors, who cumulate the amount due for every 
delay in settlement that leads to further financial hardship on the debtor.  Instead, it calls for 
the creditor to grant respite to the borrower such that, if the creditor were to forfeit the 
amount owed, this reflects a higher order of virtuousness, and will be rightly rewarded (verse 
2:280).  Unsurprisingly, the prohibition of ribā an-nasi’ah is also enjoined in the religious 
books of Islam’s sister religions, i.e., Judaism and Christianity (see Cornell, 2006).  
Both the Qur’ān and Sunnah have specific references for assisting the underprivileged.  
The financial forms of charity can be broadly categorised into zakāt (social welfare funds), 
waqf (philanthropic foundations) coupled with qard (interest-free loan) or salaf (synonymous 
with interest-free loan).  Zakāt forms one of the five pillars of Islam and is obligatory on 
one’s wealth for the benefit of the recipients identified in the Qur’ān (verse 9:60).  Of interest 
is the specific directive for financial resources to be allotted for the poor and needy.  
Although waqf (awqāf, plural) is not mentioned specifically in the Qur’ān, it plays an 
instrumental role in Islamic civilisation.  The earliest records on the practice of waqf can be 
traced to the Ottoman Empire in the eight century (Cizakca, 2000).  It is said that these 
philanthropic foundations were able to financially support the provision of social services in 
Muslim society at that time, and in turn help address economic disparity.  Such practice 
                                                   
73  Although Islam enjoins charitable deeds, it prohibits begging, for it is best to be actively employed to uplift 
one’s economic status (Sahih Al-Bukhārī Vol. 2, 24:1470–1471; Sahih Muslim Vol. 3, 12:2396, 2400 and 
2404). 
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involved the endowment of privately owned properties for charitable purposes in perpetuity.  
The revenue generated by the waqf is then utilised according to its objects.   
Qard signifies the extension of loan to a borrower from one’s resources without 
expectation of gains, whereby the lender forfeits the use of his resources during the loaned 
period.  Such is its prominence that it is ranked higher than charity and even equated as a loan 
to God himself (verses 2:245; 5:12; 57:11 and 18; 64:17; 73:20).
74
  This benevolent loan is 
also synonymous with salaf that connotes the extension of a loan, subject to repayment at a 
later time (Al-Zuhayli, 2003).   
From a fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) perspective, jurists are divided on the rights of the 
lender on the terms of the loan.  Two widely opposing views are that a lender has absolute 
rights to recall the loan at anytime; whilst others view that it is permissible for the lender to 
stipulate the loaned period and hence, both contracting parties should abide by it (see Al-
Zuhayli, 2003 on the debate by the four major Sunni schools of thought).  This ambiguity in 
the Shari’ah interpretation can cause adverse repercussions in current financial context that 
warrants property rights certainty.
75
  Underdevelopment of the fiqh provides ammunition to 
critique Islamic law (see Kuran, 2011).   
Despite these shortcomings, there is documented evidence where qard is deployed as a 
funding mechanism in modern financial dealings.  Ebrahim (2009) finds the well-to-do 
members of clans in Oman informally granting interest-free loans (qard) to their destitute 
clan members for home purchase.  In the same study, he explores the potential of formalising 
interest-free solutions for long-term real estate financing.  Other studies on interest-free 
structures include Darrat and Ebrahim (1999) who focus on open market operation instrument 
in a partial equilibrium framework of qard-based Malaysian Government Investment 
Certificates.  There are also existing practices such as the National Australia Bank (Australia) 
no interest loan schemes, Akhuwat (Pakistan) no interest microfinance and JAK Members 
Bank (Sweden). 
                                                   
74  Ali (2002) connotes qard to “spending in the cause of God” (footnote 710, p.245).  A benevolent loan does 
not exempt the borrower from honouring the debt.  The severity of non-repayment is highlighted in the 
Sunnah whereby even a martyr who is forgiven for every sin is still bound by his debt (Sahih Muslim Vol. 
5, 33:4883–4884).   
75  Earliest record on employment of qard by Az-Zubair also does not allude to its form and activity in which 
it was deployed (Sahih Al-Bukhārī Vol. 4, 57:3129). 
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Our model explores alternative platforms for deployment of this form of financing and 
augments present studies and actual practices mentioned above.  Furthermore, the 
employment of interest-free element emphasised in our paper provides a direct contrast to 
current payday usurious facility.  More importantly, according to religious injunction, if the 
expected return (r) on funds is gradually restrained to zero (moving from re to r′e and finally 
0), the supply of funds (S) will contract to a level where funding disappears (see Figure 6 
below).  This is the probable reason why scholars like Fazlur Rahman (1964) 
compartmentalises this form of funding to only philanthropic endeavours.  However, this 
study demonstrates that lending is revived by embedding the interest-free credit facility 
within a circuit, which promotes group insurance.  This is because members help each other 
when faced by misfortunes (exogenous liquidity shocks).   
Figure 6: Supply and demand of funds with changes to the expected returns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Model development 
This section details the mathematical design of an efficient interest-free short term 
payday loan facility (using endogenous leverage) to address the inter-temporal liquidity needs 
of payday loan borrowers.  Our endogenous leveraged circuit is founded in the works of 
institutional economics (Commons, 1931), and builds from the technology of ROSCA 
(Besley et al., 1993; Dagnelie and LeMay-Boucher, 2012), its associated hybrids; namely, 
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ASCRA (Bouman, 1995), and the more contemporary mutual and financial cooperative 
(Ebrahim, 2009).  Besides liquidity transformation, the circuit features akin to an Islamic 
insurance (takāful) or mutual scheme where members guarantee each other from unexpected 
damage, losses or misfortune (Bouman, 1995).   
Furthermore, unlike other endogenous leverage groupings, liquidity constrained 
members of the circuit receive short term interest-free payday loans, which are repaid at their 
next payday date.  Our model expounds the elements that need to be observed if an interest-
free loan that is enjoined in Islam is to have a profound impact in any financial development 
scheme.  Here, we demonstrate that this endogenous interest-free payday loan circuit 
integrated with appropriate constraints that circumvent adverse selection and moral hazard 
can be economically more efficient or at least neutral to that of its competitor, i.e., payday 
lender and mainstream financier. 
The interest-free payday loan circuit is structured as follows.  Individuals are required 
to become members by contributing monthly to a common pool of funds, i.e., circuit 
members.  In our model, members are risk neutral, and the demand for liquidity or payday 
loan is treated as exogenous.  Members can only apply for the interest-free loan, i.e., borrow, 
after qualifying a defined period of membership.  This gestation period has a two-fold effect.  
First, it allows the circuit to identify and assist the member in realisation of her/his financial 
goals.  Second, it allows member to build up equity cushion through their monthly 
contributions.  This effectively binds the member to the circuit and addresses member time-
inconsistent preferences.  In addition to these two covenants, other mandatory rulings to 
address adverse selection and moral hazard issues (i.e., default cost) include requirement for 
(i) direct deposit of member paycheque into the circuit; and (ii) existence of loan guarantor 
(see detailed explanation below).  Furthermore, once a member borrows from the circuit, 
she/he is required to undergo financial planning program to enhance her/his financial literacy.  
This helps errant members to plan ahead, alleviate future liquidity crises and stay debt free.   
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Figure 7: Stylised depiction of the various scenarios for Models 1-3 
 
 
A stylised depiction of the models set up is summarised in Figure 7.  This comprises of 
a basic institutional framework and two stepped extensions that embeds real-world 
practicalities.  Model 1 (see Limb A of Figure 7) illustrates the basic structure of our efficient 
interest-free endogenous leverage circuit across a one period cycle.  Here, all circuit members 
are savers and also liquidity constrained borrowers. This conforms to a self-insurance 
scheme.  The extension to this basic framework is provided in Models 2 and 3 (see again 
Limbs A and B of Figure 7).  In Model 2, we relax the simultaneity in borrowing needs.  That 
is, only fraction of members will borrow to tide their liquidity shortfall.  Model 3 further 
relaxes the elements whereby there is random multi-period borrowing that in the long-run 
approaches a steady state.  As shown in Figure 7 in the case of defaulting borrowers, the 
circuit retains the accumulated contributions or savings of the defaulters.  Otherwise, they 
receive their savings net of the amount loaned.  On the other hand, non-borrowing members 
are entitled to their savings.   
For all three models, we implicitly assume the existence of an information architecture, 
where property rights needed for the forthcoming paycheque to serve as collateral, accurate 
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methods of verifying or evaluating members’ income and bankruptcy procedures are well 
established (see Levine et al., 2000).  Individuals joining the circuit are assumed to have 
limited asset qualifying collateral and void of other alternative credit solutions, would have to 
subscribe to current high cost payday loan.  Each of the circuit members receives an 
exogenous flow of income.  The above assumptions are representative of the stylised facts of 
payday loan borrowers’ demographics (see Lawrence and Elliehausen, 2008; FDIC, 2009).    
4.1 Model 1: Institutional basic framework where all members are both savers and 
liquidity constrained borrowers  
Figure 8: All members are savers and also liquidity constrained borrowers 
 
 
 
 
(i) As depicted in Figure 8, each member is required to make periodic monthly 
contributions ‘C’ into a pooled fund, from time i = -m (at the point of membership) to i 
= 1 (the circuit terminal date).  Here, we adopt monthly contributions to maintain 
consistency with members’ income stream, i.e., paycheques are generally issued on 
monthly basis.  By instituting periodic contribution, it (i) moderates adverse selection, 
as it reveals the financial status of the prospective borrower through her/his income 
level (especially during the gestation period) as illustrated in the income constraint (see 
Equations (5)-(5a) below and also Akerlof, 1970); (ii) assists in long-run accumulation 
of wealth that minimises exposures to exogenous income shocks; (iii) acts as an equity 
buffer that minimises the likelihood of the member to strategically default on her/his 
borrowing (see Foote et al., 2008); and (iv) most importantly, it acts as a commitment 
device that moderates self-control issues associated with payday loan borrowers (see 
Skiba and Tobacman, 2008; Dagnelie and LeMay-Boucher, 2012).   
The accumulated periodic contribution, represented by ‘S’, forms the capital base of 
this circuit and is used to meet short term financial needs of liquidity constrained 
C(1-ζ) C(1-ζ) C(1-ζ) -Q(1-ζ) (1-α)(Q-S)+ αS 
-m -m+1 -m+2 1-n 1 
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members.
76
  This is given in Equation (1), where ‘m’ denotes the month building up to 
the disbursement of the interest-free payday loan facility. 



t
mi
mtCCS )1(
 
(1) 
When 1t  (as in Models 1 and 2), this culminates into  



1
)2(
mi
mCCS  (1a)     
(ii) After satisfying the minimum gestation period, liquidity constrained members qualify 
to draw ‘Q’ interest-free payday loan from the circuit at time i = 1-n (see Figure 8), 
where ‘n’ is a fraction of a month (i.e., n < 1 month).77  The interest-free facility 
resembles a bullet loan, where total repayment of principal ‘Q’ is made at terminal time 
i = 1.  The loan repayment is net of the accumulated contributions ‘S’. 
SQ   (2) 
(iii) To account for the opportunity cost of capital employed within the circuit, ‘C’ and ‘Q’ 
are discounted by ‘γ’.  That is, the monthly discount rate comprises of an imputed 
return ‘r’, which is equivalent to the average cost of fund incurred in mainstream credit 
market.   
r

1
1
  < 1,  r > 0 (3)  
(iv) We also incorporate the fractional transaction cost ‘ζ’ associated with administering the 
circuit, eg. management of members’ contributions and loan processing (Kontolaimou 
and Tsekouras, 2010), and fraction default ‘α’ (Jaffee and Russell, 1976).78, 79  It should 
                                                   
76  To assist in the circuit start up and reduce the lag in time to loan disbursement, the circuit may employ 
seed funding from charitable funds (e.g. zakāt and sadaqah funds).  Ideally for long-run stability, this 
charitable fund should be institutionalised and performs the central role of providing liquidity relief to 
individual circuits that may suffer from unforeseen shocks.  This is akin to the Verband, associative level 
of the German cooperative banking system (Biasin, 2010). 
77  This implies members face liquidity problems before their next paycheque. 
78  The institutional structure of the circuit already minimises upfront transaction costs compared to current 
payday lenders, as it: (i) benefits from non-profit motive management force; (ii) does not incur external 
funding costs; and (iii) is not bound to issue investment returns to its ‘depositors’.   
79  Intuitively, utility derived from an interest-free credit facility would be higher than subscribing to high cost 
current payday loans or face credit rationing from mainstream financier.  Therefore in such situations, we 
foresee that the (non) pecuniary costs associated with default penalty should be significantly severe such 
that it impels repayment of the loan (see Skiba and Tobacman (2008) for empirical evidence on the degree 
of reliance of these borrowers on payday loans for their liquidity needs).   
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be noted that this fractional default ‘α’ represents the proportion of defaulters (ex-post 
any recoveries from respective loan guarantors) from the circuit’s total population of 
borrowers.  The circuit efficiency is contingent on minimising transaction costs and 
default, as they can fritter away the circuit’s gains or cause erosion to its capital base 
(Coase, 1937; Alchian, 1950).  Both outflows are moderated by presence of covenants 
discussed below.  Additionally, the circuit also retains right of recourse on defaulting 
borrowers’ savings ‘αS’.   
In line with the circuit’s objectives, the discounted ‘γ’ contributions and interest-free 
loan after accounting for transaction ‘ζ’ costs and default ‘α’, coupled with net loan 
payoff, given by Equation (4) should at least be equal or greater than zero.
 80,
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Substituting ‘S’ in Equation (1) into Equation (4) gives us:  
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The periodic contribution in Equation (4a) form a geometric series that can be further 
simplified as follows: 
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(4b) 
                                                   
80  The circuit structure is designed to be contribution and time invariant for each member joining the pooled 
fund.  That is, each member is required to make periodic monthly contributions to the pooled fund ‘C’ 
from the point of membership at time i = –m to the circuit terminal date, i = 1 (in the case of Models 1 and 
2) and i = T (in the case of Model 3) (refer Equations (1) and (1a)).  This similarly applies to the 
aggregated member contributions.  Consequently, this does not affect the outcome of Equation (4).   
81  Each term in Equation (4) signifies either a cash inflow (represented by a positive sign) or an outflow 
(represented by a negative sign).  Each of these terms is discounted by ‘ ’ that comprises an imputed 
return ‘ ’, which is equivalent to the average cost of fund incurred in mainstream credit market.  This is a 
standard treatment of discounting in finance to account for the opportunity cost of capital (i.e., next best 
investment avenue forgone by the members).  The first term thus represents the discounted value of 
member contributions, while the third term represents that of payback of loans disbursed (netted against 
their aggregate contributions) after adjusting for defaults. 
Discounted monthly 
contributions net 
transaction costs 
Receipt of member 
monthly 
contributions 
Disbursement of 
interest-free payday 
loan to liquidity 
constrained members 
(borrowers) 
Repayment of 
non-defaulting 
borrowers’ 
savings net of 
outstanding loan  
Retention of 
defaulting 
borrowers’ 
savings  
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(4c) 
Potential maximum loan is, 
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(4d) 
To moderate the risk of adverse selection and moral hazard, it is imperative for the 
circuit to institute covenants as follows: 
(i) Income and loan constraint:  Each member is subjected to an after tax income test, 
where ‘y’ is the member’s income, to ascertain her/his capacity to meet her/his periodic 
contribution and loan obligation.  This not only supports responsible lending (Carr and 
Kolluri, 2001), but also moderates the adverse selection issues (Jaffee and Russell, 
1976).  The member’s financial capacity is represented by a multiple ‘b’ of her/his 
income and loan.   
(ia) Income constraint ‘b1’ 
Here, the income constraint ‘b1’ curtails the contribution ‘C’, given as follows:  
1b
C
y
 , which can be rewritten 
1b
y
C   (5)  
1
max
b
y
C   (5a) 
(ib) Loan constraint ‘b2’
82, 83
 
Here, the loan constraint ‘b2’ curtails the loan amount ‘Q’, given as follows: 
                                                   
82  This is consistent with Ebrahim (2009). 
83  The interest-free payday loan facility is strictly for managing inter-temporal liquidity shocks faced by its 
members.  In tandem with this objective, ‘Q’ should therefore be confined to a reasonable multiple of its 
members’ monthly after tax income.  This helps alleviate debt entrapment, discussed in Lawrence and 
Elliehausen (2008) and OFT (2013). Nonetheless, our model can still be adapted to reflect allowances for 
this restriction.    
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1maxQ  is defined in Models 1–3 (sections 4.1–4.3) respectively by Equations (4d), (7e) 
and (16d), while ntQ ,2max  reflects the resource constraint of the circuit given by 
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(ii) Pre-commitment constraint:  Members are subjected to salary deduction to moderate 
time inconsistent preference tendencies (Skiba and Tobacman, 2008; Dagnelie and 
LeMay-Boucher, 2012) and moral hazard.  With this, it partially limits the member 
consumption options available in the future.  This seamless transfer of member income 
to the circuit and subsequent settlement of the interest-free payday loan has a secondary 
effect of lowering transaction costs of the circuit. 
(iii) Collateral constraint:  Given the potential limited ability of these households to raise 
asset qualifying collateral, disbursement of the interest-free payday loan is then 
subjected to a reputable co-signer, who provides surety upon default by the member.  
The co-signer, who has local information compared to the circuit, is in a preferred 
position to conduct ex-post monitoring and impose social sanctions (see Stiglitz, 
1990).
84
  This then, significantly reduces costly state verification issues, particularly in 
dealings with low net worth members. However, failure of the co-signer to act 
accordingly can have a detrimental effect on the circuit efficiency/ sustainability (see 
Guinanne, 1994 on demise of Irish credit union).  
(iv) Financial capability constraint: Each member who borrows is required to undergo 
personal finance program (eg. money management, asset building and debt 
                                                   
84  The collateral covenant should not be a major participation constraint in lieu that members are required to 
be economically active.  The co-signer can be from or outside the circuit. Where the co-signer is also a 
member of the circuit, co-signing incentivises peer monitoring, in view that the sustainability of the circuit 
ultimately affects the interest of the co-signer (Stiglitz, 1990).  
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management) to enhance their financial capability (Agarwal et al., 2009; Gathergood, 
2012).
85
  This non-pecuniary cost of borrowing is an interventionist measure that has its 
roots in behavioural finance, as it seeks to influence the cognitive psychology of 
payday borrowers with regards to their financial conduct (see Bernheim and Garrett, 
2003 on the positive long-term behavioural effects of increased exposure to financial 
education).
86
  
Proposition 1. For the circuit to be competitive, its net surplus must satisfy the efficiency 
condition given by Equation (4c)
87
 
Equation (4c) signifies three possible states of the circuit.  First, when the circuit fulfils 
the equality sign, the circuit is at best economic-neutral to its competitors, namely 
mainstream financiers.
88
   Second, if the inequality sign is satisfied, the circuit is then 
economically more efficient to its competitors.  The surplus capital signifies welfare 
improvement of an initially liquidity constrained group.  Third, if Equation (4c) is unmet, 
then the circuit is economically inferior with erosion in its capital base, and its continued 
sustainability is doubtful.  Here, its sustainability is contingent on minimising transaction 
costs and defaults, as both erode the circuit’s gains and ultimately its capital base.  Therefore, 
the circuit administrators must institute controls, so that both costs are reduced significantly.  
This is achieved through various covenants and retention of defaulting member savings as 
highlighted earlier.  
  
                                                   
85  Our model can accommodate the funding for the personal finance program through the transaction costs  
in the administration of the circuit.  This can also be complemented by financial education public policy 
programs or specific workplace schemes.   
86  Other interventionist measures, which are pecuniary in nature, are to gradually: (i) decrease b1, and (ii) 
increase b2, thereby compelling erring borrowers to save and avoid debt entrapment.  This can be extended 
in our model to incorporate real world practicalities.    
87  Our analysis is rationalised based on a standard Net Present Value analysis employed in Financial 
Management (see Brealey et al., 2011).  We have not provided a formal proof as it is a normal practice in 
the field to discount cash flows of alternate ways of funding a project in order to evaluate an efficient 
scheme.  This approach is also adopted by Ebrahim (2009).   
88  We can also deduce that the circuit is economically more efficient to that of contemporary payday loan, in 
view of the latter’s high cost of funds.  
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4.2 Model 2: Impute real-world element by relaxing the borrowing condition in that 
only a fraction of members ‘λ’ borrow from the endogenous circuit  
Figure 9: A fraction of liquidity constrained members borrow from the circuit ‘λ’ and 
supported by ‘1-λ’ non-borrowing members 
 
  
 
 
 As in Model 1, members are required to contribute ‘C’ on monthly basis upon entry, at 
i = -m to i = 1 period.  The following similarly hold in Model 2: (i) the circuit has a defined 
period, i.e., one-period cycle until i = 1, after which it terminates; (ii) variables defined in 
Equations (1), (2), (3) and (4); (iii) transaction costs and default; and (iv) the four covenants 
(i.e., income, pre-commitment, collateral and financial capability).   However, Model 2 
specification differs from previous in that it conceives the likelihood of liquidity strained 
members may occur at different circuit cycles.  Therefore, at any one time, there is a fraction 
of borrowers signified by ‘λ’ that are supported by ‘(1- λ)’ lenders or non-borrowers (see 
Figure 9). This clearly depicts the ‘transformation service’ provided by the circuit, whereby 
the temporary idle funds of a proportion of members (lenders or non-borrowers) are used to 
provide liquidity to others who suffer from exogenous inter-temporal income shocks.  This 
improves on “competitive market by providing better risk sharing among people who need to 
consume at different random times” (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983, p.402). 
As with the previous section, observance of ‘C’ entitles member a right to draw on the 
circuit funds if she/he faces liquidity squeeze.  We find the technology of the circuit in Model 
2 best resembles the practice of mutual or Islamic insurance (takāful), where members agree 
to indemnify each other against a defined loss.  Based on the concept of solidarity, members 
of the group contribute to a specified fund that entitles each person to protection on 
occurrence of the loss event.  The commercial implementation of this concept of mutuality 
can be traced to the eight century, where sea merchants would initiate a pool to protect 
C(1-ζ) C(1-ζ) C(1-ζ) -λQ(1-ζ) λ(1-α)(Q-S)+λαS-(1-λ)S 
-m -m+1 -m+2 1-n 1 
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themselves against perils during their voyages (Alhabshi and Razak, 2011).
89
  A 
characteristic that differentiates mutual/ Islamic insurance from the mainstream is that, in the 
former, each member is the insurer and also insured, which means there is risk sharing 
between members rather than risk shifting. 
Based on the above extension (see Figure 9), total borrowings in the circuit are now 
signified by ‘λQ’.  At time i = 1, i.e., expiry of the circuit cycle, (a) non-defaulting borrowers 
are required to settle the outstanding interest-free payday loan net of their savings ‘λ(1-α)(Q-
S)’; and (b) any defaulting borrowers will have their accumulated contributions or savings 
retained within the circuit ‘λαS’.  The proportion of non-borrowing members are then entitled 
to a payback of their accumulated contributions constituting ‘(1-λ)S’.90  Equation (7) is a 
modification of Equation (4), as it incorporates the fraction of borrowing and non-borrowing 
members. 
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Substituting ‘S’ in Equation (1) into Equation (7a) gives us:  
             012211......11 11    mCQQC nmm
 
(7b) 
 
 
                                                   
89  Although there is no direct reference to takāful in Islamic scriptures, the concept finds support in the 
Qur’ānic verses and Sunnah that call for upholding of brotherhood and solidarity in times of hardship 
(Qur’ān 5:2; Sahih Muslim Vol. 6, 45: 6585–6590, 45:6669–6674). 
90  In our model, a member’s primary objective in joining the circuit is to ensure access to low cost credit, i.e., 
maximise borrowing opportunity, in contrast to high cost credit from payday lenders or financial rationing.  
Given the above motivation, we have not incorporated dividends or investment returns on the accumulated 
contributions (savings) as these may be better served by existing financial intermediaries. 
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This is further simplified as follows: 
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Potential maximum loan is, 
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(7e) 
Proposition 2. The efficiency condition of the circuit with fraction of members who are 
borrowers is contingent on satisfaction of Equation (7d) 
The three efficiency states described earlier in Proposition 1 apply in Proposition 2.  
This is even with the added complexity, where not all members will borrow during the same 
circuit cycle.  The circuit can ensure that it satisfies the inequality sign in Equation (7d) by 
enhancing its predictive ability on probability of liquidity calls by its members.  This is 
closely associated with the principle law of large numbers employed in insurance pricing.  By 
collating sufficiently large number of exposures, the randomness in the occurrence of the 
exposures will statistically converge towards a defined mean with a given variance, which 
then allows insurers to fairly predict the frequency and severity of their exposures and price 
the insurance products accordingly.  In the case of the circuit, it can then correctly determine 
the loan amount and tenure that is feasible to limit liquidity gaps at the end of the circuit 
cycle.   
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4.3 Model 3: Extends further the real-world element whereby there is random 
borrowing over multi-periods that in the long-run approaches a steady state 
Figure 10: A fraction of liquidity constrained members borrow from the circuit ‘λ’ 
across multi-periods that in the long-run approaches a steady state 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We further extend the model to allow for multi-period endogenous leverage, where 
members pool their endowments across time, in order to assure accessibility to short-term 
interest-free payday loan, in light of unexpected contingencies (see Figure 10).  This brings 
the circuit nearer to that of contemporary financial cooperatives (Ebrahim, 2009).  Here, we 
have a random process of member borrowing. This discrete-parameter Markov chain of {Xt-n, 
t>n} is represented by:  
 )/(),....,,/( 122111 tntnttntnnnt iXjXPiXiXiXjXP    (8)  
 Equation (8) essentially assumes a member’s future borrowing behaviour is a 
consideration of only her/his present behaviour, and is independent of the member’s past 
1-λt-n 
1-ρt+1-n λt-n 
ρt+1-n 
C(1-ζ) C(1-ζ) C(1-ζ) -λt-nQ(1-ζ) -λt+1-nQ(1-ζ) 
-m -m+1 -m+2 t-n t+1-n 
-λT-1Q(1-ζ) 
... T-1 T 
λT(1-α)(Q-S) 
+λTαS- (1-λT)S 
1-φt+1-n 
φt+1-n 
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history.  The initial probability vector ‘pt-n’ is denoted by probability of borrowing ‘λt-n’ and 
non-borrowing ‘1-λt-n’, respectively: 
  ntntntp    1,  (9) 
We also assume during the next interval that there is a probability ‘ρt+1-n’ that members 
borrow and ‘1-ρt+1-n’ otherwise.  The two-state Markov chain transition probability matrix is 
illustrated below. 
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The above two-state transition matrix converges in steady state as follows (see Hsu, 
2011). 
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 This matrix in Equation (10a) is further simplified using the well-known Bayes’ rule, as 
illustrated in the Appendix, where we realise 
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 The long-run borrowing behaviour converges to a steady state ‘ ˆ ’. That is, there exists 
a stationary distribution for the Markov chain.  This is found by solving  
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 Where,  21,ˆ ssp  , and 121  ss   (12) 
 Equation (11) can then be rewritten as follows:  
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Solving the matrix, we obtain two equations described below: 
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 Thus, both Equations (14a) and (15a) lead to the same solution, implying the 
exogeneity of ‘ρ’.  By substituting ‘s
1
’ in Equation (14a) into Equation (12), we get  
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
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1
1 2s  
  12s , and hence  1s   (15c) 
Thus, restating ‘ pˆ ’ of Equation (12) with the results derived in Equation (15c) gives us 
the steady state matrix as follows: 
    1,pˆ   (15d) 
Proposition 3. A member borrowing behaviour is contingent on her/his past borrowing 
history. 
We find member borrowing behaviour is path dependent, which corroborates the 
empirical evidence documented in Lawrence and Elliehausen (2008).  Despite this intricate 
issue of path dependency, we can still determine the loans to be underwritten by exploiting 
the property of steady state, where a fraction ‘λ’ of the population borrow (irrespective of 
previous borrowing).  For mathematical tractability and aligned with Lawrence and 
Elliehausen (2008), we assume borrowers who do not redeem their loans would continuously 
rollover their facility. Therefore, default emerges only at terminal period ‘T’ (see Figure 10 
and Equation (16)).  All other variables and covenants remain the same.  
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We substitute ‘ S ’ from Equation (1) into Equation (16) and simplify it to derive 
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Potential maximum loan is, 
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Proposition 4. The efficiency condition of a circuit with borrowing by a fraction of 
members across multi-periods is contingent on satisfaction of Equation (16c) 
The efficiency states detailed in Proposition 1 similarly applies for Proposition 4.  We 
find that the circuit’s efficiency can be improved in a multi-period model.  A circuit that is 
conducted repeatedly over a series of periods will have greater latitude on its borrowing 
policy, as each borrower’s financial conduct is fully revealed (Hosios and Peters, 1989).  By 
instituting renewal model that is dependent on the member’s financial conduct, the circuit 
effectively addresses conflict of interest between borrowers and non-borrowers.  In this 
situation, each member will endeavour to undertake fewer risks, which would potentially 
affect access to future liquidity facility.  Credible threat of sanctions in multi-period states 
can also reduce moral hazard (Stiglitz, 1990). 
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4.3.1 Numerical illustration 
 Using Equations (4d), (7e) and (16d), we conduct a numerical simulation using MS 
Excel to enumerate the breakeven level of the interest-free payday loan in each of the three 
models.  The circuit exogenous factors encompass: (i) member income profile y; (ii) cost of 
fund prevailing in mainstream credit market r; (iii) transaction costs and default ζ and α; (iv) 
loan tenure and drawdown period n and t; (v) underwriting constraint corresponding to the 
income multiple b1 and b2; (vi) gestation period prior to loan drawdown m; (vii) fraction of 
borrowing members λ; and (viii) substantive circuit life T.  We use the observations by 
Lawrence and Elliehausen (2008) and the FDIC (2010) to check the reasonableness of the 
exogenous parameters.  Overall, the final values of the exogenous parameters are set to avoid 
excessive financial burden and ensure a liberal round of liquidity cycle, until member reaches 
financial security.     
Table 4: Indicative pricing structure of the endogenous interest-free payday loan circuit 
Increase in exogenous factor 
Direction of change in endogenous factor 
Cmax Smax Qmax 
y + + + 
b1 + + + 
b2 uc uc + 
r uc uc + 
ζ uc uc – 
α – – – 
m + + + 
n uc uc – 
λ uc uc – 
T uc uc + 
Notes: Direction of change in the endogenous values ‘+’ increase; ‘–’decrease, and ‘uc’ unchanged. 
 
 We tabulate the efficiency scenarios, given various permutations of the endogenous 
parameters, which cover (i) maximum member monthly contribution: Cmax; (ii) maximum 
accumulated savings: Smax; and (iii) potential maximum loan: Qmax.  Table 4 illustrates the 
effect on the endogenous factors, given changes in the exogenous parameters.  This provides 
an indicative pricing framework that can be emulated in the design of similar endogenous 
leveraged circuits.  It highlights the sensitivity of each endogenous factor to the decisions that 
the circuit undertakes and the various levers that may be combined to enhance the circuit 
efficiency.   
 86 
 
 Additionally, Table 5 provides the resultant values of the endogenous parameters, 
which assure that the circuit satisfies the economic-efficiency propositions under Models 1–3.  
Model 3 further demonstrates the interplay of the loan constraint covenant between 
2b
y
 or 
Qmax, where Qmax is characterised by the lower of either Qmax1 or Qmax2, t-n.   Here, QBinding 
demands balancing the twin issues of: (i) protecting the member from potential debt 
entrapment; and (ii) ensuring the circuit’s long-run liquidity, i.e., solvency.  By not pursuing 
aggressive loan disbursement policies, it promotes accumulation of equity buffer that would 
ultimately allow the circuit greater financial latitude to pursue financial policies that enhance 
member welfare within the reasonable risk tolerance limits, eg. relaxing the ‘QBinding’ 
constraint and undertaking loan rehabilitation program that customises the loan repayment 
tenure for genuinely financially constrained member.        
Table 5: Results illustrating circuit economic efficiency for each model 
Model 1  
b1 b2 r ζ α m n Cmax Smax Qmax1 QBinding  
100 10 12% 2% 10% 6 ¼ 20 160 1,045 200  
      ⅓   960   
  15% 2% 10% 6 ¼ 20 160 1,228 200  
      ⅓   1,113   
50 10 12% 2% 10% 6 ¼ 40 320 2,091 200  
      ⅓   1,921   
  15% 2% 10% 6 ¼ 40 320 2,456 200  
      ⅓   2,226   
Model 2 
b1 b2 r ζ α m n λ Cmax Smax Qmax1 QBinding 
100 10 12% 2% 10% 6 ¼ 0.2 20 160 4,044 200 
       0.3   2,794  
       0.4   2,170  
      ⅓ 0.2 20 160 3,715 200 
       0.3   2,567  
       0.4   1,993  
  15% 2% 10% 6 ¼ 0.2 20 160 5,026 200 
       0.3   3,444  
       0.4   2,652  
      ⅓ 0.2 20 160 4,555 200 
       0.3   3,121  
       0.4   2,404  
50 10 12% 2% 10% 6 ¼ 0.2 40 320 8,087 200 
       0.3   5,589  
       0.4   4,339  
      ⅓ 0.2 40 320 7,430 200 
       0.3   5,135  
       0.4   3,987  
  15% 2% 10% 6 ¼ 0.2 40 320 10,052 200 
       0.3   6,887  
       0.4   5,305  
      ⅓ 0.2 40 320 9,109 200 
       0.3   6,241  
       0.4   4,807  
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Model 3 
b1 b2 r ζ α m n λ T Cmax Smax Qmax1 Qmax2 QBinding 
100 10 12% 2% 10% 6 ¼ 0.2 180 20 3,740 2,417 137 137 
       0.3    1,611   
       0.4    1,208   
      ⅓ 0.2 180 20 3,740 2,394 137 137 
       0.3    1,596   
       0.4    1,197   
      ¼ 0.2 240 20 4,940 2,417 137 137 
       0.3    1,611   
       0.4    1,208   
      ⅓ 0.2 240 20 4,940 2,394 137 137 
       0.3    1,596   
       0.4    1,197   
  15% 2% 10% 6 ¼ 0.2 180 20 3,740 2,279 137 137 
       0.3    1,520   
       0.4    1,140   
      ⅓ 0.2 180 20 3,740 2,253 137 137 
       0.3    1,502   
       0.4    1,127   
      ¼ 0.2 240 20 4,940 2,279 137 137 
       0.3    1,520   
       0.4    1,140   
      ⅓ 0.2 240 20 4,940 2,253 137 137 
       0.3    1,502   
       0.4    1,127   
50 10 12% 2% 10% 6 ¼ 0.2 180 40 7,480 4,833 274 200 
       0.3    3,222   
       0.4    2,417   
      ⅓ 0.2 180 40 7,480 4,788 274 200 
       0.3    3,192   
       0.4    2,394   
      ¼ 0.2 240 40 9,880 4,833 274 200 
       0.3    3,222   
       0.4    2,417   
      ⅓ 0.2 240 40 9,880 4,788 274 200 
       0.3    3,192   
       0.4    2,394   
  15% 2% 10% 6 ¼ 0.2 180 40 7,480 4,559 274 200 
       0.3    3,039   
       0.4    2,279   
      ⅓ 0.2 180 40 7,480 4,506 274 200 
       0.3    3,004   
       0.4    2,253   
      ¼ 0.2 240 40 9,880 4,559 274 200 
       0.3    3,039   
       0.4    2,279   
      ⅓ 0.2 240 40 9,880 4,506 274 200 
       0.3    3,004   
       0.4    2,253   
Notes: The model is solved for endogenous variables Cmax, Smax and Qmax where Cmax is the maximum monthly contribution, 
Smax is the maximum savings accumulated from the contributions, and Qmax is the potential maximum loan per period. Total 
loan advanced is given by QBinding = min {y/b2, Qmax}.  The values of the endogenous variables depicted in the table above 
signify the breakeven threshold that ensures the circuit is economic neutral.  For this simulation, the exogenous parameters 
are: (i) member monthly after tax income: y = $2,000; (ii) income multiplier constraint: b1,1 = 80 times, b1,2 = 40 times; (iii) 
loan multiplier constraint: b2 = 25 times; (iv) cost of funds: r1 = 12%, r2 = 15%; (v) transaction and default costs: ζ = 2% and 
α =10%; (vi) membership gestation period: m = 6 months; (vii) fraction of borrowers in the circuit: λ1 = 0.2, λ2 = 0.3; λ3 = 
0.4; (viii) loan tenure: n1 = 7 days (¼ month); n2 = 10 days (⅓ month); (ix) loan commencement period: t = 1; and (x) circuit 
life: T1 = 15 years (180 months), T2 = 20 years (240 months).  
 
 Based on Equation (16d), we extend the simulation to illustrate the effect of transaction 
cost on the potential loan amount, while holding other exogenous factors constant (see Figure 
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11).
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  Premised on the loan covenant in Equation (6) with loan multiple of 102 b  and 
monthly after tax income of 000,2$y , 
2b
y
is then fixed at $200.  On the other hand, ‘Qmax’ 
changes with variation in the transaction cost ‘ζ’, i.e., there exists an inverse relationship 
between ‘Qmax’ and ‘ζ’. ‘ BindingQ ’ as given in Equation (6a) is the minimum of either
2b
y
 or 
Qmax.  As highlighted in Equation (6b), if the transaction cost is low, i.e., MaxQ
b
y

2
, then
2b
y
QBinding  .  Otherwise, QBinding is restrained by Qmax. The critical transaction load, whereby 
2b
y
 = Qmax, is when %7.28 , which is signified in Figure 11 by critical . 
Figure 11: Effect of transaction cost on the circuit potential maximum loan 
  
5. Discussion and conclusion 
Payday borrowers are categorically those who suffer from poor credit history, exhibit 
time-inconsistent preferences and are often precluded by mainstream financiers.  Given the 
prohibitive payday loan rates, this may potentially lead into a debt cycle if the borrower fails 
to observe the repayment term.  Despite the unfavourable publicity against payday loans, 
                                                   
91  Exogenous factors are: y = $2,000, m = 6 months, r = 15%, α = 10%, λ = 0.4, T = 180 months, and t = 1. 
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financially constrained households still succumb to its services.  This underlines a latent need 
for inexpensive short term liquidity facility to bridge their liquidity needs.   
Unlike previous studies on payday loans, this study undertakes to conceptualise a 
solution to usurious payday loans and address credit rationing in mainstream finance.  It 
entails the design of an institutional structure that embeds the interplay of cost efficient 
organisations and cultural beliefs.  Our model is based on risk-neutral economic agents within 
an endogenous leverage circuit that draws from the technology of member based institutions 
such as ROSCA and its hybrids, i.e., ASCRA, mutual and financial cooperative.  A unique 
feature of this structure is that it harnesses the concept of coalition of savers and borrowers to 
allay inter-temporal liquidity shocks faced by its members, through the deployment of 
interest-free payday loan.         
Our study illustrates the employment of this antiquated charitable form in contemporary 
financial perspective.  This credit modality is chosen for its contrast with current payday 
loans.  Furthermore, it is held esteemed in religious tenets, which specifically distinguish 
such deeds from usurious practices. We demonstrate that the circuit performs favourably in 
contrast to current usurious payday loans.  First, the interest-free facility averts expropriation 
of wealth, an issue associated with payday loans.  The periodic contribution, which features a 
minimal fraction of members’ salary, promotes asset building which should consequently 
improve their financial security in the long-run.  Second, our member based endogenous 
circuit allows credit accessibility to these households who are financially rationed by 
mainstream financiers.  Third, we attest the economic proposition of interest-free loans 
expounded in religious teachings in current financial settings, whereby the circuit is able to 
boot strap its resources to grow endogenously.  Fourth, in line with documented studies of 
time-inconsistent preferences of these households, the institutional design of our interest-free 
payday loan relies on the commitment technologies associated with circuit-based structures.  
The efficiency of an endogenous leveraged circuit is contingent on observing risk 
control measures to constraint adverse selection and moral hazard, thus reducing default and 
transaction costs significantly.  This builds on ensuring equitable commitment, i.e., the 
periodic contribution can be fulfilled without jeopardising financial interests of individual 
members and the circuit.  This is followed through by requiring the commitment to be 
directly dispensed into the circuit, which would effectively pre-empt irrational consumption 
tendencies.  This is fortified with programs that build the members’ financial capability and 
 90 
 
route them from poor credit tendencies.  Next, we require existence of co-signer that acts in 
absence of standard collateral.  Here, the co-signer’s central role is in reducing costly state 
verification and execution of credible sanctions.  The institutional design of the circuit 
provides upfront dilution of transaction costs that directly feeds into promoting the circuit 
efficiency.   
Given the circuit technology that is member driven, accumulation of substantive capital 
base may create lag in time to loan issuance.  To manage the gestation period, the circuit may 
rely on seed funding from zakāt and sadaqah to reinforce its initial capital base. These 
charitable funds can also be institutionalised to provide safety net to the circuit that defrays 
any long-run sustainability issues.  Alternatively, the interest-free loan facility can be 
integrated into an already operational circuit, eg. financial cooperative.  Results of our study 
support the policy direction of the FDIC’s (2010) small-dollar loan program.  That is, it 
promotes affordable credit, observes risk-based underwriting, maximises technology and 
automation, integrates savings component in combination with financial education.  Last, our 
model sets an indicative pricing mechanism, mostly absent in charitable institutions, which in 
the long-run promotes self-sufficiency.  
In terms of future research work, this study endows us with a framework to investigate 
the efficiency of ar-rahnu (Islamic form of pawn broking) facility in alleviating liquidity 
issues faced by microtraders.  As with our endogenous leveraged circuit, the ar-rahnu facility 
also employs interest-free loan to the supply of funding.  Here, the borrower (entrepreneur-
manager) pawns his property in lieu of the interest-free loan from the lender (financial 
intermediary).  In contrast to mainstream pawn broking practices, the intermediaries earn 
their revenue from the custodial services that is contingent on the collateral value and safe 
keeping tenure.  To our knowledge, no research has been undertaken to assess the economic 
efficiency of ar-rahnu in comparison to competing mainstream pawn broking and other 
microfinance facilities.  The outcome of such study is important in light of the public policy 
objective of expanding affordable credit to the masses.   
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Chapter 4: Reinforcing resilience of the 
financial architecture with default-free 
collateralised loan 
  
 “Older collateralised loan obligations are worrying managers as their due date 
approaches...Participants in the market are warning that bonds issued by the CLOs before 
the crisis may be getting more dangerous, as managers invest in riskier assets... ”. 
Foley and Stothard (2012, p.32) 
1. Introduction 
Collateralised loan obligations (CLO), linked to the recent financial meltdown are 
rearing their head again after a short impasse.  In the run up to the financial crisis, a total of 
$97 billion were reported to have been issued in 2006 (Foley, 2012).  Markets have voiced 
concern whether these exotic collateralised loans that are nearing maturity have the ability to 
fulfil their obligations (Foley and Stothard, 2012).  These exotic loans were portrayed by their 
originators as safe-haven with low default risk given the collateral backing the instrument.  
Associated with collateralised funding are also controversies surrounding rehypothecation 
activities, the churning of collateral posted by broker-client to the broker-dealer for its own 
proprietary activities.  Figures show approximately $1 trillion securities pledged by hedge 
fund players were rehypothecated or further leveraged in 2007 (Singh and Aitken, 2010).   
The unfolding of the crisis highlights a pressing need for an extensive review of the 
issue on financial fragility, one of the economic rationales for the Islamic prohibition of ribā 
an-nasi’ah (see Salleh et al., 2012).  Specifically in this essay, we highlight the import of 
financial fragility from the perspective of collateralised loan given its significance in the 
construct of present financial system. .  The repercussions on the global economy accentuate 
the pertinence of proper pricing of collateralised loan to curb default.  Particularly where the 
traditional forms of collateralised loan that are tied to real productive processes are 
increasingly being displaced by securitisation, i.e., layering of loan with loan, that is then 
further spun to support repo arrangements (see Gorton and Metrick, 2009).  Moreover, the 
transitioning towards speculative and Ponzi-like financing predicted by Minsky (1992), and 
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the inextricable linkage of the financial sector and the real economy through the collateral 
channel pointed by Fisher (1933), Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Reichlin and Siconolfi 
(2004), underscores the criticality of this issue.  Thus, there is a resounding need for the 
financial fraternity to address the vital issue of agency cost of debt in loan pricing rather than 
marketing risky loan, with the expectation that few defaults will be offset by a large non-
defaulting pool.  As endeared by Minsky (1992), diversification of poorly underwritten loan 
only perturbs vulnerability in poor states of economy.   
In detangling collateralised loan pricing, the economic efficiency of collateralisation in 
minimising agency costs merits attention.  A substantive part of this research is expended on 
information asymmetry issues affecting optimal loan contracts (see Leland and Pyle, 1977; 
Barnea et al., 1981b; Eisenhardt, 1989; Harris and Raviv, 1991; Allen, 2001).  Whilst 
information opacity does exacerbate principal-agent conflicts (Grossman and Hart, 1983), by 
only addressing the former it nonetheless does not fully expunge the agency costs of (i) ‘risk-
shifting’ or ‘asset substitution’; (ii) ‘underinvestment’ or ‘debt overhang’; and (iii) ‘defaults’ 
or ‘bankruptcy’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Smith and Warner, 1979a,b; 
Barnea et al., 1981b).  As mentioned by Berger et al. (2011), there is still residual friction 
unresolved by enhanced information architecture.  Additionally, the mixed results between 
theoretical and empirical research points to the potential failure to endogenously account for 
agency cost in the analysis of collateralised loan contracts (see Table 6).   
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Table 6: Collateralised loan theoretical framework and empirical results 
Collateral increases with:  Theoretical framework: Empirical evidence: 
Extent of agency cost  
 
Yes: Smith and Warner (1979 a,b); Stulz and Johnson 
(1985); Chan and Kanatas (1985) 
Yes: Archer et al. (1996); Eisdorfer (2008); Steijvers et al. 
(2010)  
Extent of borrower riskiness in 
information asymmetric setting  
 
Yes: Chan and Kanatas (1985); Bester (1987); Besanko and 
Thakor (1987a)*; Chan and Thakor (1987); Boot et al. 
(1991)  – supports incentive theory, generally tied to moral 
hazard issue 
No: Chan and Kanatas (1985); Bester (1985; 1987); 
Besanko and Thakor (1987a)*; Chan and Thakor (1987) – 
supports signalling theory  
* the paper discusses both theories. 
Yes: Berger and Udell (1990), Jimenez and Saurina (2004); 
Jimenez et al. (2006); Gottesman and Roberts (2007) 
No: Ono and Uesegi (2009) 
Minimal lender (institutional) 
knowledge/ expertise 
Yes: Inderst and Mueller (2007) Yes: Jimenez and Saurina (2004); Jimenez et al. (2006) 
Extent of banking relationship 
 
Yes: Boot and Thakor (1994); Boot (2000)* – supports 
hold up theory 
No: Boot (2000)* – supports soft budget constraint theory 
* the paper discusses both theories. 
Yes: Jimenez et al. (2006); Steijvers et al. (2010) 
No: Menkhoff et al. (2006); Ono and Uesegi (2009)  
Low collateral redeployability Yes: Shleifer and Vishny (1992); Benmelech and Bergman 
(2011) 
Yes: Benmelech and Bergman (2011) 
High transaction/ dissipative 
costs
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Yes: Barro (1976); Benjamin (1978); Boot et al. (1991); 
Lacker (2001); Jokivuolle and Puera (2003) 
Yes: Boot et al. (1991)  
Tightening of discount rate/ 
Risk free rate 
Yes: Boot et al. (1991) Yes: Jimenez et al. (2006)  
Extent of loan size Yes: Boot et al. (1991)  Yes: Boot et al. (1991); Jimenez et al. (2006) 
Extent of loan tenure Yes: Boot et al. (1991) Yes: Boot et al. (1991)  
                                                   
92  Costs to the lender include monitoring and supervision costs, enforcement of property rights and disposal upon default. 
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Collateral increases with:  Theoretical framework: Empirical evidence: 
Extent of market competition Yes: Besanko and Thakor (1987a); Chan and Thakor 
(1987) 
No: Jimenez et al. (2006 – only in respect of short term 
loans) 
Movement of macroeconomic 
factor 
Yes: Bernanke and Gertler (1989 – from debt-deflation 
perspective); Reichlin and Siconolfi (2004) 
No: Benjamin (1978); Bernanke and Gertler (1989 – from 
asset bubble perspective); Reichlin and Siconolfi (2004 – 
from business cycle perspective) 
Yes: Jimenez et al. (2006 – testing effect of GDP decline) 
Collateralised loans profile: Theoretical framework: Empirical evidence: 
Collateralised loans portfolio 
are riskier (higher default 
probability) 
 Yes: Berger and Udell (1990), John et al. (2003); 
Gottesman and Roberts (2007) 
Collateralised loans portfolio 
have higher yield spread 
 Yes: Berger and Udell (1990); John et al. (2003); 
Gottesman and Roberts (2007) 
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The strategy adopted in this discussion paper is to provide qualitative insights on the 
economic efficiency of two forms of collateralised loan (i) a pragmatically default-free; and 
(ii) default-prone one.
93
  This involves modelling a contractual financial relationship between 
risk-averse lender and borrower, within a framework of rational expectations and symmetric 
information setting.
94, 95
  Consistent with Allen (2001), we treat the costs of bankruptcy as 
endogenous arising from conflict of interest (agency perspective).  Building on this result, we 
expound design of an iron-clad collateralised loan structure that further improves on the 
agency issues.  The goal is to properly price the collateralised loan such that it reduces the in-
moneyness of the embedded put option to default.  This is of utmost importance given 
significant default risk can prevent market formation (Allen, 1981). 
The paper contributes to current literature from the following perspectives.  First, it 
demystifies the present misconception with regards to agency cost.  In particular, we 
demonstrate that the elements of principal-agent relationship warrant its own treatment that is 
not eliminated even with information symmetry.  Second, this paper enriches the present 
literature that acknowledges the presence of conflict of interest but fails to endogenously 
account for it in their loan pricing models (see again Table 6).  We characterise an optimal 
collateralised loan as one that potentially moderates the endogenous issues of agency.  Our 
proposal is consistent with Myers (2001), and Ebrahim and Hussain (2010) who infer the 
efficiency of default-free collateralised loan structure as mitigating agency cost.  Third, by 
segregating the welfare of financial contracting parties, it enumerates the conflict of interest 
between the two.  This provides more substantive solution to that of Myers (1984b), and 
Strebulaev (2007) static as well as dynamic and capital structure trade off hypothesis.   
                                                   
93  It should be noted that our model is conceived in a framework of well-functioning financial and capital 
markets.  Consistent with Levine et al. (2000) we assume the existence of an information architecture 
where property rights, foreclosure procedures needed for the underlying real assets of a firm to serve as 
collateral and accurate methods of valuation are well established.  
94 Maddock and Carter (1982) define rational expectations as “the application of the principle of rational 
behavior to the acquisition and processing of information and to the formation of expectations” (p.41).  It 
is ‘self-fulfilling’ in the sense that the economic agents form correct expectations, given the pricing model 
and information (Bray, 1981). 
95  The setting involving symmetric information is consistent with Biais et al. (2010) where equilibrium asset 
prices aggregate and reveal private information, which permit market participants to easily interpret private 
information held by counterparties by observing their trading patterns. We also find there are various 
mechanisms used in the real world to reveal the agents’ profile a priori and incentivise effort ex-post (see 
Section 3).     
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Fourth, the default arising from endogeneity of agency cost in our loan pricing model 
differs from that of the contingent claims pricing models.  In the structural-form of Black-
Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974), defaults although endogenous arise only from agent-firm 
value factors.  On the other hand, the reduced-form models of Jarrow-Turnbull (1995) and 
Duffie-Singleton (1999) default is exogenous and the primary focus is on calibrating the 
economic cost of default.  Fifth, in terms of macroeconomic implication, collateralised loan 
pricing that controls agency cost through maximising the utilities of both lender and borrower 
provides restitution to fragile financial system. As commented by Fama (1978, p.272), 
“...maximizing combined stockholder and bondholder wealth is the only market value 
consistent with a stable equilibrium”.     
The ramifications of our results are profound.  In the aftermath of the financial crisis, 
regulators are compelling banks in Europe to raise their capital.  While this moderates moral 
hazard, it may not be sufficient if banks disregard the pricing of their loan facility, which 
endow borrowers a strategic option to default and hence transfer the risk of their venture to 
the banks.  Regulatory authorities need to require banks to price their loan facility in a 
pragmatic manner stripping away the put option to default.
96
  This will strengthen the 
financial sector and enhance its resiliency. 
This essay proceeds in Section 2 with a review of collateral and its economic 
application in loan contracts.  Section 3 attempts to demystify agency cost issues with that of 
asymmetric information.  Majority of studies associate non-performing loans arise from the 
agent explicit decision to exercise the embedded default option.  Given the strong preference 
for collateralised loan in financial contracting, we rationalise in Section 4 the economics of 
collateral in addressing this issue.  In Section 5 we extend this view to further minimise the 
put option to default by the borrower by ensuring that it is not significantly in-the-money.  
This involves pricing the loan such that the collateral does fully expunge default (nearly risk-
free debt).  Thus, it maximises the welfare of both lender (principal repayment with yield) 
and borrower (maximise firm value).  This is conducted in an agency theoretic framework 
consistent with Ebrahim and Hussain (2010).  Section 6 concludes. 
                                                   
96  This can be done via insurance paid by the lender (continuous workout) – see Shiller et al. (2013). 
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2. Collateral taxonomy 
Collateral is depicted as a lien that permits the borrower to raise the requisite financial 
resource externally rather than pursuing the costly option of liquidating the said asset (Igawa 
and Kanatas, 1990), or faced with credit rationing (Jaffee and Russell, 1976; Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981).  Collateralised loans are generally non-recourse in that recovery of the 
defaulted loan amount is limited to the foreclosed collateral value.  That is, the security 
indemnifies the lender from defaults that may arise and consequently discharges the borrower 
from any outstanding liability.  In a study by Boot and Thakor (1994), they find collateralised 
loans ranks Pareto efficient to unsecured loan and self-financing.  First, the high interest rates 
of unsecured loan (to compensate for credit risk) affect the borrower marginal return to effort 
in successful states.  Second, self-financing warrants liquidation of the asset, whereas for 
collateralised loans this only occurs in default states. 
In the context of bank lending, collateralised loan features prominently in banks’ 
balance sheet.  Reportedly 70% of commercial and industrial loans disbursed in the United 
States are secured (Berger and Udell, 1990), mirroring the large share reported in syndicated 
loans (Gottesman and Roberts, 2007).  Apart from the corporate loan sector, collateralised 
loan also plays a key role in financing small businesses in the United States and United 
Kingdom (Berger and Udell, 1998; Hanley and Girma, 2006), as well as in emerging markets 
(Menkhoff et al., 2006).
97
  Securitisation activities command a significant market in the 
United States.  Gorton and Metrick (2009) note that mortgage-related securitisation formed 
the largest fixed-income market.  In respect of non-mortgage related securitisation, it 
overshadows that of corporate debt market share during the pre-financial crisis period in 
2004-2006.  By pooling the loans that originates from the banks’ books, securitisation 
process permits these loans to be used as collateral for further funding activities such as CDO 
and repo arrangements.
98
  In the hedge fund industry, the collateral posted for margin 
financing, securities borrowing with the prime broker were allowed by regulations to be 
rehypothecated for the broker-dealer’s own trading activities (Singh and Aitken, 2010).   
                                                   
97  Study on the Spanish credit market by Jimenez and Saurina (2004) contrasts those of the United States and 
United Kingdom markets. They find majority of the loan studied are unsecured and this relates to reliance 
on relationship banking in moderating default risk.      
98  See (i) Gorton and Metrick (2009) for flow of the interconnectedness of the financial markets arising from 
collateralisation of banks’ loan portfolio; and (ii) Singh and Aitken (2010) for the multiplier effect arising 
from rehypothecation activities. 
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Table 7: Collateral classifications 
Categories Economic role 
Inside (business) collateral – asset drawn from firm 
existing pool of assets 
Collateralised debt is economic-efficient to self-financing, since it avoids liquidation of asset and hence, loss of 
productive opportunity.  In event of default, it does not trigger asset losses beyond that pledged by the firm. Thus, 
the cost of providing additional unit of collateral is the associated transaction costs related to the collateral. 
Collateral minimises the required financing rate compared to unsecured loan: 
(i) Reduces the value of put option to default in debt contracts. 
(ii) Minimises asset substitution that reduces firm terminal value.  It is comparatively more effective than 
covenant due to the need to monitor compliance. 
(iii) Lowers enforcement cost of default - provides the secured lender absolute priority over other creditors.  This 
‘me-first’ rule delineates the collateral from the common pool of firm assets and thus accord lender legal 
certainty in the event of bankruptcy.  
(iv) The lower yield afforded by the presence of collateral moderates underinvestment as it limits wealth transfer 
from borrower to financier.      
Personal (outside, non-traded) collateral – private 
assets of the equityholder that are not normally 
attachable to the firm 
It notionally expands the borrower’s balance sheet. However, default triggers asset losses beyond that owned by the 
firm.  Thus, the cost of providing additional units of collateral is basically the loss of the assets as well as the 
transaction costs related to the collateral. 
These forms of collateral: 
(i) Enhances secured lender property rights without affecting other creditors’ claims during bankruptcy.  
(ii) Although the pecuniary value of this collateral is marginal to the lender, its existence amplifies borrower 
reservation value which in turn moderate agency issues and has the effect of lifting the limited liability veil.  
(iii) Moderates information asymmetry issues of adverse selection and moral hazard as it reveals borrower private 
information.  This explains the heavy reliance of both forms of collateral in small business, family firm 
lending. 
(iv) Alleviates credit rationing since debt capacity is not entirely based on inside collateral.   
It ranks lesser than inside collateral due to: 
(i) Less restrictive controls on usage of assets backing the secured debt. 
(ii) Protective legislation favouring small borrowers. 
Personal guarantee – provides general recourse 
against the private assets of the said guarantor. 
Unlike personal asset collateral, it is not bound to a 
specific lien. 
 
Source: Benjamin (1978); Chan and Kanatas (1985); Berger and Udell (1998, 2003); Leeth and Scott (1989); Boot et al. (1991); Morellec (2001); Ono and Uesugi (2009); 
Stulz and Johnson (1985); Steijvers et al. (2010).
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The broad purpose of collateral is to moderate costly contracting (Smith and Warner, 
1979a).  Its use in loan contracts signifies the cost efficacies of institution of private ordering 
in preserving property rights as opposed to enforcement via the court system (see Table 7).  
Collateral ranks higher than penalties in controlling default risk (Allen, 1981), and overcomes 
restrictive mandates that are negatively associated with debt based covenants (Stulz and 
Johnson, 1985).  In a cross-country study, Qian and Strahan (2007) find firms with more 
tangible assets operating in secured creditors rights environment, receive favourable loan 
terms (i.e., longer maturity and lower interest rates) as it enhances the lenders’ right of 
recourse over these liens.  They further observe that diffusion in loan ownership (i.e., greater 
number of participating banks in the loan) increases the use of collateral, signalling the 
complementarities of collateral in reducing the cost of default.     
To remain effective in mitigating default, the value of collateral required must exceed 
the outstanding liability throughout the financing tenure (Bester, 1987).  As highlighted in 
Table 6, this is correlated to its recovery costs including asset specificity (Smith and Warner, 
1979a; Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Benmelech and Bergman, 2011), ease of legal 
enforcement (Menkhoff et al., 2006), borrower risk and the collateral value (Barro, 1976; 
Benjamin, 1978; Boot and Thakor, 1994).
99, 100
     
Various studies have documented the looping effect of the financial system and real 
sector through the collateral channel.  For example, Gan (2007) and Chaney et al. (2010) 
document the country effects of exogenous shocks on collateralised loan in Japan and the 
United States, respectively.  Both studies find systematic shock depresses collateral values.  
This in turn severely limits the loan capacity of borrowers and tightening of investments.  
Lack of collateral also creates barriers to entry for new firms and hence, limits 
entrepreneurship (Black et al., 1996).  The collateral damage arising from the financial 
system with repercussions on the government funding machinery exemplifies how poorly 
structured collateralised loans feed financial fragility within the system as well as into the 
economy (Burton, 2012).   
                                                   
99  Asset specificity is inversely related to collateral realisable value for it limits redeployability to other real 
sectors such that the maximal potential loan recovery is dependent on financial state of potential bidders 
within the industry (see alternative viewpoint by Morellec, (2001)).     
100  Non-tradable assets (only of value to the borrower) may also be pledged as long as it increases the cost of 
default to the borrower.  However, this puts the onus on the lender to appropriate the correct valuation 
perceived by the borrower (Benjamin, 1978). 
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3. Detangling agency cost from asymmetric information 
We analyse the rich literature on collateralised loan through the theoretical and 
empirical lenses of (i) agency costs; and (ii) asymmetric information.  This provides a 
precursor to the discussion in Section 4 on the economic efficiency of collateral in loan 
pricing. 
3.1 Agency cost 
“Agency costs are real as any other costs” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p.357).  It is 
well established that asset substitution, underinvestment and bankruptcy, components of 
agency cost of debt is inherent in contractual relationship involving principal delegation of 
managerial decision to an agent.  This arises from the principal-agent conflict of interest as 
each seeks to maximise his/her own utility, which raises the probability that the agent may 
not be acting in the best interest of the principal (Barnea at al., 1981b; Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Given rational expectations, the principal may institute mechanisms to control these conflicts, 
including establishing incentives coupled with monitoring activities.  Alternatively, principal 
may require agent to undertake actions that ensure conformance, i.e., bonding costs.         
Agency cost is synonymous with risky loan where default risk is positive, i.e., the 
actual value of the project on going concern is less than the loan nominal value.  As observed 
by Fama (1978, p.274), “when the firm can issue risky debt, it may be able to use its 
financing decisions to shift wealth from its bondholders to its stockholders or vice versa”.  
This is similarly echoed by Myers (2001, p.96), whereby “if debt is totally free of default risk, 
debtholders have no interest in the income, value or risk of the firm.  But if there is a chance 
of default, then shareholders can gain at the expense of debt investors”.101  That is, with a 
risk-free loan, borrower bears all of the project risk.  Nonetheless, when these investments are 
leveraged, the loan becomes a risky debt by virtue of the embedded put option to default on 
the firm assets (Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1974; Stiglitz, 1979), which may cause the 
lender ultimately holding the project residual risk. 
                                                   
101  The Modigliani and Miller (MM – 1958, 1963) and Miller (1977) model aggregates the two adversarial 
claimants (debt and equity) objective functions, thereby depriving the analysis of agency issues and hence 
the optimal pricing parameters of debt.  Furthermore, it is construed under risk neutrality (akin to a linear 
programming model), yielding a multitude of solutions (i.e., the well-known invariant result) in the 
absence of market imperfections (such as taxes), and a corner (i.e., 100% debt financing) under corporate 
tax deductibility of interest. The capital structure irrelevance theory relies on strong presumption that 
individuals resorting to MM (1958) arbitrage have the same negotiating power accruing to financiers and 
institutional players.  Similar limitations are observed in the Miller (1977) analysis.  
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First, shareholder may exhibit risk shifting behavior to undertake riskier investments or 
operational strategies that maximises his/her interest to the detriment of the lender.
102
  By 
this, the firm may be more inclined to engage in high risk projects that generate high returns 
in successful states whilst sheltered from full effects of such losses in poor states.  The 
institution of limited liability clause limits the lender’s potential clawback in event of 
bankruptcy to the firm available assets.  This highlights the prominence of incentive effect in 
agency issues discussed in earlier studies of Jensen and Meckling (1976), Smith and Warner 
(1979a,b), Barnea et al. (1981b), and Stulz and Johnson (1985).  It is also linked to 
incomplete contracting (Holmstrom, 1979) that limits the principal’s ability to structure 
contingent contracts on all possible outcomes as agent effort cannot be fully observed.   
Second, borrower may consciously opt to underinvestment that is to reject positive net 
present value projects, if the gains from these new investments wholly accrue to the lender 
(Myers, 1977; Bodie and Taggart, 1978; Barnea et al., 1981b).  This has a distortionary effect 
on the efficient allocation of economic resources, i.e., suboptimal investment decision which 
curbs firm future growth opportunities.  Third, the riskiness of debt financing is compounded 
by bankruptcy costs that create a loss on the contracting party (Barnea et al., 1981b).  As seen 
in the aftermath of the financial crises, the securitisation process that is essentially the trading 
of risky debt for debt magnifies the financial fragility, as the exercise of the embedded put 
option to default in the originating portfolio has potentially negative knock-on effect on the 
appended debt contracts.  Even the threat of financial distress (regardless of actual occurrence 
of bankruptcy) has repercussions on the loan contractual terms (Myers, 1977).   
3.2 Information asymmetry 
 Adverse selection is ubiquitous with imperfect information.  This arises where one party 
to contract has superior information over the other.  Another feature of asymmetric 
information is moral hazard that ensues from ex-post information opacity.  Both are 
generally held as synonymous with agency theory in the financial literature.  Here, using 
interest rate as credit allocation mechanism may result in selection bias, given “the terms of a 
credit contract may affect the average quality of loan applicants.  For instance, low risk 
borrowers may drop out of the market if bank raise the rate of interest.  Loan contracts may 
involve moral hazard because they influence the behaviour of the borrowers.  Thus, higher 
                                                   
102  Risk shifting includes wider effects of managerial pursuits with intention to appropriate firm resources for 
personal perquisites (see Barnea at al., 1981b; Myers, 2001).      
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interest payments may induce the borrower to select investment projects with a higher 
probability of failure” (Bester, 1987, p.887).  
 Costly verification of the true character or action of the borrower magnifies hazards of 
‘market for lemons’, as expounded by Akerlof (1970).  Given concerns on borrower private 
information on his actions and project viability, a high risk borrower, i.e., ‘lemon’, may be 
offered credit terms contrary to his risk profile.  As expressed by Leland and Pyle (1977, 
p.371), “Borrowers cannot be expected to be entirely straightforward about their 
characteristics, nor entrepreneurs about their projects, since there may be substantial 
rewards for exaggerating positive qualities.  And verification of true characteristics by 
outside parties [lender/ investor] may be costly or impossible”. 
 In the financial sector various mechanisms have been deployed to reduce information 
asymmetry between lender and entrepreneur-borrower.  Gompers and Lerner (2001) observe 
staged financing and board representation are widely used in venture capital industry, Cooper 
and Hayes (1987) and Hosios and Peters (1989) find trading financial claims over a multi-
period horizon supports information revelation in insurance contracting, whilst Allen et al. 
(2000) find dividend is used as a signalling mechanism of firm quality.  Similarly, sinking 
fund provision (Wu, 1993), and credit scoring techniques (Berger et al., 2011) are 
innovations arising from the industry need to enhance conduct and transparency.  Even the 
functional existence of financial intermediaries is to enhance financial efficiency of 
information acquisition and monitoring in presence of costly state verification (Diamond, 
1984; Townsend, 1979; Gale and Hellwig, 1985), screening for adverse selection (Broecker, 
1990) and moderating moral hazard (Holmstrole and Tirole, 1997).  Moral hazard too can be 
mitigated by underwriting iron-clad covenants in the financial contract (see Smith and 
Warner, 1979a; Billet et al. 2007). 
4. Economic efficiency of collateral in diffusing agency cost and information 
asymmetry to avert loan default 
Stemming from these issues, studies have sought to examine the economic role of 
collateral as a bonding mechanism.  Stulz and Johnson (1985) find collateral increases firm 
value as it moderates agency cost in risky loan. 
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4.1 Risk shifting 
 Collateral moderates risk shifting given the asset title is assigned to the lender.   It 
creates disincentives for borrower to exercise option to default since it triggers transfer of 
collateral to the lender (Barro, 1976; Smith and Warner, 1979b).  By this it amplifies the loss 
of default on the borrower, i.e., it reduces the value of the embedded put option.
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  “When 
more collateral is posted, it increases the borrower’s loss (reduces his or her marginal 
payoff) in those states in which there is project failure and collateral transfers to the bank” 
(Chan and Thakor, 1987, p.353).  Given that the “debt obligation is less than the net market 
value of the collateral backing it, the right to repay that obligation is valuable and the default 
rate on such obligations will be zero” (Benjamin, 1978, p.336-337).  This is empirically 
supported by Archer et al. (1996) in their study of the mortgage market. 
 Naturally, borrowers who exhibit greater risk shifting attitude will be subjected to 
higher collateral requirement (Chan and Kanatas, 1985; Menkhoff et al., 2006).  For example, 
Steijvers et al. (2010) find privately owned family firms are subjected to greater collateral 
requirement given their loan size.  This accrues to greater agency cost of debt issues, such as 
family altruism ‘free rider’ problem, ineffective entrepreneur-managers and excessive 
management perquisites, which increases monitoring activities of lender (principal).   
 On the collateral characteristics, Smith and Warner (1979a) argue ‘inside collateral’ is 
effective in reducing risk shifting since there is lesser monitoring required (see also Table 7).  
Morellec (2001) in his study posits this is contingent on the liquidity of inside collateral and 
state of the industry, measured by the level of productivity and demand volatility.  Firm with 
highly liquid inside collateral has greater incentive for risk shifting; i.e., asset stripping, 
compared to a firm operating in steady-state industries (low demand uncertainty and high 
productivity).  It is thus, more optimal for the latter to opt for collateralised loan financing to 
show bonding commitment since there is lesser need to retain operational flexibility by way 
of asset liquidation.   
 Additionally, collateralised loan constrains the borrower from undertaking action that 
reduces loan value (eg. dividend payout) and insures against volatilities of the firm’s other 
assets, a risk that is borne by unsecured debtors (Barnea et al., 1981b). As observed above, 
                                                   
103  The extent of loss is dependent on divergent borrower-lender values assigned to the collateral, i.e., 
normally the lender’s valuation of the collateral is a fraction of the value perceived by the borrower.  This 
difference in valuation relates to its recovery costs (see Section 3). 
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collateral has a symmetrical function of (i) reducing default costs incurred by the lender; or 
(ii) making default costly for the borrower (Benjamin, 1978; Smith and Warner, 1979b; Plaut, 
1985).   
4.2 Underinvestment 
 Collateral shields secured debtors from underinvestment issues suffered by unsecured 
debtors.  In addition, the trade off between collateral and interest rate moderates 
underinvestment as it limits wealth transfer from borrower to lender (Barnea et al., 1981b).  
Nonetheless, there may be situations where issuance of collateralised loan worsens 
underinvestment.  For example, Stulz and Johnson (1985) argue if the firm has existing 
unsecured debtors, the issuance of collateralised loan will dissipate the gain that would have 
accrued to them (diluting the unsecured debtholders’ rights over the firm assets).  To 
compensate for the possibility of the firm exercising this strategy, the unsecured debtholders 
may demand higher yield, and this worsens the underinvestment issue.  With regards to firm 
type, they argue low risk firms will favour collateralised loans given the investment hurdle 
rate will be comparatively less significant.  
4.3 Bankruptcy 
 Legislative provisions that prioritises secured debtholders over other creditors further 
minimises bankruptcy costs of the former.  Since collateralised loan mitigates costly 
contracting, the borrower would in return expect favourable financing terms from the lender 
(see also Table 7).  However, this needs to be weighed against potential cramdowns where 
the defaulting borrower under Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings may (i) reduce the loan to 
the present market value of the collateral; (ii) reduce the contracted interest rate; (iii) extend 
the loan tenure; or (iv) alter the repayment schedule.   
4.4 Information asymmetry 
 Under the context of information asymmetry, collateral is either used as a signalling or 
incentive mechanism. Under the signalling theory, low risk borrowers endeavour to credibly 
convey their true state through commitment mechanisms, such as infusing collateral into the 
project (Leland and Pyle, 1977).  In this instance, the lender will offer separating contracts 
(i.e., combinations of loan rates, quantum and collateral) contingent on the expected returns, 
i.e. sorting-by-private information paradigm (see also Besanko and Thakor, 1987b).   
 105 
 
 By designing incentive-compatible contracts, it induces borrower to signal their project 
true form (Bester, 1985, 1987).  Therefore, this moderates adverse selection by sorting low 
risk borrowers from ‘lemons’.  In rational expectations equilibrium, the former will trade off 
higher collateral given their low default risk for favourable loan rates (Bester, 1985; Chan 
and Kanatas, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987a) subject to the availability of sufficient 
collateral and risk neutrality of the borrower (Bester, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987a).  
Under the signalling effect, borrower quality and action are treated as complements that is, a 
low risk borrower is assumed to commit greater effort and due to the probable low default  
risk she/he is more willing to offer higher collateral.       
 The incentive theory presupposes the lender is able to observe the risk profile of the 
borrower ex-ante, i.e., sorting-by-observed risk-paradigm.
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  Given costly monitoring of the 
borrower’s conduct ex-post, lender seeks to influence risky borrower effort that maximises 
project success.  Therefore, by increasing the collateral requirement on high risk borrower, it 
instigates a positive incentive effect on the borrowers’ project selection and effort that averts 
costly defaults.  The economic efficiency of collateralised debt holds if information transfer is 
costly (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Bester, 1985; Chan and Kanatas, 1985), and the collateralised 
asset is of greater value to the borrower than the lender (Lacker, 2001).  Under the incentive 
effect, borrower quality and effort are treated as substitutes since for low risk borrowers 
higher collateral does not generate greater marginal return to effort.     
 From the review of empirical studies, we observe mixed results on collateral vis-à-vis 
information asymmetry (see again Table 6).  Study by Berger and Udell (1990) for the United 
States, Jimenez and Saurina (2004), and Jimenez et al. (2006) for the Spanish credit market 
support the use of collateral in respect of high risk borrowers.  This is aligned with that of the 
incentive theory and demonstrates wider application of the ‘sorting-by-observed risk-
paradigm’ in actual loan disbursement decisions.  Nonetheless, in Jimenez et al. (2006) they 
find among young firms the use of collateral is lower for those borrowers who subsequently 
default, which they justify to the signalling theory.  Given the consensus in agency theory 
that collateral influence default risk positively, one would expect that the presence of 
collateral would be required to mitigate the incidence of default.   
                                                   
104  Borrower past credit performance or financial position may provide an indicative point of probable default.  
For example, Stulz and Johnson (1985, p.519) states, “since the value of the security provision is an 
increasing function of the face value of the unsecured debt, one would expect secured debt financing to be 
used more often if the firm has high leverage ratio”. 
 106 
 
 In respect of the inter-linkages between collateral and loan portfolio risk, Berger and 
Udell (1990) and John et al. (2003) observe collateralised loans are on average riskier than 
unsecured ones and subjected to higher yield.  This is similarly observed by Gottesman and 
Roberts (2007) in their study of the United States syndicated loan market.  Again, these 
results run contrary to the ideal of Smith and Warner (1979a) that collateral moderates costly 
contracting.  The disparity in empirical results flag possible gaps to endogenously account for 
agency cost in collateralised debt structures.  As pointed by Lacker (2001), Gottesman and 
Roberts (2007), and Berger et al. (2011) there is still residual risk and potential management 
perquisite consumption not fully absolved by the collateral coupled with the issue of recovery 
costs that affect loan recoveries in default state.    
5. Improving the resiliency of the financial architecture  
In this section, we discuss an intuitive approach of reducing the fragility of the financial 
architecture from an agency theoretic perspective.  We argue that this can be done by 
stripping away the put option to default in a financial contract.  We capture the contrasting 
effect of (i) default-free (i.e., pragmatically risk-free); and (ii) default-prone (i.e., risky) 
collateralised loan structure on the overall financial system resiliency.  We draw from 
Ebrahim and Hussain (2010) who illustrate that in rational expectations equilibrium (REE) a 
default-free (i.e., pragmatic risk-free) collateralised loan as economic-neutral [economic 
efficient] with a default-prone (i.e., risky) when the cost of default are constrained 
[unconstrained].  These two solutions arise from the trade-off of financial claims between a 
risk-averse lender (financial intermediary) and borrower (entrepreneur-manager).  This issue 
has major ramification on the theory and application of financial intermediation as discussed 
below. 
On the theoretical front, the above result chips away at the static (as well as dynamic) 
trade-off hypothesis (see Myers, 1984b; Strebulaev, 2007).  The rationale for the distinct 
result of Ebrahim and Hussain (2010) ensue by segregating the welfare of borrowers and 
lenders.  This approach captures the agency perspective (i.e., the conflict of interest) between 
the two.  In contrast, the static as well as dynamic trade-off theory aggregates the welfare of 
the two competing agents resulting in structurally unstable equilibria with endemic banking 
crisis.   
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On the application front, the result of Ebrahim and Hussain (2010) imply that regulators 
should reinforce the structuring of pragmatically default-free loans to mitigate fragility.  This 
prevents frittering away public resources from the bail outs of failed financial institutions.  
This requires borrowers to have enough ‘skin in the game’ to avoid resorting to: (i) 
defaulting; and (ii) transferring the downside of their risky ventures to society at large.  This 
section furthers the framework of Ebrahim and Hussain (2010) and presents literature on 
collateralised loan (see Section 4) by exploring the effects of the two contrasting 
collateralised loan structures on the asset transformation intermediation function in a 
financial system, through methodological review of a financial intermediary (bank) financial 
statement.  
5.1 Bank assets: collateralised loans 
 We assume a two-period financial system, where an entrepreneur-manager has a 
positive-yielding project which requires a fixed amount of investment but nonetheless 
constrained by his initial wealth.  This is addressed through trading non-recourse financial 
claims that are collateralised against project payoffs, which comprise of the net operating 
income (NOI) in addition to the liquidating value of the project.  The trading of financial 
claims can either be structured on a (i) pragmatically default-free; or (ii) default-prone 
collateralised loan (see Figure 12).  Both the NOI and asset value are positive random first-
order Markov processes whose probability distribution is known to the lender and borrower. 
5.1.1 Pragmatically default-free loan contract  
 We rationalise a pragmatically default-free collateralised loan solution as one that does 
not allow the put option to default to be significantly in-the-money.  That is, the terminal 
project payoffs exceed the loan balance to its tenure (over all states of the economy) with 
very high probability (see Figure 12).  The importance of ensuring the payoffs from 
depreciating to a substantial negative value over the loan tenure emphasises the views of 
Bernanke and Gertler (1989, p.28) in that “agency costs depend not only on current wealth 
but also on future expected conditions”.105  This stresses a dynamic approach in debt pricing 
that endogenously account for the conflict of interest from agency perspective.  On a micro-
                                                   
105  Our assertions are consistent with Foote et al. (2008), and Archer and Smith (2013), who observe non-
linearity in the put option to default.  In that, home mortgage borrowers do not immediately default as soon 
as their equity goes ‘underwater’.  Rather, this occurs when there is substantial erosion in their home 
(property) equity values.    
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level, pragmatically default-free collateralised loan mitigates credit and liquidity risk of the 
financial intermediary given the put option to default is never significantly in-the-money.  
Furthermore, the entrepreneur-manager enjoys a favourable cost of debt given the nearly 
default-free financial claim.  At a macro-level, it averts fragility within the financial system 
where a default may set off a domino effect given a leveraged-dominant financial system 
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Minsky, 1992).     
Figure 12: Bank balance sheet: schematic flow of asset transformation in financial 
intermediation 
 
  
C 
A 
A′ 
O 
B′ 
B D 
Bank asset: collateralised loan arrangement 
Collateralised financial claims 
Credit funding Lender 
(Financial institution) 
Borrower 
(Entrepreneur-manager 
with collateral) 
Bank liabilities: Deposit arrangement 
Non-contingent callable deposit 
 
Liquidity funding 
Borrower 
(Financial institution) 
Lender 
(Depositor) 
Default-prone Pragmatically default-free 
Default-free 
loan payoffs 
Future state of economy 
Loan + interest 
Put option to default is 
never significantly in-
the-money   
Put option to 
default increasingly 
in-the-money Actual payoffs 
Expected 
Future state of economy 
Default-prone 
loan payoffs 
Loan + interest 
 109 
 
5.1.2 Default-prone loan contract 
On the other hand, a default-prone solution either has or will have a put option to 
default deep in-the-money.  As depicted in Figure 12, the default-prone solution suffers from 
potential default states prior to critical stage ‘C’, and normal states beyond it.  Before 
reaching critical stage ‘C’, the entrepreneur-manager is technically in default as the project 
payoffs are less than the maturity value of the collateralised loan (including interest).  In the 
default states of the economy, the entrepreneur-manager may not have the motivation to 
maintain the project’s payoffs indicated in sum as ‘AB’ over the future states of the economy 
‘OC’.  This may lead to a fall in the value of these payoffs to A′B′ over the defaulting states 
of the economy.  The quadrilateral AA′BB′ thus represents the frictional cost of default 
serving as the proxy for the agency cost of debt.        
The embedded put option to default is deep-in-the-money (valuable to the entrepreneur-
manager), the greater the relative divergence of the project payoffs with the outstanding loan 
amount.  In a foreclosure, the financial intermediary recovery rate (net default cost) is 
contingent on the collateral value since he loses the payoffs from the NOI given the non-
recourse loan status.  Where the recovery rate is stochastic, particularly in case of 
cramdowns, a default-prone loan is a costlier solution.
106
  If the recovery rate is extremely 
low, risky financing is untenable leading to pragmatically default-free financing as the only 
viable (and economically efficient) alternative.   
Given the default-prone solution involves default in states of economy, the loan pricing 
structure warrants higher interest rate and loan ratio than a pragmatically default-free one.  
Similar to Ebrahim and Hussain (2010), we find default-prone collateralised loan has a 
receding economic efficiency with heightened agency cost (accruing from the default risk).  
Even when agency cost is low, it ranks at best economic-neutral to a default-free 
collateralised loan as the loan pricing structure involves the lender bearing the agency cost of 
debt.  The above may account for the disparate collateralised loan yield observed in empirical 
studies of Berger and Udell (1990), John et al. (2003) and Gottesman and Roberts (2007).  
Overall, the financial intermediary is better off with pragmatically default-free collateralised 
loan by sterilising the put option to default.   
 
                                                   
106  See Franks and Torous (1989) on the costly impact of Chapter 11 bankruptcy on debt pricing. 
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5.2 Bank liabilities: deposits
107
  
The asset transformation function entails the intermediation of the demand and supply 
of funds.  In our model, the supply of funds is contingent on receipt of deposits, which 
warrants the financial intermediary to guarantee repayability of funds on demand by 
depositors.  Whilst this liquidity funding, akin to non-contingent callable ‘loan’, is 
alternatively cheaper than internal capital, it exposes the financial intermediary to liquidity 
risk from potential asset-liability mismatch.  Figure 12 presents a stylised linkage between 
collateralised loan arrangements (bank asset) with demand deposits (bank liabilities).  At 
minimum, the intermediary will fund the project subject to satisfying his contracted cost of 
funds on the liability-side.  We pursue this framework further by decomposing the two 
contrasting collateralised loan net payoffs on the financial intermediary deposit obligation. 
5.3 Income statement: collateralised loan and deposit arrangement payoffs  
Figures 13(i)-(iii) model variations of the respective net payoffs of a default-prone and 
pragmatically default-free collateralised loan solution without [with] deposit insurance.  We 
show that the net payoffs under each permutation leads to different (i) liquidity effect on the 
financial intermediary; and (ii) risk exposure on the deposit arrangement.  The following 
results are fundamental given the important public deposit custodial role of an intermediary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
107  This does not preclude other forms of liquidity funding in a bank’s balance sheet.       
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Figure 13: Pragmatically default-free and default-prone collateralised loan payoffs on 
financial intermediary deposit obligations 
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5.3.1 Default-prone collateralised loan payoffs without deposit insurance 
As seen in Figure 13(i), the default-prone solution suffers from default risk up to 
critical stage ‘C1’ and normal states thereof.  The deterioration of expected payoffs from ‘X1’ 
to ‘X′1’ in the states of economy to ‘C1’ exposes the intermediary to cost of default, where 
entrepreneur-manager shifts the project risk to the former.  The put option to default for the 
risky solution increases in value where borrower equity is deep underwater, which signifies 
irrational exuberance in demand for and supply of credit.
108
   
In asset price run ups, the increase in asset values induces a false sense of heightened 
security and parallel expansionary credit policy.  Subsequent asset price collapse distorts the 
intermediary balance sheet and magnifies the value of put option to default by entrepreneur-
manager.  As equity goes deep underwater, it is thus, advantageous for the borrower to 
exercise the put option to limit losses.  Widespread defaults in the credit market, creates debt 
overhang with contagion effect on intermediary’s credit and liquidity risk (i.e., financial 
fragility).   
A lower than expected performance of the default-prone collateralised loan worsens the 
financial intermediary capacity to meet deposit payoffs.  States up to point ‘C2’ in Figure 
13(i) indicates the deterioration from expected payoffs of ‘Y1’ to ‘Y′1’.  To meet the deposit 
obligation, this entails drawing on the intermediary’s internal capital to rebalance the inter-
temporal liquidity gap.  Nonetheless, due to coordination problem among depositors, any 
anticipation of the intermediary’s difficulty in fulfilling the deposit claim is sufficient to 
trigger bank run.  The intensity of deposit withdrawal coupled with loan defaults triggers 
severe liquidity crunch.  In this state of economy, financial intermediary capital which forms 
only fraction of the estimated risk exposure is under critical strain.  This sets off an adverse 
dynamic.  
                                                   
108  Archer and Smith (2013, p.373) find “During periods when the market is strong borrowers, as expected 
are more willing to take on more risk, underwriter [lenders] rationalize extending that risk on the 
expectation of continued robust market activity and reduced costs of potential default”.  Allen and Gale 
(2000) identify a buoyant economy feeds investor’s exuberance causing formation of asset bubbles.  
Where the investments are debt funded, this heightens the fragility of the financial system for investors are 
likely to exhibit risk shifting tendencies since they are sheltered from downside risk.  Similarly, Eisdorfer 
(2008) observes a positive link between market volatility with risk shifting, whereby there is higher 
incidence of overinvestment by firm in distress states. This bullish investment actually generates lesser 
firm value. 
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Foreclosure efforts to resuscitate lender balance sheet and income position are 
contingent on the collateral redeployability (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Benmelech and 
Bergman, 2011).  Forced collateral sale obscures recovery in illiquid markets concomitant 
with downward business cycle.  The next best buyer might be restrained due to debt 
overhang, market uncertainty, or exhibit predatory buying behaviour (Benmelech and 
Bergman, 2011; Brunnermeir, 2008).  This is worsened by liquidity freeze by other market 
participants given uncertainty of the intermediary’s financial state.  Counter actions to source 
liquidity from the deposit market by bidding up the rates only pushes the interest spread 
further that in turn sparks self-reinforcing liquidity spiral and capital erosion (see also 
Brunnermeir, 2008; Gorton and Metrick, 2009).  ‘S1’ and ‘S2’ in Figure 13(i) are inflexion 
point of bank insolvency.
109
  Depositors who are unable to secure full payoffs rank in line 
pursuant to the financial intermediary liquidation.  
5.3.2 Default-prone collateralised loan payoffs with deposit insurance  
Most financial systems have instituted deposit insurance schemes to contain bank run 
and maintain public confidence.  With deposit insurance, deposits are insured up to the 
legally covered sum.  Here, depositors’ payoffs are invariant to the riskiness of the 
intermediary loan portfolio.  The deposit payoffs profile in Figure 13(ii) mimics that of 
deposits under the default-free solution (see Figure 13(iii)).  Whilst this enhances depositor 
protection, the deposit insurance scheme is a risk transfer mechanism to a deposit insurer it 
nonetheless does not absolve the downside risk of default-prone collateralised loan.  Further, 
this safety net comes at the potential cost of moral hazard by lender.  First, it curtails 
depositors’ incentive to monitor financial intermediary’s conduct.  Second, the financial 
intermediary may exhibit risk shifting tendencies to (i) undertake riskier loans since the risk 
of bank run is mitigated by the deposit insurance scheme; and (ii) maintain nominal ‘buffer’ 
capital.  Third, deposit insurance scheme covers a specified threshold and does not alleviate 
the intermediary’s exposure to other creditors. 110  Thus, there could be other risk points that 
                                                   
109  The differential payoffs accruing to the financial intermediary is contingent on the extent of the loss given 
loan default and the obligations to its depositors.  Figures 13(i)-(iii) only illustrate three scenarios of this 
potential impact. For example, the financial intermediary could potentially slide into a deeper illiquidity 
trough than that depicted in Figure 13(i) (i.e., S1 < 0).  This then would entail greater resources on the 
intermediary to reinstate its liquidity and solvency position.    
110  In the case of Northern Rock despite the security provided by the deposit insurance scheme, there was still 
run on the bank as depositors were acutely aware that deposits above £2000 are not fully guaranteed 
(Milne and Wood, 2008).  This limit has since been revised upwards to £85000 per depositor per financial 
intermediary (International Association of Deposit Insurers, 2012). 
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could trigger a liquidity crunch (see the discussion below on repurchase agreement). States 
prior to point ‘C1’ under the net payoffs illustrate region of financial fragility.  ‘OS3’ is point 
of financial distress due to income impairment arising from poor loan portfolio.   
In Figures 13(i)-(ii), the heightened value of put option to default emits financial 
fragility into the system arising from the financial network effect.  This is even with the 
institution of deposit insurance coverage.  Any financial intermediary bailout becomes a 
public liability with repercussions on social welfare.     
5.3.3 Pragmatically default-free collateralised loan without deposit insurance 
In Figure 13(iii) the payoffs exhibit stability over states of economy, i.e., payoffs 
exceed the loan balance to tenure with very high probability.
111
  Supply of deposits remains 
unrestricted subject to the intermediary fulfilment of non-contingent callable ‘loans’ from its 
depositors irrespective of states of economy.  In other words, the depositors’ funds are 
pragmatically default-free as long as the financial intermediary maintains significant capital 
to back it.  This in turn allows the intermediary to earn economic surplus from the margin by 
stripping the put option to default (via prudent pricing of the debt and maintaining sufficient 
capital).  Thus, it assures uninterrupted liquidity and credit cycle of the trilateral 
intermediation contract between depositor-financial intermediary-borrower.  If regulators 
enforce proper pricing of the loan along with sufficient capital, this minimises the option 
value and mitigate the moral hazard to increase risk taking on both facilities, permitting 
reduction of cost to society.  Regulators should therefore encourage financial intermediaries 
to price their lending and borrowing facilities pragmatically default-free as it alleviates 
financial fragility and thus enhances the stability of the financial architecture.
112
  This also 
curtails systemic risk and contagion effect.  More importantly, we posit that these measures 
accord the same depositor protection without the need to institute a public safety net.   
  
                                                   
111  This reflects real world practicalities whereby default risk cannot be fully eliminated but substantially 
minimised.  See Section 5.5 on pricing pragmatically default-free collateralised loan.  
112  It should be noted that our discussion precludes the size of the financial intermediary.  Thus, intermediary 
size is not important if the intermediary is able to price both lending and borrowing facilities in a default-
free manner.  In other words, it enhances the financial system resiliency against ‘too-big-too fail’ or ‘too-
many-to-fail’ crisis intervention conundrum. 
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5.4 Special case of repurchase agreements (repo) 
 A repo is a sale of securities in conjunction with an agreement to buy them back at a 
later date, at a repurchase price that includes the original sales price plus interest (repo rate) 
over the tenure of the arrangement.  It is thus equivalent to a spot sale integrated with a 
forward contract.  These are normally of short-term nature and favoured by financial 
institutions, institutional investors and large firms. The seller of the security (institution 
owning the security) benefits from the additional liquidity received.  On the other hand, the 
buyer (institution providing the funds) receives the right to use the security to either sell or 
further churn to meet other financial obligations.  To reverse the repo, the buyer must 
redeliver the same or equivalent security at the end of the said tenure.   
 The presence of the security in repo arrangements makes it attractive to both seller and 
buyer.  For a financial intermediary, borrowing through repo allows the institution to secure 
funds at a cost generally below the inter-bank deposit rates by virtue of the collateralised 
arrangement.  Furthermore, for institutions with highly leveraged modus operandi (eg. 
investment banks or hedge funds) this permits borrowing at more favoured rates than in 
unsecured market arrangements.  Lending through repo permits a lower regulatory risk 
charge as opposed through unsecured lending.  Ownership of the security permits the 
intermediary to further churn the collateral.  Thus, it maximises the use of the said asset 
without any contractual loss to the original repo arrangement.  Whilst this promotes cost 
efficiency, the ability to rehypothecate the original transaction and its extensive use heightens 
the default risk on other upstream contracts (eg. securities, derivatives, inter-bank and money 
market).
113
 
 The put option to default arising from a counterparty failure to deliver the closing leg of 
the repo repurchase and concern on the quality of the security is mitigated to an extent by 
imposing haircut or initial margin, which is a fraction of the security market value.  Similar to 
a default-prone collateralised loan, a default-prone repo has or will have a put option to 
default deep in-the-money.  In a market with a downward trend, a potential default by the 
seller will expose the buyer holding a security that has depreciated (valued less than the 
original amount loaned).  Consequently, the buyer will subject the seller to a significant 
                                                   
113  Trading debt for debt has a multiplier effect on the ultimate leverage position in the financial market that 
contributes to magnifying the size of the financial system disproportionately to a country’s gross domestic 
product (GDP).  See also Singh and Aitken (2010) on the extent of rehypothecation in the shadow banking 
system.   
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haircut value.  On the flip side, the seller suffers a carrying cost on the default-prone repo by 
virtue that the institution would then need to repurchase the security at a premium value if the 
actual market value of the said security has significantly depreciated.   
Figure 14:  Pragmatically default-free and default-prone securities payoffs 
with repo obligations   
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 Thus, the ability to correctly value the collateral is very important.  This can be 
encumbered by the intangibility and information asymmetry with regards to (i) liquidity or 
complexity of the collateral; and (ii) seller risk profile.  The degree of liquidity deteriorates as 
one move from a pragmatically default-free security (eg. government bonds) to default-prone 
one such as the CDOs and CLOs from the subprime market.  Once its market value falls, the 
repo buyer is unable to square off his position by selling directly in the market.  Furthermore, 
trading is impossible during a crisis as market participants are unable to correctly price these 
securities.
114
  
 Under our model, securitisation of the pragmatically default-free [default-prone] 
security in Figure 14 enables the owner of the said securities to expand their liquidity line not 
only via deposits but also from the repo market.  In this case, the security owner (seller) 
offers the securitised pragmatically default-free [default-prone] collateralised loan as lien in 
return for cash funding from the repo counterpart (buyer).
115
  The riskiness of the security is 
signified by the quantum of haircut that reflects its quality (i.e., agency cost of debt).
  
Accordingly, a default-prone repo would incur a larger haircut quantum over a pragmatically 
default-free one (see Figure 14).
116
   
 The deterioration in the stream of payoffs of the underlying default-prone security from 
‘X1’ to ‘X′1’ in the states of economy up to ‘C1’ affects the liquidity position of the institution 
owning the security.  Added to this, the reversal of the repo at a premium (i.e., repurchase of 
the security where its market value has significantly depreciated) leads to a loss on the net 
payoffs accruing to the seller, up to point ‘C1’.  The region between ‘OS4’ demonstrates 
losses that erode the capital base of the institution owning them.  As demonstrated in the 
recent financial crisis, actual default by the seller profoundly affected the downstream 
contract of the repo buyer, causing contagion liquidity effect on the buyer’s solvency 
position.  Intuitively, the above discussions highlights any permutations of financial 
                                                   
114  We elaborate this further in Section 5.5.1 and see also Figure 16.  
115  Prior to mid-1990s, securities in repo arrangements were confined to treasury bills and other government 
agency securities.  Constrains in attaining sufficient high-grade securities saw the eligibility extended to 
include more risky debt instruments such as [non] mortgage asset backed securities, CDO and CLO. 
116  We ignore the institution of margin calls in the context of our two-period model.  However, in a multi-
period model margin calls alleviate risk shifting. A repo buyer also earns interest on the funds lent, i.e., 
repo rate, paid at settlement date.  We do not illustrate this outflow separately as it is already imputed in 
the seller repurchase price.  
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structures that involve an element of default-prone solution will end up destabilising the 
financial system (Minsky, 1992). 
5.5 Pricing nearly pragmatically default-free collateralised loan 
 How then do we engineer a pragmatically default-free collateralised loan structure that 
ensures the option to default has a very low (negligible) probability?  This has major 
ramifications on the financial system resiliency in light of the negative experience of 
collateralised loans in the recent financial crisis and the financial industry unabated 
fascination with such instruments.
117
     
 Models of debt pricing fail to consider the welfare of both principal-agent relationships 
of agency theory (see Black-Scholes (1973), Merton (1974), Jarrow-Tunrbull (1995) and 
Duffie-Singleton (1999)).    In this section, we focus on reducing the attendant agency cost by 
ensuring borrower does not transfer the project risk to the lender.  This is by ascertaining the 
put option to default will never be significantly in-the-money.  This is attained by objectively 
pricing the endogenous loan parameters (initial loan value, loan repayments, initial deposit 
and loan tenure), given the underlying exogenous factors (initial asset price, its mean and 
volatility, safety margin, borrower income and income multiplier).
118
 These parameters are 
discussed below. 
Figures 15(i)-(iii) emulates Ebrahim (2009) to exemplify a project (venture) with initial 
value (P0) funded by trading financial claims on the project payoffs with a financial 
intermediary.  To secure financing, entrepreneur-manager places an initial deposit (ID) that is 
further secured by the project payoffs.  Hence, the amount financed (Q0) is the difference 
between the two.  The initial deposit acts as a commitment device enforced on the borrower, 
which (i) locks in upfront equity to the lender; and (ii) reduces borrower risk shifting 
behaviour.   
                                                   
117  For example, covered bonds are seen as an alternative form of funding to investors seeking high grade 
investment instruments and avenue for long term funding. Regulators, such as the Korean financial 
authorities, are keen to enact the requisite legislation to promote the development of this market (see 
Mundy, 2012).   
118  Holmstrom (1979) explores the effect of principal-agent relationship in optimal debt contracts.  However, 
his solution suggests the use of information systems, which reduces asymmetry with respect to the agent’s 
conduct.  Although imperfect, it can improve the contract economic efficiency, i.e., presumably by treating 
information asymmetry it absolves agency issues.  Other measures to curb agency cost of debt include (i) 
call provisions that moderates information asymmetry and asset substitution issues; (ii) conversion rights 
to curb management excessive consumption; and (iii) income bonds that alleviates bankruptcy problems 
(Myers, 1977; Barnea et al., 1981b). 
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The outstanding loan balance (Qt) is measured by the compounded initial loan value 
and netted off by future value of annuitised periodical payments over the loan duration.  
Asset prices in Ebrahim (2009) are assumed to follow a Geometric Brownian Motion, where 
future states are independent of past movements (see Efficient Market Hypothesis - Fama, 
1970, 1991).  Its asset movement is function of its value appreciation [depreciation] and risk 
profile across time.
119
   
Figure 15(i) presents a stylised situation where the entrepreneur-manager equity 
(project payoff relative to outstanding loan) is ‘underwater’ in period ‘t1’ to ‘t2’.  While it is 
understood that borrowers’ with positive equity will never default, not all borrowers whose 
equity is underwater will automatically default.  Actual default occurs where the equity is 
significantly underwater that is borrower expectation of future asset prices and pecuniary 
[non-pecuniary] costs (eg. income capability, effect on borrower credit score) substantially 
exceeds the benefits of continuing with the loan repayments (Allen, 1981; Ambrose and 
Buttimer, 2000; Foote et al., 2008; Archer and Smith, 2013). 
Prudent underwriting warrants satisfaction of both (i) asset; and (ii) income constraints.  
The loan pricing mechanism here is consistent with Baltensperger (1978) who advocates 
incorporation of not only the interest rate but also the loan-to-value ratio and the tenure of the 
facility.  Archer and Smith (2013), and Foote et al. (2008) in their studies extend the 
parameters by including borrower income factors.
120
  This satisfies a higher order risk 
management approach in contrast to ad hoc credit rationing practices (Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981; Ebrahim and Hussain, 2010), and overall loan loss rehabilitation programs (Ambrose 
and Buttimer, 2000; Foote et al., 2008). 
  
                                                   
119  One can also incorporate jump processes to asset prices by resorting to a Poisson distribution as suggested 
by Merton (1976) and adapting the methodology elaborated in Ebrahim et al. (2011).  
120  Archer and Smith (2013), and Foote et al. (2008) observe debt-to-income ratio and unemployment rate 
positively influence the put option to default. 
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Figure 15: Default-prone and pragmatically default-free debt structure over states of 
economy 
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5.5.1 Asset value constraint 
 Figures 15(ii)-(iii) illustrate asset market with upward and downward trend, 
respectively.  In contrast to its default-prone counterpart, a pragmatically default-free one is 
characterised by safety margin that ensures the entrepreneur-manager equity to loan value is 
untainted by asset market volatilities across states of economy (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989) 
with very high probability.  This safety margin should be pre-conditioned to accommodate 
both an upward or downward trend asset price (see again Figures 15(ii)-(iii)).  Moreover, the 
degree of safety margin required is contingent on specificities of the underlying project/ asset 
riskiness.
 121
  Figure 16 provides a stylised menu of collateral that are recognised under the 
banking capital accord.  Given the endogeneity of agency issues, collateral that converges 
towards the extremes of the asymmetric information and asset intangibility as per Figure 16 
suffers from heightened lemons problem and transparency issues.  These obscurities call for 
stricter safety margin due to the innate difficulties in pricing such instruments (i.e., 
concordant with asset risk).   
 The safety margin is measured by a multiple ‘α’ of the underlying asset riskiness.  
Thus, the initial value of the loan is evaluated in such a way that at the optimum level, the 
value of the outstanding loan balance (Qt) is always equal or lesser to the asset price reduced 
by the safety margin.  This yields the minimal initial deposit (or ‘skin in the game’) as a 
function of the underwriting asset value constraint along with the characteristics of assets (see 
Ebrahim, 2009).
122
  
 
  
                                                   
121  The asset riskiness is influenced by its redeployability (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Benmelech and 
Bergman, 2011); transaction/ dissipative costs (Barro, 1976; Benjamin, 1978; Boot et al., 1991; Lacker, 
2001; Jokivuolle and Puera, 2003), asset drift, volatility and correlation with other firm assets (Benjamin, 
1978; Jokivuolle and Puera, 2003).  The duration gap between loan default and repossession of the 
collateral should also be accounted in assessing the asset value (Ebrahim and Hussain, 2010).  See also 
Table 7 on the broad categories of collateral and the associated economic impact. 
122  It should be noted that when asset follows an upward trend, initial loan disbursed by the financial 
intermediary yields a corner solution in Ebrahim (2009).  In contrast, an asset following a downward trend 
yields an interior solution.  
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Figure 16: Collateralised loan pricing with endogenous agency cost and heightened asset 
intangibility-asymmetric information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.5.2 Income constraint 
 The repayability of the loan is contingent on (i) periodic annuitised payments; as well 
as (ii) income capability of the borrower.  Prudent underwriting warrants the periodic 
payments to be within the entrepreneur-manager income capability.  This yields optimal loan 
tenure as a function of income of entrepreneur-manager underwriting asset value and income 
constraints, exogenous interest rate along with asset characteristics (see again Ebrahim, 
2009).     
 In summary, structuring pragmatically default-free collateralised loan involves 
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6. Conclusion 
 This study builds on the issue of financial fragility, one of the economic rationales for 
the Islamic prohibition of ribā an-nasi’ah deduced from the first essay, from the perspective 
of collateralised loan structures.  Given established literature on risk-reducing feature of 
collateral in loan contracts, the spate of loan arrears and repo run in the recent financial crisis 
highlights the mere presence of collateral do not fully dissipate default risk.  The unravelling 
of sophisticated securitisation and rehypothecation of debt instruments that emanates from 
poor loan practices emits system-wide financial fragility.  Recent regulatory calls for steeper 
capital adequacy can boot strap liquidity risk but with an attached economic cost (Diamond 
and Rajan, 2005; Hammond and Masters, 2013; Masters and Hammond, 2013).  We argue 
that this should be supplemented with upfront prudent underwriting, which is economically 
efficient to credit rehabilitation or bailout programs.   
In this paper we rationalise an elegant way of going back to the basics of prudent 
underwriting, which minimises agency costs between lender and borrower.  We apply an 
intuitive approach of contrasting this agency effect in pragmatically default-free collateralised 
loan with that of risky solution.  The former is characterised as one that does not allow the 
put option to default to be significantly in-the-money, whereas the latter either has or will 
have a put option to default deep in-the-money.  Using financial intermediary financial 
statement, we illustrate that default-prone (risky) collateralised loan leads to potential 
disintermediation, i.e., it negates intermediary’s core role of (i) asset transformation, and (ii) 
deposit custodian functions.  Subsequent churning (securitisation and rehypothecation) of a 
default-prone solution, as exemplified by the repo run in the recent crisis, only transfers but 
not absolve the default risk to other market participants.       
Our findings concur with Ebrahim and Hussain (2010) in that default-prone 
collateralised loan has a receding economic efficiency with heightened agency cost accruing 
to the risk of default.  This is significant where the (i) recovery rate is stochastic with 
cramdown actions by the borrower, or (ii) if recoveries from foreclosures are extremely low.  
In this situation, a pragmatically default-free loan is the only economic efficient solution.  
Even when agency cost is marginal, default-prone loan ranks at best economic neutral to its 
competing counterpart.  This arises from the loan pricing that involves lender bearing the 
agency cost of debt.  The above observations are distinct from the static and dynamic trade 
off results of Myers (1984b) and Strebulaev (2007) who aggregate the welfare of the 
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opposing agents leading to erroneous result in poor states of economy.
123
  On the other hand, 
our approach of segregating the lender-borrower welfare in the financial contract accords 
recognition of the conflict of interest endogenous to principal-agent relationship.   
The results also have policy implications in reinforcing the present financial 
architecture resiliency.  Regulators should emphasise the structuring of pragmatically default-
free loans to mitigate financial fragility.  This warrant sterilising the put option to default 
through ensuring borrowers maintain adequate ‘skin in the game’, which minimises risk 
shifting tendencies over duration of the loan.
124
  More importantly, by constraining the put 
option to default, it endows depositors’ similar security to a financial system with deposit 
protection scheme but without the moral hazard issues associated with such guarantees.  
Intuitively, this should prevent systemic crisis in a highly networked financial system and 
minimise cost on public funds arising from bailouts of failed financial intermediaries.         
Pricing pragmatically default-free collateralised loans involves calibrating the 
endogenous loan parameters subject to its asset and income constraints.  Our approach is 
consistent with that of Baltensperger (1978), Foote et al. (2008), and Archer and Smith 
(2013).  This encompass stripping the put option to default by ensuring borrower equity does 
not bottom into a negative region over all states of economy (i.e., in both asset market 
upward or downward trend).  By ensuring borrower maintains adequate ‘skin in the game’, 
this makes the structure quasi-Islamic as it resolves the fragility and conflict of interest 
between the financial intermediary and borrower.
125
  This paper addresses the need for a 
more dynamic method of pricing collateralised loan arrangements.    
In terms of future research work, the above framework on pricing nearly pragmatically 
default-free collateralised loan provides us with a tool to investigate the efficiency of ar-
rahnu (Islamic form of pawn broking facility) that is widely practised in Malaysia for funding 
microtraders.  Here, the borrower (entrepreneur-manager) pawns his property in lieu of an 
interest-free loan (qard) from the lender (financial intermediary).  Currently, gold is the only 
                                                   
123  Both studies aggregates the two adversarial claimants (debt and equity) objective functions, thereby 
depriving the analysis of supply and demand functions and hence the optimal pricing parameters of debt, 
particularly following periods of economic down cycle (see also Footnote 105).      
124  This can be further strengthened by joining a continuous workout insurance scheme as advocated in Shiller 
et al. (2013), which addresses potential defaults ex-post.   
125  From an Islamic perspective, all commutative transactions are permissible unless they lead to animosity 
and dispute (see Al-Zuhayli, 2003) 
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medium of collateral accepted by the intermediaries.  Testing the efficiency of ar-rahnu in 
mitigating default provides an interesting case study that should contribute towards 
enhancing the financial policies of emerging economies.   
Additionally, this study also proffers linkage to other research on the economic 
implication of trading of debt for debt (bai al dayn bi al dayn) and short selling that are 
currently prohibited in Islamic finance.  Certainly from mainstream financial context, debt 
trading and short selling enhances market liquidity.  However, an assessment of this 
prohibition by Muslim jurists would provide the substantive proof from a financial and 
economic perspective.        
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
1. Summary and policy implications 
This thesis is a collection of three essays that pertain to financial development of 
emerging Muslim economies.  In our first essay, we focus on the prohibition of ribā an-
nasi’ah as Kuran (2005, 2009) alleges that it has hindered the progress of the Muslim world.  
The second essay focuses on the accessibility of financial services to financially strapped 
consumers by advocating an endogenous circuit structure (akin to ROSCA/ ASCRA) by 
employing the classic qard (interest-free) facility.  The final essay, in contrast, presents a 
practical way of mitigating fragility of collateralised loans by employing a hybrid facility 
which resembles a pure debt interest-bearing facility with a crucial difference.  That is, it 
allows borrower equity to go slightly underwater thus, reducing defaults and hence financial 
fragility.  In this context, it makes the structure quasi-Islamic as it resolves financial fragility 
and reduces principal-agent conflict of interest.      
1.1 Has the prohibition of ribā an-nasi’ah hindered the economic development of the 
Muslim world? 
In the first essay we discuss this Islamic injunction in light of economics of religion 
literature.  Other studies on the economics of Islam approach this from the perspective of 
historical economics (Ragab, 1980; Kuran, 2004, 2005, 2009; Rubin, 2011; Grosjean, 2011), 
political economy (Chapra, 2008) and economic development (Guiso et al., 2003; Noland, 
2005).  Given the prohibition of ribā an-nasi’ah entails the conduct of commutative 
transactions; this essay seeks to study the rationale for it through modelling trading financial 
claims in the business sector between a risk-averse financier and entrepreneur-manager in a 
general equilibrium setting (augmented with rational expectations framework).  Default 
ensues from the agency cost of debt accruing to the conflict of interest between the two 
economic agents.  This is consistent with Allen (2001) who underscores the endogeneity and 
pertinence of agency cost in financial transactions.  In our pure interest-based debt structure 
model, we observe the religious injunction creates gain for it averts (i) sub-optimal financial 
structures due to agency cost of debt; (ii) expropriation of wealth of either party to contract; 
(iii) financial system fragility; and (iv) financial exclusion.   
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Expropriation of wealth by the lender occurs when the debt pricing apportions the 
project returns heavily to the financier (above the venture’s unleveraged return).  
Alternatively, lender could practice predatory pricing to induce default by way of ‘income-
stripping’ and ‘equity-stripping’.  On the other hand, the entrepreneur-manager could 
expropriate the wealth of the financier by exercising risk shifting, underinvestment strategies 
or ultimately strategic default that leaves the financier absorbing the project risk.  All the 
above practices lead to non-sustainable long-run equilibria.  The default risk in pure interest-
based debt contract emits fragility into the financial system given the system’s 
interconnectedness and highly leveraged nature.  A system that is embedded with fragile 
states is sensitive to ruptures and costly to fire wall against contagion risk.  Additionally, 
elevated agency cost of debt could result in the market clearing conditions for financing to 
breakdown leading to financial autarky.  Where this occurs cohorts of the population are 
subjected to financial exclusion which delimit their economic capabilities.  Each of the three 
issues creates drag on financial development and consequently, economic growth.   
With respect to pure interest-based debt contracts, our results also show that risky debt 
is at best economic neutral (not economically more efficient) to a risk-free solution due to 
defaults in agency cost of debt.  In addition, we observe the amalgamation of Pecking Order 
and Static Trade-off Theories in absence of asymmetric information and taxes, respectively.  
Thus, the ability to disentangle the primacy of either theory accruing to the above market 
friction from the seminal work of Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984a) is debatable.   
Given the fallibilities of pure interest-based debt contracts, we discuss the economic 
efficiency of hybrid contracts, characterised by upside profit and downside risk sharing 
between financier and entrepreneur-manager.  In our hybrid structure, profit sharing can be 
derived from equity, appreciation or income of the project in return for subsidising fraction of 
the project lease payment.  These forms the equity kickers that alleviate risk shifting 
tendencies in agency cost of debt and permits financier to match risk preferences with the 
project value generation specificities.  Furthermore, underinvestment in agency cost of debt is 
mitigated by the presence of collateral from the project.  Unlike convertible debt, hybrid 
structures allow entrepreneur-manager to retain ownership and control rights over the project 
even in good states.  The participative element in hybrid structures reduces financial fragility 
for it directly links the banks’ asset-liability function and is preferred over specialised 
banking system.  It also satisfies liquidity attributes as it can be structured for trading on 
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secondary market.  We find pure equity contract is economically more efficient only when 
hybrid structures are infeasible due to excessive agency cost of debt.  Where there is financial 
autarky, this warrants the deployment of charitable institutions as enjoined in the Islamic 
revealed sources.    
From the above observations, the Islamic prohibition on ribā an-nasi’ah does not 
impede economic growth.  Rather the underdevelopment of Muslim states accrues to the 
failure of the political elites to uphold the protection of property rights and establishment of 
institutions mandated to assist the underprivileged.  This has policy ramifications on the 
criticality of the institution of independent judiciary, legislative and executive branches of the 
government.  At the same time, the ijtihad by Muslim scholars has not progressed in tandem 
with the rigours of modern financial exchanges.  As financial economics become a highly 
specialised field, only joint ijtihad between the jurists, specialist and practitioners would 
increase the robustness of such decisions in today’s economic setting.  Additionally, 
sustainable economic growth warrants the institution of body to govern the interests of 
underprivileged segment of society.       
1.2 Can an interest-free credit facility be more efficient than a usurious payday loan? 
The second essay provides a timely and relevant discussion on payday loan industry, an 
alternative financial service provider of small unsecured short term loans at high APR.  
Report on the payday loan industry find these borrowers, comprising moderate to low income 
earners still subscribe to the loan despite the high charges due to their inability to secure 
funding from mainstream providers to meet unplanned events.  Literature on this subject is 
generally focused on either the credit behaviour or welfare effect of payday loans on the 
borrowers.  To our knowledge none have ventured on studying alternative forms of funding 
to meet the latent financial demands of these cohorts of borrowers.  Thus, this essay proffers 
an institutional design, in the form of endogenous leveraged interest-free payday loan circuit.  
In this essay, circuits are member based institutions akin to informal systems of ROSCA, 
ASCRA and the more formal hybrids, mutual and financial cooperatives.  Members are 
economically active risk-neutral agents.  The circuit provides short-term liquidity facility to 
allay its members’ inter-temporal exogenous income shocks. 
Our model incorporates (i) institutional economics of efficient organisation, which is 
characterised by its ability to adapt to the environment to deliver services in a cost effective 
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manner; and (ii) cultural beliefs in Islamic tenets that contrasts charity to ribā an-nasi’ah.  
The endogenous circuit is unique in that it addresses the inter-temporal liquidity shocks of its 
members despite funding being deployed on an interest-free basis.  We employ numerical 
simulation to appraise the economic efficiency of our interest-free facility with that of 
usurious payday loans and credit rationing by mainstream financier.  We find our interest-free 
facility is economic efficient [economic neutral] where the NPV exceeds [equals] that of 
competing solutions.   
It also performs favourably over its competitors.  The interest-free facility does not 
suffer from expropriation of wealth related with usurious facilities.  Members’ contributions 
that are linked to their income capacity promote asset building and long-run financial 
security.  Furthermore, the endogenous circuit permits credit access to credit rationed cohorts.  
Moreover, we demonstrate the economic viability of interest-free loans by boot strapping its 
resources to grow endogenously rather than being relegated to only philanthropic endeavours.  
The circuit also addresses the time inconsistent preferences of present payday loan borrowers 
by instituting commitment technologies that is peculiar to circuit-based structures.                    
The circuit cost efficiency is contingent on reducing default and transaction costs.  This 
involves instituting risk control measures that mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard.  
First, there must be equitable commitment, whereby the contributions and loan are stratified 
to the members’ income and circuit resources without jeopardising both parties’ financial 
interests.  Second, the contributions are directly deposited into the circuit to pre-empt 
irrational consumption tendencies.  Third, members undergo financial programs to enhance 
their financial capability.  Fourth, a co-signer is present in absence of standard collateral to 
reduce moral hazard and costly verification.  The structure of the circuit itself already 
minimises upfront transaction costs compared to current payday lenders, as it:  (i) has a non-
profit motive management force; (ii) benefits from internally generated funds; and (iii) is not 
compelled to issue investment returns to its ‘depositors’.      
The findings support policy objects of financial inclusion through provision of 
affordable credit.  Furthermore, the structure: (i) incorporates risk-based underwriting from 
the income and loan constraints; (ii) maximises technology and automation through direct 
deposit of the contributions from members’ income; (iii) promotes members’ financial 
capability and asset building by means of compulsory participation in financial programs and 
embedded savings.  Included in the essay is an indicative pricing mechanism for circuit based 
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structures.  This illustrates the pricing parameters that are critical to maintain self-sufficiency, 
which is an issue with most charitable institutions.           
1.3 Reinforcing resilience of the financial architecture with default-free collateralised 
loan 
In the third essay we study the perspective of collateralised loan to transmit financial 
fragility, which is contrary to established literature that identifies it as a mechanism to defray 
default risk and an aspect endeared under the economic rationale for the prohibition of ribā 
an-nasi’ah.  This is evident from the recent financial crisis where highly accredited 
securitised collateralised loans subsequently defaulted, which then led to a viral effect on 
other credit markets including repos.  We illustrate the pertinence of proper pricing of 
collateralised debt contracts on a financial intermediary asset transformation function, i.e., 
deposit taking activity and credit creation role.  This is done by modelling the payoffs of a 
pragmatically default-free solution with a default-prone one and its consequential effect on 
the intermediary’s deposit obligations.  We treat defaults as endogenous accruing to the 
agency cost of debt.  The conflict of interest between the financial intermediary (lender) and 
borrower (entrepreneur-manager) is represented by segregating the welfare of both parties. 
The endogeneity of agency cost in debt contracts results in potential financial 
disintermediation, i.e., breakdown in the asset transformation function.  Financial fragility is 
amplified in the case where these default-prone collateralised loans are further churned in 
securitisation and rehypothecation activities.  It is apparent that the churning of poorly 
structured collateralised loan only transfers but not absolve the embedded default risk arising 
from the agency cost of debt.  This corroborates the findings of Ebrahim and Hussain (2010) 
in that default-prone loan is at best economic neutral (not economically more efficient) to 
pragmatically default-free solution due to the agency cost of debt.  Its economic efficiency is 
particularly curtailed where the (i) recovery rate is stochastic; or (ii) salvage value from 
foreclosures is extremely low.  In this situation, a pragmatically default-free collateralised 
loan is the only economically efficient solution.  Our approach of segregating the welfare of 
interest between contracting parties is distinct from Myers (1984b) and Strebulaev (2007) 
who aggregates the welfare of the contracting parties. Thus, it fails to capture the conflict of 
interest in principal-agent arrangements, which leads to potentially misleading results in poor 
states of economy.   
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Structuring pragmatically default-free collateralised loan composes of stripping the put 
option to default by requiring the borrower to impute adequate equity, i.e., ‘skin in the game’ 
over all states of economy.  This minimises risk shifting tendencies and is consistent with 
Baltensperger (1978), Foote et al. (2008), and Archer and Smith (2013).      
Our findings have policy ramifications to reinforce resilience of the financial 
architecture.  Regulatory measures should emphasise the criticality of pricing pragmatically 
default-free loans to moderate financial fragility.  By reducing the put option to default it 
guarantees the integrity of deposits without the moral hazard attaching to deposit insurance 
scheme.  Additionally, pragmatically default-free collateralised loan structures mitigate 
systemic ruptures of highly networked financial system and avert costly bailouts.                    
2. Thesis limitation and suggestions for future research 
Generally, the fundamental aim of the religious injunction of ribā an-nasi’ah is for 
protection of property rights in deferred commutative exchanges between parties to contract.  
Thus, its scope is wider than the confines of interest-based (debt) contracts argued by Muslim 
jurists.  Although our model in the first essay is based on pure debt contracts, our capital 
structure approach can also be extended to other financial exchanges such as hybrid, pure 
equity or leasing structures, to identify whether these contracts are fallible to the three issues 
highlighted above.   
In the second essay on endogenous interest-free payday loan circuit, we adopt a simple 
framework of risk neutrality to derive close form solutions.  Although the model can be 
extended to risk-averse agents, we consciously decided otherwise.  Firstly, the circuit would 
need to satisfy a higher opportunity cost of fund in the economic efficiency condition.  This 
however does not cause any fundamental effect on the objects of the circuit.  Second, it limits 
the circuit financial reach given the need to satisfy a higher order of cost of funds.  This is 
contrary to the Islamic injunction on ribā an-nasi’ah that promotes charitable teachings.   
Funding for the circuit is generated from member based contributions which may 
require gestation period to accumulate substantive capital before it can be deployed.  To 
mitigate the lag from contribution collection to loan issuance, the circuit (i) may rely on seed 
funding from zakāt or sadaqah to supplement its initial capital base; or (ii) it can be 
integrated into an existing operational circuit, eg. financial cooperative.  The circuit may be 
exposed to exogenous shocks such as economic-wide slump that affects overall member 
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economic status.  To enhance its robustness, a potential strategy is to institute safety net akin 
to Verband, associative level of German cooperative banking system that provides liquidity 
relief in light of unforeseen shocks.       
Lastly in our endogenous interest-free payday loan model, we assume the aim of circuit 
members is to maximise accessibility to low cost credit in contrast to usurious payday loan or 
subjected to credit rationing.  Thus, investment returns or dividends on the accumulated 
contributions (savings) are not featured in the circuit.  This is best served by existing 
financial intermediaries. 
With respect to the third essay, it is written from a mainstream perspective in order to 
have a more impactful effect on academics, policy makers and practitioners.  Nonetheless, the 
essay’s underlying theme of moderating financial fragility within the system is still reflective 
of the economic rationale for the prohibition of ribā an-nasi’ah deduced from our first essay.  
Additionally, in the third essay we emphasise the economic efficiency of structuring 
pragmatically default-free loan, where the project payoffs exceed the loan obligations over all 
states of the economy with very high probability.  This recognises real world practicalities of 
structuring completely risk-free loan discussed in our first essay for the latter approaches 
agency cost issues from a theoretical perspective.   
In terms of future work, the first essay currently highlights the issues with pure interest-
based debt contracts from the perspective of the injunction on ribā an-nasi’ah.  However, this 
Islamic injunction essentially applies to any deferred commutative exchanges.  Thus, our 
capital structure approach can also be extended to other financial exchanges such as hybrid, 
pure equity or leasing structures, to identify whether these contracts are fallible to the issues 
of expropriation of wealth, financial fragility and financial exclusion that are observed in 
respect of interest-based financial contracts.  The study on the prohibition of ribā an-nasi’ah 
also invokes a closer scrutiny on the form of financial system that best serves society’s 
welfare, specifically due to the negative ramifications of the recent financial crisis.  The 
prevailing low policy rate rates due to Western economies quantitative easing regime (i.e., in 
some cases converging to nearly zero rates) raises the question whether there is possible 
convergence of Islamic and Western financial systems.   
Essays two and three endow us with a framework to investigate the efficiency of ar-
rahnu (pawn broking) facility that is widely practised in Malaysia for funding microtraders.  
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Here, the borrower (entrepreneur-manager) pawns his property in lieu of an interest-free loan 
(qard) from the lender (financial intermediary).  In contrast to mainstream practices, the 
intermediaries earn their revenue from the custodial services that is contingent on the 
collateral value and safe keeping tenure.  Currently, gold is the only medium of collateral 
accepted by the intermediaries.  The economic efficiency of ar-rahnu in comparison to 
competing mainstream pawn broking and other microfinance facilities provide an interesting 
case study that should contribute towards enhancing the financial policies of emerging 
economies.  With respect to the third essay on collateralised debt, it provides a framework for 
other research on the economic implication of trading of debt for debt (bai al dayn bi al dayn) 
and short selling, issues that are debatable in Islamic finance.  
In short, the PhD programme at Bangor University has given me a solid theoretical 
training and has broadened my horizon.  This should help me to contribute towards the goals 
of my employer, the Central Bank of Malaysia in the financial sector policy design 
particularly as Malaysia transitions into a high-value, high-income economy.     
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Appendix 
Has the Prohibition of Ribā An-Nasi’ah 
Hindered Economic Development of the 
Muslim World 
A. Proofs 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
(i) In our risk-free setting, the underlying assets of the project are of high quality and are 
not susceptible to severe deterioration in their payoffs.  This allows the entrepreneur-
manager to honour her loan obligation (with interest) in all states of the economy.  This 
result is consistent with the prognosis of Shleifer and Vishny (1992). 
(ii) Equation (10a) is derived from Equations (3a), (7a), (8) and (9). 
(iii) Equation (11a) is derived from Equations (4a), (8) and (9). Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
(i) (a) A risky loan is characterised by defaults in some state of the economy in the future; 
In (b) and (c), the interest rate contracted for the risky loan and its debt ratio are greater 
than that of the risk-free alternative, which is reflective of an upward slopping supply 
curve.  In a risky loan setting, the entrepreneur-manager prefers a high debt ratio, while 
the lender (financier) seeks extra compensation for the increased risk exposure. 
(ii) Equation (10b) is derived using Equations (3b), (7b), (8) and (9). 
(iii) Equation (11b) is derived using Equations (4b), (8) and (9). Q.E.D. 
Proof of Theorem: 
The Rational Expectations Equilibrium in Propositions 1 − 2 are impacted differentially 
by the endogenous agency costs of debt.  
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(i) The Amalgamation of the Pecking Order Theory with Static Trade-off Theory: 
The risky loan and asset pricing conditions (Equations (10b) and (11b)) comprise of: (i) 
default states of the economy (at or below the critical ‘Z’ state of the economy); and (ii) 
normal states.  In the default states, the lender takes over the project to salvage the 
outstanding debt value.  The lender’s ability to full compensation is nonetheless 
encumbered by the presence of direct and indirect bankruptcy costs (eg. adjudication 
costs, value lost from asset fire sale), which limit the recovery to only a fraction (k) of 
the project’s payoffs (as indicated by the line FG in Figure 2).  This is in contrast to the 
normal state of the economy (as indicated by the line BH in Figure 2), where the lender 
receives the full contractual payments of the debt.  In equilibrium, this endogenous 
agency cost of debt, arising from the transmission of project risk to lender, along with 
costs of default, are accounted for in the pricing of debt.  This is borne by the 
entrepreneur-manager in the form of higher interest rates in contrast to a risk-free loan 
(see Equation 10b). 
Any debt capacity decision is largely influenced by the liquidation value of the funded 
project.  It thus requires the project’s underlying assets to hold value that fulfils the 
Basic Condition of Proposition 1 of min. (q
1j
+P
1j
) > 0.  Since default costs are 
transmitted by the lender to the entrepreneur-manager (see Equation 10b), the latter’s 
welfare is lower with a risky debt.  This ensues from the fact that risky debt is welfare 
reducing, as the borrower loses his prime asset (i.e., the project) in the poor states of the 
economy (below the critical state ‘Z’).  Furthermore, equilibria with risky loans are 
feasible only when the agency cost of debt associated with default costs (as indicated 
by the quadrilateral AFBG in Figure 2) are not excessive.  In contrast, equilibria with 
risk-free loans are feasible even when those with risky loans are unfeasible.  In this 
context, risky loan equilibria, if feasible, are at best economic neutral to risk-free 
financing facilities.  This concurs with Myers (1977) who attributes agency cost of debt 
to underinvestment issue, whereby firms refrain from undertaking projects with positive 
net present value if the benefit of the project accrues to the lender on default. 
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(ii) Embedded potential for expropriation of wealth in risky debt facilities: 
There is potential for expropriating wealth of either the lender or entrepreneur-manager 
if the equilibrium interest rate is outside the interval given by Equation (12) with the 
potential of generating non-sustainable equilibrium in the long-run.  That is: 
i  <  0, or (13a) 
i  >  runleveraged (13b) 
(iii) Risky debt facilities imbue financial fragility: 
Low risk aversion levels and default costs lead to economic neutrality of risky loans.  
This instigates financial instability, whereby failure of the entrepreneur-manager to 
honour its financial claims causes a rippling effect of credit defaults.  Its severity is 
dependent on the degree of interconnectedness of the financial sector (as illustrated in 
Figure 3).  
(iv) Financial exclusion in the credit market: 
An equilibrium entails the fulfilment of all three conditions in Propositions 1 or/and 2.  
In a situation where there is total breakdown of the market clearing conditions, this 
leads to financial autarky of the borrower.  Drawing from Jensen and Meckling’s 
(1976), the entrepreneur-manager will be left to absorb the detrimental impact of agency 
cost of debt.  
Q.E.D. 
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Can an interest-free credit facility be more 
efficient than a usurious payday loan? 
 
A. Proof  
We employ conditional probability premised on Bayes’ rule with notations B: Borrow 
and NB: No Borrow, respectively to derive at: 
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Glossary of Arabic terms 
ar-rahnu Pawn broking 
bai al dayn bi al 
dayn 
Trading of debt for debt 
bi-al-batil Literally ‘without right’.  It implies expropriating people’s assets 
unjustly. 
hikmah Rationale 
hilah Legal stratagem 
ijtihad Literally ‘exertion’.  It implies independent deduction of laws not 
self-evident from the primary sources, namely the Qur’ān and 
Sunnah. 
‘illah Effective cause, or ratio legis, of a particular ruling 
madrasah Religious school 
mudarabah Passive partnership contract between capital provider and investor 
(entrepreneur-manager) where profits are shared on a pre-agreed 
ratio, whilst losses are borne by the former.   
qādi Judge 
qard Interest-free loan 
Qur’ān The holy book of Islam 
ribā An injunction protecting property rights.  This is generally 
misinterpreted as usury or interest. 
ribā al-fadl  This is termed as hidden ribā.  It is an injunction to deter 
expropriation of assets on spot exchanges.  
ribā an-nasi’ah This is termed as evident ribā.  It is generally an injunction to deter 
expropriation of assets on deferred exchanges.  It also mitigates 
financial fragility and the exclusion of underprivileged from 
financial services. 
sadaqah  Voluntary offering or alms from a person’s wealth.  
salaf Interest-free loan over a pre-fixed duration. Also synonymous with 
qard (see above) 
shari’ah Islamic law 
sunnah The body of traditional, social and legal custom and practice of the 
Islamic community. Along with the Qur’ān and Hadith (recorded 
sayings of the Prophet Muhammad), it is a major source of 
Shari’ah, or Islamic law. 
takāful Derived from the Arabic word ‘kafala’, which literally means ‘to 
guarantee’.  It denotes an agreement between parties to indemnify 
another on occurrence of the said event. 
usūl fiqh Encompasses the sources of Islamic law, their order of priority, and 
methods applied in deduction of the sources.  
waqf Philantrophic foundations (awqāf, plural). 
zakāt Literally ‘cleansing or purity’.  It implies a religious tax to be 
deducted from one’s wealth to help the needy.  
 
